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ABSTRACT

THEORY OF SUBJECTIFICATION IN GILLES DELEUZE:
A STUDY OF THE TEMPORALITY IN CAPITALISM

By
Boram Jeong
August 2017

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Fred Evans and Dr. Éric Alliez
This dissertation looks at time as a socially or psychologically imposed ‘structure’
that determines the ways in which past, present and future are weaved together in the
subject. This inquiry presents (1) a critical role of temporality in the formation of the subject,
(2) a specific temporality characteristic of contemporary financial capitalism, and (3) the
pathologies of time found in the subjects of capitalism. The first two chapters provide an
extensive analysis of Deleuze’s passive syntheses of time given in Difference and Repetition,
which reveals the subject’s passive relation to time as a structure of ‘becoming.’ The
following chapters examine how this ontological structure of time interacts with socioeconomic temporalities in its production of the subject. I particularly focus on the temporal
structure of debt, which has become a general condition of the subjects in the current
economic system. I claim that the debt-based economy produces ‘melancholic subjectivity,’
characterized by a dominance of the past and the inhibition of becoming.

iv

DEDICATION

To my parents, to whom I am infinitely indebted.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to first express my most sincere gratitude and appreciation to my director, Fred
Evans, for his incredible support, encouragement and friendship. I must also thank my codirector, Éric Alliez, for his insightful feedback, guidance and extraordinary generosity. I
am deeply grateful for the extremely helpful contributions and intellectual inspiration
provided by the two other members of the committee at Duquesne, Jay Lampert and Daniel
Selcer. I would also like to acknowledge the thoughtful input offered by my external readers,
Leonard Lawlor, Tamsin Lorraine and Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc.
In addition, many thanks go out to the Philosophy Department at Duquesne
University and École doctorale Pratique et théories du sens at Université Paris 8 for their
administrative support, which allowed me the privilege of earning a dual degree. For their
financial support including the dissertation fellowship, I am grateful to the McAnulty
College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts. I would also like to thank Ronald Polansky,
Joan Thompson and Kelly Arenson, whose guidance and generosity were invaluable in
making my job search successful. I extend my heartfelt gratitude to David H. Kim for his
exceptional support, intellectual guidance and faith in me. Thanks also to Constantin V.
Boundas for encouraging me to publish an earlier version of the chapter on time and
capitalism in Deleuze Studies.
Finally, I would like to thank my dear friends and family, whose love sustained me
and kept me sane throughout my graduate studies. I will never forget the groceries, the care
packages and good laughs brought to me by them in hard times. Special thanks to J for
walking alongside me on this journey.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction: Time, Subject and Capital .................................................................................. 1
I. Time and Movement: Deleuze’s Critique of ‘Time Subordinated to Movement’ .................... 5
1. Zeno’s Paradox: Confusion of time with space ................................................................. 6
2. Bergson’s view of movement and time ............................................................................. 10
2.1 Bergson’s theory of multiplicities ............................................................................ 10
2.2 Bergson’s analysis of movement ............................................................................. 13
3. Deleuze’s view on time and movement: Subordination of time to movement .................... 18
3.1 Time in antiquity: Circular movement ....................................................................... 19
3.2 Time as a succession of instants ................................................................................. 22
3.3 Time as an empty form.............................................................................................. 27
4. Deleuze’s notion of time: Temporalized difference ........................................................... 31
4.1. Time and the notion of difference: Time as self-differentiation.................................... 32
4.2. Time as internal difference: Auto-affection ................................................................ 39
II. Time and Subjectivity: Deleuze’s Three Syntheses of Time .................................................. 48
1. Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s syntheses .............................................................................. 52
2. The Passive Syntheses of Time: The Formation of the Subject .......................................... 68
2.1 Time and Subjectification: Memory as Auto-affection................................................. 68
2.2 The first synthesis of habit: Originary subjectivity ....................................................... 72
2.3 Second synthesis of memory: Bergson’s pure past – the unconscious ........................... 79
2.4 Third synthesis of the future ...................................................................................... 93
3. Time and the Production of the Subject ........................................................................... 106
3.1 The virtual as a new transcendental: Critique of the ‘possible’ ..................................... 106
3.2 Subjectification in time .............................................................................................. 108
III. Time in Contemporary Capitalism: A System of Debt ........................................................ 111
1. Time and Capitalism ...................................................................................................... 113
1.1 Time and the movement of capital ............................................................................. 113
1.2 Deleuze’s reading of Marx through Suzanne de Brunhoff............................................ 117
1.3 The power of financial capital: Fictitious capital ......................................................... 128
2. Force of time: Temporal Structure of Debt ....................................................................... 134
2.1 Time value of money: Time subordinated to monetary movement............................... 135
2.2 Debt and Memory..................................................................................................... 141
IV. The Production of Melancholic Subjects: Subjectification through Debt .............................. 147
1. The Problem of Subjectification in Deleuze...................................................................... 148
1.1 Foucault-Deleuze Encounter: Power and Subject Formation....................................... 148
1.2 Subjectification in A Thousand Plateaus: Capital as a point of subjectification ................ 155
2. Subjectification in the time of debt ................................................................................... 160
2.1 Debt as an instrument of power: From subjectification to subjection ............................ 161
2.2 Subjectification through debt: Melancholic temporality............................................... 166
3. The Production of Melancholic Subjects: The Passive Syntheses Revisited ........................ 170
3.1 Memory of debt: Bare repetition of the past ................................................................ 171
3.2 Temporality of ‘no longer’: Failed synthesis of the future ............................................ 176
3.3. Capital and the inhibition of becoming: Debt as the ‘memory of the future’ ................ 182
Conclusion: Financial Melancholia ......................................................................................... 187
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 191

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
1.

Zeno’s First Paradox of Motion ………………………………………………............... 7

2.

Aristotle’s Model of Universe (Engraving from Peter Apian’s Cosmographie (1524)
Newberry Library, Chicago)….………………………………………………………… 15

3.

Descartes’s Proportional Compass …………...…………………………………………. 15

4.

E. J. Marey, Saut à la perche (1890) ………………………………………...…………… 17

5.

Bergson’s Inverted Cone of Memory ……………………...…………………………… 82

6.

The Bifurcation of the Present …………………………………………………............. 88

7.

The Circular Image of Time ………………………………………………….………… 98

8.

The Straight Line of Time: Self-differentiation of Memory ……………….………… 100

viii

LIST OF TABLES
1.

Spatial and Temporal Difference………………………………...……...……………... 34

2.

Levels of Repetition……………………………………………………………………... 75

3.

The Virtual and the Actual ……………………………………….……….……………. 85

ix

ABBREVIATIONS
AO

Deleuze, Gilles & Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. trans.
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press,1983. Citations to this work will be accompanied by pagination to
Deleuze, Gilles & Félix Guattari. Capitalisme et schizophrénie tome 1: L’Anti-Œdipe,
Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1972.

B

Deleuze, Gilles. Bergsonism. trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New
York: Zone Books, 2006. Citations to this work will be accompanied by pagination
to Deleuze, Gilles. Le Bergsonisme. Paris: PUF, 1966.

C1

Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara
Habberjam. London: The Athlone Press, 1983. Citations to this work will be
accompanied by pagination to Deleuze, Gilles. Cinéma 1, L’image-mouvement. Paris:
Les Éditions de Minuit, 1983.

C2

Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert
Galeta. London: The Athlone Press, 1989. Citations to this work will be
accompanied by pagination to Deleuze, Gilles. Cinéma 2, L’Image-temps. Paris: Les
Éditions de Minuit, 1985.

DR

Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1994. Citations to this work will be accompanied by pagination to
Deleuze, Gilles. Différence et Répétition. Paris: PUF, 1968.

F

Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. trans. Sean Hand, Minneapolis and London: Continuum,
1988. Citations to this work will be accompanied by pagination to Deleuze, Gilles.
Foucault. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1986.

NP

Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche and Philosophy. trans. Hugh Tomlinson. New York:
Continuum, 1986. Citations to this work will be accompanied by pagination to
Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche et la philosophie. Paris: PUF, 1962.

PCK Deleuze, Gilles. Kant’s Critical Philosophy. trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara
Habberjam. London: The Athlone Press, 1984. Citations to this work will be
accompanied by pagination to Deleuze, Gilles. La Philosophie Critique de Kant. Paris:
PUF, 1963.
MP

Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.
Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
Citations to this work will be accompanied by pagination to Deleuze, Gilles and
Félix Guattari. Capitalisme et schizophrénie tome 2: Mille plateaux. Paris: Éditions de
Minuit, 1980.

x

Introduction: Time, Subject and Capital
Over the past thirty years, the suicide rate in Korea increased from a rate of 6.8 to 28.4 per
100,000. In the attempt to lower the rate, the government recently installed suicide-watch
cameras on the popular suicide bridges, along with encouraging messages such as “the most
shining moment of your life has yet to come.”1 Despite the variety of the causes, it is hardly
coincidental that this country also holds the highest ratio of household debt to income as
well as the most credit cards per capita in the world. Suicide is often committed out of
realization of the complete loss of ownership of the time to come, that is, when one feels
that it is the only decision actively to make for (and against) oneself. We can say that
suicide, as the most radical attempt to resign from one’s life to come, is caused by a failure
to live in accord with temporality. For those who are in debt that multiplies infinitely over
time, time promises only to accelerate debt growth. Suicides caused by the pressure of
growing debt links the subject’s perception of time and the economic system, capitalism. In
fact, we need not look as far as to the cases of suicide to prove the relationship. The majority
of economic subjects in contemporary capitalism live with debt from credit cards and taking
out loans and mortgages, which impact greatly on the perception of time. Although debt has
existed in other types of economic systems, it appears that it has now become ‘a way of life’
generally in contemporary financial capitalism. Therefore, it is of great significance to
investigate this new, capitalist form of temporality.
My research aims to show that there is a certain temporality characteristic of
contemporary capitalism and that it is through participating in this temporality that a

1

http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/11/08/seoul-bridge-of-life-still-attracts-suicide-attempts/
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capitalist subject is produced. To carry out this inquiry, I examine traditional reflections on
the relationship between time and the subject, where time is considered to be a category
through which the subject actively shapes her experience. Then I turn to the reversal of this
relationship in the contemporary discourse, according to which time takes a crucial role in
the constitution of the subject, namely, “subjectification.” Based on the significance of time
in the subjectification process, I finally show how temporal dimensions – present, past and
future – relate to the production of the capitalist subject. Here I focus specifically on the
failure of recognizing futurity in one’s subjectivity in the subjectification process through
debt. Therefore, the following questions will be posed throughout this dissertation: (1) What
is the role of temporality in the formation of the subject? (2) What is distinctive about
contemporary financial capitalism? How could the temporality of capitalism be
characterized accordingly? (3) What are the possible symptoms or pathologies of time found
in the subjects of capitalism?
The notion of temporality in philosophy has always been in a paradoxical
relationship with subjectivity. On the one hand, time is dependent upon the subject, in the
sense that it is a condition through which the subject experiences the world; it is a
metaphysical category that determines our experience. On the other hand, the subject is
subjected to time in the determination of the self. That is to say, the subject herself is in time.
I will argue that the traditional view of time concerns mostly the former aspect. This way of
understanding time was often related to physical time, that is, time as “the number of
motion.”2 However, with the emergence of psychoanalysis and the intellectual
developments in the 20th century, later known as post-structuralism, the latter aspect of
Aristotle, Physics iv, 219a30-b2, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Revised Oxford Edition, Vol.1, Edited by
Jonathan Barnes, Translated by R.P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (Princeton: Princeton University, 1995)
2
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temporality became more prominent. This is due to the fact that the idea of the subject built
upon identity was called into question; a subject is no longer conceived as a unity of
consciousness or a substance that underlies change. Rather, it is produced over time, as an
effect of unconscious, involuntary and inconsistent elements. Here, time is what constantly
threatens the identity that a subject attributes to herself. This introduced complex
relationships into temporal dimensions: the past and the present in the subject formation are
understood neither as a linear structure nor as a simple causality. Present perception is
shadowed by memory.
Among the important responses to this “crisis” of the modern subject, Gilles
Deleuze’s theory of “passive synthesis” is of particular interest. As a reworking of Kant’s
three syntheses (apprehension, reproduction, and recognition), which suggests the active
synthesis of time that an already constructed subject experiences on the level of
consciousness, Deleuze’s passive synthesis offers a genetic account of the subject formation.
Time in this sense is not simply a metaphysical category or form of our experience, but a
productive force of “subjectification.” Finally, I attempt to show the peculiarity of the
temporal structure in the formation of the capitalist subject. Building upon the observations
on contemporary capitalism in Deleuze’s later works, I shall try to demonstrate how this
macro-level social structure influences the micro-level process of subjectification. We will
first look at Deleuze’s reading of Marx’s theory of money, with a particular focus on his
discussion of financial capital and credit-debt. Then I show how time subordinated to
monetary movement functions as a structure under which the subject is produced by
analyzing the temporality of ‘indebtedness.’ I will claim the temporal structure of debt

3

produces a ‘melancholic subjectivity,’ characterized as a dominance of the past and a
preempted future.
This dissertation will contribute to Deleuze studies because it will propose a novel
interpretation of Deleuze’s account of time in relation to the process of subjectification.
Deleuze’s three syntheses of time, corresponding to three dimensions of time (present, past
and future), have widely been thought of simply as a theory of time. I will show that it is not
only an account of time but also a new theory of the subject based on the notion of the
“fractured I.” Moreover, my work draws a link between seemingly disparate works of
Deleuze. Deleuze scholarship currently divides into the studies on the early works and those
on his later works written in collaboration with Félix Guattari. Hence it fails to address the
continuity of his thought. In this project, I shall show by highlighting the significance of
temporality in the production of the capitalist subject that Deleuze’s theory of time
appearing in his early works connects closely to his later project on ‘capitalism and
schizophrenia.’ I will also explore contemporary implications of his thought by showing
that the psychological disturbances commonly found in the advanced capitalism need to be
understood in this temporal structure.

4

I. Time and Movement: Deleuze’s Critique of ‘Time Subordinated to Movement’
In this chapter, I will demonstrate how Deleuze’s theory of time is developed through
his understanding of the relationship between time and movement in the history of
philosophy. The first two sections elucidate that Deleuze’s view of time and movement is
rooted in Henri Bergson’s. The first part of the chapter will explain what Deleuze finds
problematic in the traditional notions of time. Since Deleuze’s emphasis on the significance
of time in itself comes from his reading of Bergson, we will first see Bergson’s attempt to
restore the nature of time, which has only been ‘symbolically represented in space’3 by the
predecessors in philosophy. In doing so, I present Deleuze’s reading of Bergson’s notion of
time as a qualitative multiplicity. Deleuze pursues Bergson’s problem of defining time
positively without being projected on space, namely as a qualitative multiplicity rather than
a means of counting the number of movements. The last two sections will be dedicated to
investigate Deleuze’s own view of time. I will argue that Deleuze’s critique of time
subordinated to movement is a critique of the idea of ‘repetition’ that underlies the ancient
and modern notions of time. I show that Deleuze redefines time in terms of difference, more
precisely as ‘self-differentiation,’ by synthesizing Bergson’s concept of duration and Kant’s
definition of time as a form of ‘auto-affection.’ The newly defined time freed from
movement prepares us for the problems that we will examine in the following chapters: a
different understanding of the relationship between time and the subject (Chapter II) and the
notion of time in capitalism and its relation with the movement of capital (Chapter III).

“[P]ure duration is wholly qualitative. It cannot be measured unless symbolically represented in space”
(Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. trans. F. L. Pogson (New York:
Harper, 1960), 105).
3
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1. Zeno’s Paradox: Confusion of time with space
“I know of one Greek labyrinth which is a single straight line. Along that line so many
philosophers have lost themselves that a mere detective might well do so, too.
Scharlach, when in some other incarnation you hunt me, pretend to commit (or do
commit) a crime at A, then a second crime at B, eight kilometers from A, then a third
crime at C, four kilometers from A and B, half-way between the two. Wait for me
afterwards at D, two kilometers from A and C, again halfway between both. Kill me at
D as you now are going to kill me at Triste-le-Roy.”4
Time becomes a pure straight line. It reminds me of Borges, the true labyrinth is the
straight line. When time becomes a straight line, what does that mean and what change
does that imply?5
In his short story called “Death and the compass,” Borges speaks about labyrinth
through the main character. What he refers to as the labyrinth that is a straight line is
evidently the paradoxes of Zeno, given the following story of the points A, B, C, D. Deleuze
takes up this language of “a single straight line” from Borges and use it to suggest a novel
way of conceiving time. In fact, Zeno’s paradox is a good place to start to look into the
relationship of time and movement, which Deleuze consistently problematizes. But in
which sense is a straight line the true labyrinth? What was time like before it was thought of
as a straight line? What does it mean for time to become a straight line? In what follows, we
will examine some of the presuppositions in Zeno’s paradox regarding the relationship
between time and movement and how they resonate with Deleuze’ critique of the traditional
notion of time. Then I will try to demonstrate the new form of time Deleuze suggests by
introducing the “pure straight line.”
Let us first take a close look at the paradoxes of Zeno. Zeno discusses the four famous
paradoxes of motion and a paradox of plurality. We will be focusing on two of the former.

Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Death and the compass,’ in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings (New Directions,
2007), 86.
5 “Lecture on Kant (Cours Vincennes: synthèse et temps) - March, 21, 1978,” Les Cours de Gilles Deleuze,
http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=58&groupe=Kant&langue=1
4
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The first paradox, ‘the dichotomy’ concerns the problem of the sum of infinite series.

Figure 1. Zeno’s first paradox of motion

According to Zeno, when an object is moving from point A to point B, it has to arrive at the
half point between A and B (A’) before traversing the whole distance between them. Then
again, it must arrive at the quarter point (A’’) before it reaches the half point between A and
B (A’) and ad infinitum.6 Thus Zeno argues that the object can never reach the point B. The
second paradox ‘Achilles’ involves a race between Achilles and the tortoise. 7 The tortoise
has a head start. Zeno argues that Achilles is never able to overtake the tortoise. This is so
because by the time he catches up the distance between the tortoise and him, the tortoise
will have advanced further. When Achilles reaches this new point, the tortoise again will
have moved ahead. Even if the distance between them can become shorter, it cannot be
reduced to nothing. This is a paradox since we cannot explain how Achilles can reach the
tortoise, although we know empirically that an object does move from A to B and that
Achilles can catch up the tortoise.
In the first paradox, the problem concerns the relationship between parts and wholes.
Aristotle, Physics VI: 9, 239b9-14 in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Revised Oxford Edition, Vol.1, Edited by
Jonathan Barnes, Translated by R.P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (Princeton: Princeton University, 1995)
7 Simplicius 1013.35-1015.2: “The [second] argument was called ‘Achilles,’ accordingly, from the fact that
Achilles was taken [as a character] in it, and the argument says that it is impossible for him to overtake the
tortoise when pursuing it. For in fact it is necessary that what is to overtake [something], before overtaking [it],
first reach the limit from which what is fleeing set forth. In [the time in] which what is pursuing arrives at this,
what is fleeing will advance a certain interval, even if it is less than that which what is pursuing advanced”
(Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 6, trans. D. Konstan (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 1989)).
6
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The distance between A and B may be divided into infinite parts and these infinite parts
cannot sum to a finite whole. In the second, the issue is the relationship between space and
time, both of which Zeno believed to be infinitely divisible. That is, by the temporal instant
in which Achilles reaches the aimed position of tortoise in space, the tortoise will have
already moved. It concerns the problem of coordinating two series in an infinitely divisible
space and an infinitely divisible time.
Among the thinkers who have attempted to resolve the paradoxes, the one that interests
us particularly is Henri Bergson, since he examines the underlying assumptions in the
paradoxes regarding the nature of motion and space.8 The point of his argument is that the
paradoxes arise due to the confusion between motion in time and space. That is to say,
motion that occurs in time is different from homogeneous space in its nature, thus it cannot
be reconstructed with traversed space. Bergson claims that “[t]he mistake of the Eleatics
arises from their identification of this series of acts, each of which is of a definite kind and
indivisible, with the homogeneous space which underlies them.”9 In the first demonstration
of Zeno’s paradox above, we see the problem lies in the infinite divisibility of a quantity.
Here the motion between the point A and the point B is understood in terms of parts of the
interval between them. Since the interval is thought to be infinitely divisible it is logically
impossible for it to be traversed. However, according to Bergson, the motion cannot be
translated into an infinitely divisible quantitative multiplicity, i.e., the interval in space, since
it occurs in time. What makes space divisible is its homogeneity and externality. Unlike the

For Bergson’s refutation of Zeno’s paradox, see Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell (New York:
Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1911); Alba Papa-Grimaldi, “Why mathematical solutions of zeno’s paradoxes
miss the point: Zeno’s one and many relation and Parmenides’ prohibition,” The Review of Metaphysics 50
(December 1996): 299-314.
9 Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. trans. F. L. Pogson (New York:
Harper, 1960),113.
8
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traversed space, motion in time as a qualitative multiplicity does not consist of homogenous
units. The homogeneous space can be divided and put together again but each of Achilles’s
steps is a distinct, indivisible act. In the motion in time there are not any moments that are
identical or external to one another. In short, the paradox occurs as a result of conceiving
time as homogeneous medium. That motion as temporal duration is immediately given as
wholes resolves the first paradox, and that it cannot be coordinated with an infinitely
divisible space resolves the second paradox.
Further, Bergson makes a more general claim that this way of understanding movement
as that which is reduced to space, has been dominant throughout the history of
metaphysics.10 In the lecture ‘Perception of Change,’ he claims:
Metaphysics, as a matter of fact, was born of the arguments of Zeno of Elea on the
subject of change and movement. It was Zeno who, by drawing attention to the
absurdity of what he called movement and change, led the philosophers – Plato first and
foremost – to seek the true and coherent reality in what does not change.11
Bergson believes that Zeno, by reducing motion to the traversed space, fails to understand
the nature of time and movement. According to him, time in metaphysics is often conceived
of as a homogenous medium analogous to space, with its qualitative and durational nature
eliminated. He calls this a ‘spatialization’ of time. It is because time was spatialized that the
metaphysical inquiries tend toward ‘the unchangeable’ behind change or movement.
Whether Bergson’s critique is a fair critique of metaphysics is not without controversy, but
my primary concern here is to look into what Bergson suggests as the nature of time that is
irreducible to space.
This is, of course, not to say that our experience of time is separable from that of space. Our experience of
time mostly involves action, which is played out in space. Bergson’s point is, rather, that motion in time
cannot be reconstructed from the distance traversed. We will look more closely at how the ‘spatialization’
occurs in the following section.
11 Henri Bergson, “Perception of Change,” in The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle
L. Andison (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2007), 107-132, 117.
10
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2. Bergson’s view of movement and time
2.1 Bergson’s theory of multiplicities
Bergson’s characterization of spatialized time is crucial to understanding Deleuze’s
notion of time that we will see in the next section. Bergson shows that there is an essential
aspect of time that cannot be captured by the idea of spatialized time, which he will call
duration.12 His account of duration demonstrates the difference in nature between space and
time. As seen above, the divisibility of the traversed distance comes from homogeneity and
externality of space. In contrast to these spatial qualities, Bergson attributes heterogeneity
and internality to time as duration. He then distinguishes two types of multiplicity, which
correspond to the material objects in space and the states of consciousness in time. With this
distinction Bergson explains why we tend to miss the durational nature of time by
conceiving time as homogeneous medium in our ordinary experience.
In L’Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience [English title: Time and Free Will: An
Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness], a response to Kant’s view on time and free will,
Bergson shows how the problem of free will can be resolved by understanding time
differently. Bergson argues that Kant separated the phenomenal world from the thing-initself, defining the former as the world determined by causality. Therefore, Kant had to
place free will outside the phenomenal self. Bergson emphasizes the qualitative nature of
time, which he claims Kant dismissed, by drawing the difference between discrete

Bergson conceives ‘lived time’ as duration (durée réelle), as opposed to scientific time. He defines pure
duration as “the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when
it refrains from separating its present state from its former states” (Time and Free Will, 100). I call it an ‘aspect’
of time in the sense that we experience time in different modalities; there is time internally experienced in
consciousness, and time onto which our understanding of spatial world is mapped. See the example of
‘walking across the room’ in Jay Lampert, Simultaneity and Delay: a Dialectical Theory of Staggered Time (New
York: Continuum, 2012), 125.
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multiplicity and continuous multiplicity.13 As seen in the subtitle of the book, his theory of
multiplicities aims to distinguish two very different sorts of ‘the given (manifold)’ in the
consciousness. He suggests that we understand the material objects as discrete/quantitative
multiplicities, as opposed to continuous/qualitative multiplicities to which he relates the
states of consciousness. Bergson begins with the former, specifically with the discussion of
numbers. According to him, numbers are one and many (or, unity and multiplicity) in that
each of them is both a unit and a collection of units. With the example of a flock of sheep,
Bergson shows that numerical/ quantitative multiplicity is spatial and homogeneous; he
asks whether we count them by repeating the images of a single sheep in time or by putting
all the images together in one ideal space. He claims that when counting, we see each of
them as a unit by dismissing individual differences, in which case what differentiate them
are the positions they occupy in space. According to Bergson, “[w]e involuntarily fix at a
point in space each of the moments which we count, and it is only on this condition that the
abstract units come to form a sum.”14 Thus even when we believe we count the moments in
time, we in fact count the positions in space. What characterizes the quantitative/ discrete
multiplicity is homogeneity and externality.
In contrast, there are no moments in the states of consciousness that are external to
one another. Bergson notes that the different states of consciousness permeate one another
even when they seem to be in succession. I can describe a series of successive events in a
linear fashion; I went to bed last night, and woke up to a nightmare, then drank coffee. The
different states of consciousness that make up of this series of events are not discrete

Deleuze later calls this as numerical and quantitative multiplicity as opposed to qualitative multiplicity in his
lecture “Théorie des multiplicités chez Bergson,” in Deleuze Epars, eds. Gilles Deleuze, André Bernold &
Richard Pinhas (Paris: Hermann, 2005).
14 Bergson, Time and Free Will. 79.
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moments. It is hard to say when exactly I fell asleep, or began to realize that I was dreaming
by separating one moment from another. About our life events as well, it is hard to say
when I became dependent on caffeine, or when I began to understand the meaning of my
childhood incidents. Also, some dream images permeate my waking life, and some
memories from my childhood permeate the present moment. The states of consciousness,
instead of being external to one another, form a whole that can only be thought in terms of
qualitative difference.
We can also see that change is indivisible when we think of listening to a melody. If it
stops sooner than it is supposed to, it is not the same whole.15 This is not simply a matter of
the part that is missing. We hear melody, not by putting different notes together but as a
continuous flow that forms a whole while the previous notes are continually interacting with
the present note. Since time is not a homogeneous medium in this sense, duration in time
cannot be divided without going through a qualitative change. Thus Bergson calls this type
of multiplicity a continuous multiplicity. The reason why the states of consciousness seem to
be external to one another to us is because we fix each of them to the positions of the images
in space. Another example Bergson gives to demonstrate this point is the movement of
pendulum; when we observe the movement, we tend to understand the flow of different
conscious states in terms of the corresponding positions of the pendulum. In doing so, we
form a habit of distinguishing the successive moments of our consciousness as if they are
external parts to one another. Bergson writes that “the conception of an empty
homogeneous medium is […] a kind of reaction against that heterogeneity which is the very

15

Bergson, “Perception of Change,” 122-123.
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ground of our experience.”16 According to Bergson, this habit formation serves a practical
purpose. We break up duration or change into discontinuous states since it enables us to act
upon things.17 For the same reason, we assume underneath the change an invariable object
that moves.18 This is how we reduce duration in time to the movement in position.
2.2 Bergson’s analysis of movement
In his later works, Bergson elaborates more on the durational nature of time. In Creative
Evolution, he shows how the confusion of movement with traversed space has led to
spatializing time in the history of philosophy. Deleuze will develop this later as a critique of
‘time subordinated to movement,’ and claim that time needs to be distinguished from what
happens in it. Deleuze, in the first chapter of Cinema 1: The Movement-Image as well as his
lectures on cinema, summarizes Bergson’s theses on movement as what follows:
1. We cannot reconstitute movement with positions in space or instants in time.
2. There are two different ways of reconstituting movement with instants. In antiquity,
it was privileged instants (des instants privilégiés), but after the modern scientific
revolution, it became any-moment-whatevers (l’instant quelconque).
3. The instant is an immobile section of movement and movement is a mobile section
of duration, the whole.
The first thesis concerns the confusion between movement and the space covered. As we
have seen above, Bergson’s argument relies on the divisibility of the space as opposed to the
indivisibility of movement in time. Deleuze points out that this implies another claim that
“you cannot reconstitute movement with positions in space or instants in time: that is, with
immobile sections («coupes» immobiles)” (C1, 1/9). This sort of attempt fails for the following

Bergson, Time and Free Will, 97.
We will return to the question habit and its relation to our practical need for action in the next chapter,
where we discuss the relationship between perception and memory.
18 Bergson, “Perception of Change,” 122.
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reasons: first, we can put as many positions together as possible, but movement cannot be
captured since it always happens in the interval. Second, we can divide time infinitely, but
however close the two instants can be we cannot capture movement since it occurs in
duration. Bergson calls this “the cinematographic illusion,” in the sense that cinema
presents a false movement by making the instantaneous sections pass consecutively.
The second thesis regarding the difference between this ‘illusion’ in the ancient and the
modern is worth a close examination since it shows Bergson’s critique of the traditional
understanding of movement and time. He thinks that in antiquity, movement was
understood in terms of some privileged moments or privileged positions; it was conceived as
a transition from one form to another. This may appear to be an almost too general, even
unfair description of the ancient thinkers, especially considering the wide spectrum of
positions regarding change and movement from the Presocratics to the Stoics. What
Bergson actually has in mind seems to be Aristotle’s view of time and movement. Since
Forms or Ideas themselves are not in movement or change,19 we always miss something
about movement if we construct time and movement with a sequence of positions or forms.
For instance, we could describe the movement of a running horse as a shift between two
forms – a form of the horse in its maximum muscular contraction and its maximum
expansion. But this is in fact explaining movement from the two positions or forms that are
derived from the continuous movement retrospectively, as a ‘frozen’ moment.20 These instants
extracted from movement are themselves motionless.
In his lecture on Bergson and cinema, Deleuze explains this through Aristotle’s
Forms in Plato or Aristotle’s God as an unmoved mover are motionless and only have movements of pure
thinking. If change is a matter moving from one form to another, what moves would be the matter that is
actualized by going through the change in forms.
20 This is why Bergson describes a cinematic representation of movement as an illusion. Movement reproduced
by cinema is merely an effect of movement. However, Deleuze disagrees with Bergson on this point.
19
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account of ‘natural’ place. In Aristotle’s distinction between natural and forced movement,
there seem to be privileged positions in natural movement, where a thing returns to its ‘own
proper place’ from the place it occupied. For example, when there is no hindrance, fire goes
up rather than down and body moves down rather than up.21 When they move to a certain
direction that is determined by nature, they are said to regain their natural place.
Commenting on Bergson’s presentation of the movement in antiquity, Deleuze calls this
time of natural movement an accented time (le temps fort) as opposed to the unaccented time
(le temps faible), in the sense that it determines the direction of the movement.
If movement in antiquity can be summarized as “a reconstruction of the movement
with privileged instants that refer to forms outside of the movement,”22 movement in
modernity was understood in reference to the instants immanent to movement itself. Bergson
emphasized that the shift was made by the scientific revolution.

Figure 2. Aristotle’s Model of Universe23/ Figure 3. Descartes’s Proportional Compass
“Further, the locomotions of the elementary natural bodies – namely, fire, earth, and the like – show not
only that place is something, but also that it exerts a certain influence. Each is carried to its own place – up and
down and the rest of the six directions […] It is not every chance direction which is up, but where fire and
what is light are carried; similarly, too, down is not any chance direction but where what has weight and what
is made of earth are carried. […]” (Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, 208b 9-23).
22 “Dans un cas vous prétendez reconstituer le mouvement à partir d’instants privilégiés qui renvoient à des
formes hors du mouvement […]” (emphasis added ; Deleuze, “Lecture on Cinema November 10, 1981,” from
La Voix de Gilles Deleuze en ligne, http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=17); see also C1,
4/12. “For antiquity, movement refers to intelligible elements, Forms or Ideas which are themselves eternal
and mobile.”
23 Engraving from Peter Apian’s Cosmographie (1524) Newberry Library, Chicago, Retrieved from
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aristotle/Physics-and-metaphysics
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As we have seen above, change is explained by the motion of a thing towards its proper
place or proper form in Aristotle. So a geometrical figure is defined by its form for the Greek
mathematicians. For example, there is no homogeneous space for Aristotle. For in the
celestial region made of ether, natural movement is circular, whereas in the sublunary
region made of earth, natural movement is linear whether it is upward or downward (Figure
2). But Cartesian geometry explains curves in a very different way; curves are defined by the
positions of a point on the movable straight line. As expressed in the equation, the curve is
determinable at “any moment whatever in the course.”24 The curve is not considered in
terms of the form or the moment – privileged – where it is finalized, but in terms of actual
positions of the moving points. This is, Bergson argues, what differentiates modern science
from ancient science.
With regard to this point, Deleuze gives an example that represents the idea of time in
modernity the best – chronophotography. A French physiologist Marey invented a camera
that records a moving object in consecutive moments. This modern technology reproduces
movement as a succession of different instants or phases of movement. Deleuze emphasizes
that modern science invented the equidistance of instants, which makes it possible to
substitute privileged moments to ‘any moment whatever’ in thinking about movement and
time.25

Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York : The Modern Library, 1944), 335.
“Lecture on Cinema (Cinema: Image-Mouvement) November 10, 1981,” from La Voix de Gilles Deleuze en ligne,
http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=17.
24
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Figure 4. E. J. Marey, Saut à la perche (1890)

In his terms, modern science has liberated movement from privileged moments or forms in
its break from ancient thought. Deleuze highlights that in this second type of thinking,
movement is explained by the internal elements rather than the forms that are external to
movement. As there is no longer privileged instant in the movement in modern science, they
attempted to reconstruct movement by analyzing it.
The third thesis is the most complicated and the most fundamental one, according to
Deleuze. This concerns a peculiar distinction Bergson makes between real movement as flux
and the movement as perceived. As the instants or immobile sections are only an
abstraction of the real movement, movement is only an expression of change on the deeper
level. Deleuze calls movement in space a translation and the qualitative change as
transformation.26 He gives us the formula below in Cinema 1: Movement-Image.

If movement in space takes place with regard to parts, transformation or qualitative change
regards the whole. So Deleuze says that movements in space always refer to the qualitative

Here Deleuze is thinking of Descartes’s definition of motion; Descartes argues against Aristotelian idea of
locomotion, motion from one place to another, that motion is “the transference (translation) of one part of
matter or of one body, from the vicinity of those bodies immediately contiguous to it and are considered as at
rest, into the vicinity of [some] others.” (Principles of Philosophy, II, 25, trans. Valentine R. Miller and Reese P.
Miller (Dordrech: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982), 51); I would like to acknowledge Dr. Daniel Selcer’s
helpful suggestions on this point.
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or dynamic changes of the Whole.27 Deleuze compares the migration of the birds with the
movement of the billiard balls to demonstrate this. The latter as an abstract movement can
be explained by an isolated system, where the balls are supposed to move one another
amongst themselves. In contrast, the former as a concrete, real movement is supposed to
express changes in the whole.28 That is, the birds’ movement in a certain direction and
distance manifests the qualitative changes in the climate.
Deleuze notes the problem for Bergson was that both ancient and modern ways of
articulating movement suppose that the whole is given. In antiquity, the whole was given as
Forms or Ideas that are eternal. In modernity, it was given in the form of the principle with
which we can explain the system at any given moment. According to Deleuze, Bergson’s
claim that the modern science still relies on the ancient ontology comes from the fact that it
does not provide the conception of time that embraces the qualitative change (of the whole)
behind the movement in space (between partes extra partes). We will see what it means to
presuppose that the whole is given in the following section.

3. Deleuze’s view on time and movement: Subordination of time to movement
Deleuze develops his own account of time largely from Bergson’s critique of homogenous
and abstract time and his theses on movement. However, there is an important difference
between Bergson’s critique of the traditional notions of time and Deleuze’s; Bergson
supposed that the concept of time is inseparable from movement. Therefore, the problem of
“Les mouvements de translation expriment toujours par nature les changements du Tout. En d’autres termes, les
mouvements dans l’espace, les mouvements de translation renvoient toujours à des changements qualitatifs ou evolutifs”
(Deleuze, “Lecture on Cinema (Cinema: Image-Mouvement) - November 17, 1981,” from La Voix de Gilles
Deleuze en ligne, http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=12).
28 The same applies to the well-known example of sugar in water given by Bergson. The movement of
translation: displacement of the sugar particles. The transformation of the whole: a qualitative change from
water with sugar lumps to sugared water.
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spatializing time comes from understanding movement in spatial terms. But in Deleuze, the
problem lies in subordinating time to movement rather than confusing time with space. He is
interested in showing how limited the notion of time can be when understood in its relation
to movement. According to Deleuze, defining time in terms of movement amounts to
limiting time to what happens in it.
Deleuze’s account of the rapport between time and movement derives from Bergson’s
theses on movement. The idea of movement from which he tries to liberate time is what we
have seen above in the third thesis: movement as a relation between parts. He will develop
further the contrast between movement and time as qualitative change in the whole.
In this section we will look at Deleuze’s remarks on his predecessors’ attempt to define
time in terms of movement. As we look through different kinds of movement that
determined the image of time in Plato, Aristotle and Kant, we will examine (1) what
Deleuze means by the subordination of time to movement and (2) how he describes time
liberated from movement. The first part concerns the notion of time in antiquity, where time
was conceived in terms of the periodic or circular movements of the heavenly bodies, and
the linear/successive time in modernity. If this part mostly comes from his reading of
Bergson, the second part shows his divergence from Bergson concerning Kant’s idea of time.
Deleuze draws out of Kant the notion of time that is independent of movement, which he
calls ‘time out of joint.’
3.1 Time in antiquity: Circular movement
As long as time remains on its hinges, it is subordinate to movement: it is the
measure of movement, interval or number. This was the view of ancient philosophy
(PCK, vii).
Deleuze’s discussion on the problem of time defined in terms of movement first
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appears in Différence and Repetition.29 He writes that the dominant idea of time has been “a
matter of physical time, of a periodic or circular time which is that of the Physis and is
subordinate to events which occur within it, to movements which it measures or to events
which punctuate it.”(DR 88/118-119) He then claims that time of the Physis was marked by
the cycle of movement; it is “the subordination of time to those properly cardinal points
through which pass the periodic movements which it measures (time, number of the
movement, for the soul as much as for the world)” (DR 88/119-120).
In his lecture on Kant given in 1978, Deleuze further elaborates this idea. He gives an
example of the notion of time in antiquity, specifically Plato’s characterization of time as ‘a
moving image of eternity’ in Timaeus. In Plato, time is considered to be circular, since it is
inseparable from the cyclical movement of the planets. Here is the passage where Plato
explains how time was generated from eternity, as an imitation of it:
So, as the model was itself an everlasting Living Thing, he set himself to bringing this
universe to completion in such a way that it, too, would have that character to the
extent that was possible. Now it was the Living Thing’s nature to be eternal, but it isn’t
possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten. And so he began to
think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to
the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of
eternity remaining in unity. This number, of course, is what we now call ‘time.’30
The universe is generated from the eternal living creature, but since the generated cannot
Deleuze discusses the problem in various works, such as Différénce et Répétition (1968), Lectures on Kant
(1978), Preface for the 1984 English Edition of La philosophie critique de Kant (1963), and Cinema 2: L’ImageTemps (1985). After introducing it in Différénce et Répétition, Deleuze tries to show in his lecture on Kant in
1978, what it means to understand time as a form, in contrast to the idea of time in antiquity that is
inseparable from the movement of the celestial bodies. In the preface of La philosophie critique de Kant published
in 1984, he restates that time in antiquity is “subordinate to movement: it is the measure of movement, interval
or number” (PCK, vii). Here he gives a critique of time understood as succession while claiming that we need
to separate time from the things that are in time. “Time is no longer defined by succession because succession
concerns only things and movements which are in time” (ibid.). Also, in the preface to the English edition of
Cinema 2: L’Image-Temps published in 1985, Deleuze highlights the importance of the reversal of the
relationship between time and movement by calling it a revolution taken place in philosophy from the Greeks
to Kant (xi). Given that Deleuze consistently raises this question of defining time in terms of movement
throughout his works, we may say that it is one of the central themes in his thought.
30 Plato, “Timaeus,” trans. by Donald J. Zeyl, in Plato: Complete Works, edit. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1997), 37d.
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fully have the nature of the generator, it cannot be eternal. 31 In this respect, time seems to be
the order of the finite universe. The eternity is not subject to motion but unity, so time is
created as an image of eternity that moves according to number. It seems that this time as
the image of eternity is a deprivation of eternity. In defining time, people in antiquity
believed that the circular movement of the planets is perpetual so that it can be a reference
for all the other finite movements. Only the circular movements can be perpetual since it is
the sole kind of movement where things move towards the original position. Plato later in
the work introduces the term ‘the perfect year,’ which is brought by the perfect number of
time: the time when all of the revolving planets of various circuits simultaneously return to
their original position.32
The first point Deleuze makes about Plato’s view of time is that the form of time is
derived from the form of movement, which is a circle, in this case. Since the perfect number
of time is determined by the positions of the celestial bodies, time is subject to the cycle of
the movement toward the perfect year. Thus time itself takes a cyclical form that is
measured by the revolution of the same.33 According to Deleuze, “the circle of time, in so
far as it measures planetary movement, and the return of the same, it’s precisely this time
become circular.”34 This raises a question of distinguishing time from the things that are in
time, since Deleuze wants to explore the possibility of thinking time itself rather than with
reference to the things that it measures.
Second, Deleuze talks about what it entails to think of time as a circle. What he finds
In Plato, eternity (aiôn) is a being that is not subject to time (chronos). Deleuze describe them as two
conceptions of time in Logique du sens, following the Stoics. Chronos is the time of the present, understood as
successive moments in relation to the past and the future, whereas aiôn is a time of the virtual.
32 Daniel Smith calls this an “originary time,” in the sense that time is marked by a reference point, privileged
positions in the cosmos (Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 131).
33 Plato, “Timaeus,” 39d.
34 Deleuze, “Lecture on Kant (Cours Vincennes: synthèse et temps) - March, 21, 1978” from Les Cours de Gilles
Deleuze, http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=58&groupe=Kant&langue=1)
31
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interesting in the circular time is that it functions as limits of the world. In Plato, movement
and time are both resulted from the degradation from eternity. What constitutes time is the
‘wandering’ of the celestial bodies. However, there is an assumption that at the end of this
wandering, their position before and after the cycle will correspond. Cyclical movement is a
restoration of the place where things in the world are supposed to be. In other words, there
are positions in space or moments in time that are privileged toward which movement is
directed. According to Deleuze, this is what a Greek term ‘thesis (Θέσις: position)’ stands for.
It is thus supposed that what happens in the finite world must come to be in order after the
cycle of time.35 Interestingly, Deleuze observes that this circular image of time derived from
the revolution of planets also relates to the way worldly events are unfolding. He thinks that
there is “a certain sense of the tragic for the Greeks which is the tragic element of cyclical
time.”36 He notes that there are three moments in the cycle of this tragic time: a moment of
limitation given as justice, an act of the transgression of this limitation, and the moment of
restoration. In the last moment, the limit is restored and the order is reestablished. This is
modeled on the cyclical form of time. I believe this is what makes the idea of cyclical time
interesting to us. The notion of time structured by circular planetary movements may seem
obsolete in today’s context, but the idea of ‘return’ remains relevant to us. As will be shown,
for Deleuze understanding repetition in a non-circular image of time is crucial. We will
come back to this literary reference later in the section 3.3 on time as a straight line.
3.2 Time as a succession of instants
Time is no longer defined by succession because succession concerns only things and
movements which are in time. If time itself were succession, it would need to succeed
Lecture on Cinema (Cinema: Image-Mouvement) - November 10, 1981, from La Voix de Gilles Deleuze en ligne,
http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=17.
36 Lecture on Kant (Cours Vincennes: synthèse et temps) - March, 21, 1978 from Les Cours de Gilles Deleuze.
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in another time, and on to infinity. Things succeed each other in various times, but
they are also simultaneous in the same time, and they remain in an indefinite time
(PCK, vii).
We saw in the last section that modern science liberated time from a sequence of
privileged positions or moments and made it possible to reconstitute movement with any
moment whatever. There is no longer a model of movement that all the other movements
refer to. If time is no longer bound to the circular movement of celestial bodies, in which
sense can time still be subordinated to movement? According to Bergson-Deleuze, what
replaced circular or periodic time is the concept of time as a succession of instants, where
time is considered in relation to the trajectory of objects in motion.
I think that Aristotle’s account of time is important to examine this view; he did not
identify time with successive moments, but he seems to have introduced the idea that time
cannot be separated from the states of an object in motion. Also, it is quite obvious that
Deleuze is referring to Aristotle’s theory of time in Physics, when he talks about the ‘time of
the Physis’ that is “subordinate to movement: it is the measure of movement, interval or
number” (PCK vii, see also DR 88/119-120). Here is Aristotle’s widely known passage,
where he defines time as a measure of motion:
For time is just this—number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’ (τοῦτο γάρ
ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον).37
This definition of time can be divided into two parts: First, by defining time as “number of
motion,” Aristotle emphasizes that time is inseparable from motion and that time has
something to do with counting or measuring the quantity of motion. He thinks that time
cannot be understood independent of motion or change, since we can hardly know a lapse
of time without noticing any motion or change. That is to say, we perceive time when and
Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, 219a30-b2 in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Revised Oxford Edition, Vol.1, edit.
Jonathan Barnes, trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye (Princeton: Princeton University, 1995).
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only when we perceive motion or change. Motion or change cannot itself be equated with
time, but there can be no time without change. We may say that for Aristotle motion is logically
prior to time when he defines time in terms of motion.38 Second, in marking the interval of
time through the perception of movement or change, we recognize the temporal order,
‘before’ and ‘after.’ To mark the before and the after, we need to first recognize the distinct
‘now’ moments. For instance, one sees a lapse of time through the change in the state of the
object A, specifically by comparing the state of A at a certain moment (T1) with its state in
the previous moment (T0). What constitutes time here is the temporal relation between the
moment of ‘present now’ and the moments of ‘previous now.’ Time, in this sense, seems to
consist in the succession of different ‘now’s.
In the chapter called “Time and Temporality” of his book The Basic Problems of
Phenomenology, Heidegger characterizes Aristotle’s notion of time as “a sequence of nows
from the not-yet-now to the no-longer-now, a sequence of nows which is not arbitrary but
whose intrinsic direction is from the future to the past.”39 He also claims that our everyday
understanding of time – a linear, quantitative, clock-time – is originated from Aristotle. In
the discussion of ‘now’ in Physics, Aristotle makes it clear that it cannot itself be part of time,
for it is infinitely small and not supposed to be extended, like mathematical points.
Nonetheless, the ‘now’ moment as a unit of time plays an essential role in our perception of
time. For Aristotle, the ‘now’ as the limit between before and after not only enables us to
notice changes, but also makes these two different moments successive. It is also worth
noting that neither past nor future can constitute time in Aristotle: the past has happened

See Tony Roark, ‘Chapter 3. Time is not motion,’ Aristotle on Time: A Study of the Physics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
39 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1982), 260.
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and is not, whereas the future will be but does not yet exist.40
What Deleuze may find problematic about Aristotle’s definition of time in Physics is
the following: First, in the Bergson-Deleuzian language, there is a priority of space – or
place, rather – over time in Aristotle’s description of time. When we say time is a number of
motion, marked by the states of moving things before and after the motion, the distinction
between before and after holds in place.41 In other words, what differentiates anteriority and
posterity in time is perceived through the change in the instantaneous states of objects in
space. If this is the case, this conception of time would be derived from our perception of
space. As seen above, time loses its qualitative and durational character when it is defined in
terms of the succession of different positions in space. Second, what interests Deleuze more
than the spatialization of time is the distinction between time itself and things that are in
time. Aristotle understands time, at least in Physics, as a measure of things that are in time,
which makes it inseparable from number and counting. Although Aristotle acknowledges
that time cannot be identified with number itself, it is conceived as a quantity of motion or
the counted number of motion.42 In this sense time in Aristotle deals more with things in
time than time itself, according to Deleuze. He highlights that time has to be more than
what happens in it. Deleuze writes, “[t]ime is no longer defined by succession because
succession concerns only things and movements which are in time” (PCK, vii).
However, Aristotle’s idea of time does not lead to the same problem as Plato’s view of
“One part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet. Yet time – both infinite time
and any time you like to take – is made up of these. One would naturally suppose that what is made up of
things which do not exist could have no share in reality.” (218a); for a detailed discussion of ‘the now’
moment in Aristotle and Heidegger, see Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being
and Time,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 29-67.
41 For Aristotle, change in place (local motion) is preceded by all other motion – changes in quantity or quality.
He understands that the continuity of time is derived from the continuity of local motion as a primary type of
motion, which depends on the continuity of bodily extension.
42 According to Aristotle, time is “not number with which we count, but the number of things which are
counted” (Physics, 220b).
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time, which suggests a certain type of movement that all other movement is destined to
repeat. Then in which sense does the concept of time as a measure of movement still remain
limited? In his lecture on cinema, Deleuze shows how it can lead to a mechanistic model of
time. He refers to Bergson’s remarks on time in the modern science, which derives largely
from analyzing the trajectory of movement.43 As seen briefly above, time in modern science
was built upon the equidistance of instants that enables us to calculate possible positions of a
moving object. Let us say that an Object O proceeds to the points T1, T2, T3, ... on the line,
starting from the origin T0. Here, 1,2,3, … are units of time where O is at the points T1, T2,
T3, ... From this, one can calculate where O will be at a certain time t, at the point Tt. As we
divide the trajectory into points and use them to predict the future movement, we constitute
time with the “virtual stopping places,” assuming that the future movement is predictable.
Deleuze says that with this characterization of time, the system becomes explicable and
calculable in any given moment in virtue of the anterior moment: “It is as if the system dies
and revives every moment, the following moment repeats the preceding moment.” 44 This
system grounds itself with the principle of repetition, a repetition of the preceding moment.
It is in this sense that ‘the whole’ is assumed to be given in modern science. In the following
we will see why this idea that ‘the whole is given’ is problematic.

Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York : The Modern Library, 1944), 337-338.
Lecture on Cinema (Cinema: Image-Mouvement) - November 10, 1981, from La Voix de Gilles Deleuze en ligne,
http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=17.
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3.3 Time as an empty form
Deleuze’s concern with time derived from movement is that it tends to be constructed
with the repetitive elements of movement, either in the form of the cycle of movement or
successive moments in movement. Then how can time be defined without reference to
movement? Deleuze seems to find the possibility of this newly defined time in Kant’s notion
of time as a form. In his reading of Kant, he shows that Kant liberated time from any
repeatable type or pattern of movement. He also made it clear that time as a form is to be
distinguished from what happens in it.
This is where Deleuze diverges from Bergson. Bergson gives a critical reading of Kant,
regarding specifically his notion of time and space as a priori forms of inner and outer
intuition. According to him, Kant understood time as a ‘homogenous medium’ in which the
states of consciousness unfold themselves. Bergson claims,
Kant’s great mistake was to take time as a homogeneous medium. He did not notice
that real duration is made up of moments inside one another, and that when it seems to
assume the form of a homogeneous whole, it is because it gets expressed in space. Thus
the very distinction which he makes between space and time amounts at bottom to
confusing time with space.45
In his account of time, Kant uses the analogy of line to describe the succession of time and
sees time as a container of what happens in it, in the same way space is a form. According
to Bergson, Kant seems to believe that as we perceive material objects in space, our states of
consciousness are juxtaposed in succession, external to one another. In this sense, Bergson
argues that Kant’s notion of time is an instance of spatialized time. Although Kant notices
the difference between time and space as forms of internal and external intuition, he still
conceives time as a homogeneous medium and since “homogeneity here consisting in the

45

Bergson, Time and Free Will, 232.
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absence of every quality, it is hard to see how two forms of the homogenous could be
distinguished from one another.”46 For Bergson, when time is regarded as a homogenous
medium of the states of consciousness, it is a mere projection of time onto space.
However, Deleuze sees in Kant the possibility of going beyond the idea of time
subordinated to movement. In the preface to Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Deleuze claims that it
was Kant that first substituted the schema of cyclical time with time as straight line, where
“the beginning and the end do not rhyme.” This reference to rhyme is drawn from
Hölderlin’s reading of Oedipus in Remarks on Sophocles. He calls this ‘time that is out of
joint.’
[T]ime out of joint signifies the reversal of the movement-time relationship. […] Time
is no longer related to the movement which it measures, but movement is related to
the time which conditions it: this is the first great Kantian reversal in the Critique of
Pure Reason (PCK, vii).
Let us remember that Deleuze explained the circular image of time in antiquity with the
Greek tragedy, where we see the restoration of the order at the end. To describe the novel
idea of time Kant suggested, Deleuze uses a line from Hamlet,47 “time is out of joint (le
temps est hors de ses gonds).” As Deleuze notes later in the text, the Latin word for ‘joint
(gond)’ is ‘cardo,’ which means a hinge of the door or an axis around which the revolving
objects turn. Cardo or cardinal point is what enables us to count the number of movements
as well as the passing of time according to movements. In his commentary on Deleuze’s
theory of time, Williams gives the examples of these cardinal points: “the number of times a

Ibid., 98.
In the second lecture on cinema Deleuze also calls this a transition from tragedy to novel (Lecture on
Cinema (Cinema: Image-Mouvement) - November 10, 1981, from La voix de Gilles Deleuze en ligne,
http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=36).
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clock passes midday or a horoscope passes a birthday.”48 If time concerns measuring the
periodic movements, it would be subject to the cardinal points. In Difference and Repetition,
Deleuze writes: “The joint, cardo, is what ensures the subordination of time to those
properly cardinal points through which pass the periodic movements which it measures
(time, number of the movement, for the soul as much as for the world)” (DR 88/119).
When Deleuze says time is unhinged, it means that it no longer functions as the measure or
the number of movement. To put it another way, it is a time that distributes a nonsymmetrical before and after, since it does not refer to a movement where things are
supposed to come back to their original place or their own ‘natural’ place. Deleuze calls this
a reversal of the relationship between movement and time.
But how is this ‘a great Kantian reversal’? In order to answer this question, we need
to look briefly at Deleuze’s view of Kant’s notion of time. He emphasizes that Kant, in
defining time as a pure form of intuition, made time itself “an immutable form” of
everything that changes and moves. Deleuze draws from Kant the distinction between what
is presented and represented;49 the former indicates that which presents itself to us as
manifold/diversity (PCK 8/14), whereas the prefix ‘re-’ in the notion of re-presentation
implies an active ‘taking up’ of what is presented. Representation concerns “an activity and
a unity distinct from the passivity and diversity” (ibid.). But since sensibility is defined as
pure passivity in Kant, it cannot be a source of representations. Thus intuition, the form of
which is pure passivity, is not a representation. Deleuze says that the phenomenon in Kant
is not appearance [apparence]– which is usually paired with the essence behind it – but

James Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2011), 88.
49 In the section on the unconscious synthesis in Chapter II, we will see that this distinction was taken from a
Post-Kantian thinker, Salomon Maimon’s distinction between Vorstellung and Darstellung.
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‘appearing [apparition].’ He writes that time as the form of all possible appearing is “the only
thing which sensibility presents a priori” (ibid.). In Kant, what presents itself to us is not only
empirical diversity in time but also the pure a priori diversity of time. Time as the a priori
presentation is the form of all that changes, without being changed itself. As we will see in
the following, in Kant, even ‘the self’ in our reflection is considered as a sort of intuition
given under the form of time in this regard.
In this section, we have seen Deleuze’s view on the relationship between time and
movement. It seems to me that Deleuze’s discussion of the time subordinated to movement
is a critique of the idea of repetition that underlies the eternal Form in antiquity and the
mechanistic worldview in modernity. In antiquity, time was largely considered to be
repetition since the Whole was presupposed in the form of the completion of the cycle in the
movement of the celestial bodies. In modernity, the need to discover the principle by which
the universe as a system operates led to the idea of time as a succession of homogeneous
instants. It was supposed that the universe at any instant, governed by the same principle, is
predictable. It is a repetition not in the sense of circular time, but of the principle applied to
every moment. These notions of time, where the whole is assumed to be given, suggest ‘the
return of the same.’ When Deleuze talks about the reversal of time and movement, he is
posing a problem of time, the form of which is predetermined by the repetitive movement.
He suggests instead that we understand time as liberated from its content, so that time
would not function as limits of movements, but as a form of change that all the movements
are subject to, i.e. an empty form that allows difference. We will examine further in the
following section Deleuze’s conception of time as ‘differentiation from itself’ and how this
new form of time relates to his larger project, the philosophy of difference.
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4. Deleuze’s notion of time: Temporalized difference
We began with the problem Deleuze poses of the subordination of time to movement and
demonstrated it with the definitions of time in antiquity and in modern science. According
to them, time takes either a circular or linear form, depending on the kind of movement they
referred to. Now we will turn to Deleuze’s own understanding of time.
Deleuze’s critique of the traditional notion of time can be summarized as the
following: time had been understood in terms of what happens in it, thus as something
secondary to that which moves or changes. Consequently, time was reconstructed either
with the privileged positions or substituted by the traversed space. But in doing so, we
always miss certain aspect of time, since time cannot be reduced to either of them. Thus he
suggests that time be conceived as in itself rather than reconstructed from the traces of
movement or events. He sees the possibility of doing so in Kant, in his definition of time as
a pure form. Deleuze wants to show that there is, in fact, no unchanging substance that
underlies change or movement, but all things are in time, and thus changing. In this sense,
movement is subject to time, not the other way around. Time is the only unchanging form
to which all that changes is subject to.
I contended above that what Deleuze really aims to critique through ‘time
subordinated to movement’ is the time of repetition, whether it is derived from circular
movement or repetition of previous instants.50 In this section we will see the implications of
the reversal of time and movement in relation to his philosophy of difference, where he

Deleuze will later reinvent and complicate the notion of repetition, but here it simply means the recurrence
of the same. When repetition is thought under the identity, it is the repetition of the same; but if identity is put
into question, what’s repeated would necessarily accompany differences every time it is repeated.
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articulates the concept of difference that is not derived from, thus prior to identity. I will
argue that Deleuze reads Bergson’s theory of time in a Kantian framework. He makes use of
Bergson’s notion of duration in his reading of the traditional notions of time in philosophy,
however, as he develops his own theory of time, his concern shifts from duration to
difference. As will be shown, Deleuze modifies the idea of duration significantly when he
characterizes it as ‘internal difference.’ I will claim that Kant is the most important thinker
for Deleuze in this transition from duration to difference. This is a significant moment for
Deleuze not only because it shows why it is necessary to think difference in terms of
temporality in establishing his philosophy of difference, but also it sets the ground for his
account of ‘the passive synthesis of time’ he introduces later in Difference and Repetition.
4.1 Time and the notion of difference: Time as self-differentiation
It is perhaps in the essay “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” (1956)51 that the
relationship between time and difference in Deleuze’s system is best elaborated. I believe
this essay is particularly important since it shows how Deleuze develops the notion of
difference from Bergson’s idea of duration. On the one hand, we see that duration serves as
a crucial idea that introduces qualitative difference to time in Deleuze; instead of
reconstructing time with successive instants external to one another, Bergson sees time as a
whole that goes through qualitative change every moment. This characterization of time
inspired Deleuze to articulate difference in temporal process. There is no doubt that
Deleuze’s definition of time as “that which differs from itself (ce qui diffère avec soi)” (BCD
51) comes from Bergson’s notion of duration as a continuous, qualitative multiplicity. As an
early attempt to think difference in terms of time, this essay anticipates his project of
Henceforth abbreviated as BCD. This article first appears in Les études bergsoniennes (1956) under the title “La
conception de la différence chez Bergson.”
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redefining the concept of difference that actualizes more than ten years later in Difference and
Repetition. On the other hand, the essay describes the shift in focus of Deleuze’s reading of
Bergson, I argue, from duration to difference. By reconstructing Bergson’s account of time
around the notion of internal difference, which is Kant’s terminology, Deleuze introduces a
creative reading of the idea of duration.
The main idea of the essay is that time as duration can be conceived as the difference
of self from self, thus internal difference. To put it in another way, the concept of difference
that he attempts to articulate is conceived as differentiation in time or ‘temporalized’
difference.52 Given that Deleuze begins with the notion of duration, which he defines as
what differs from itself, characterizing time as internal difference may seem to be circular.
But what interests us more is not the definition of time as a force of differentiation itself, but
what it entails.
In the beginning of the essay, Deleuze explains the limitations of conceptualizing
difference in spatial terms, under the Bergsonian framework. According to him, spatial
understanding presents us only external difference. He writes, “[w]hat space presents to the
understanding, and what understanding finds in space, are only things, i.e. products or
results.”(BCD 34/46) When considered in spatial terms, the difference would be situated
between things that exist in space. As we have seen in the section on Bergson’s theory of
multiplicity, things in space as quantitative multiplicity relate to one another in terms of
externality and juxtaposition. Thus difference between things that are in external relation to
each other can also be called external difference. When Deleuze says what is given in space
– “things” – is only an end product, he seems to imply that there is a more fundamental
I borrowed this term from Borradori’s articulation of internal difference as “temporalization of difference.”;
see Giovanna Borradori, “The Temporalization of Difference: Reflections on Deleuze’s interpretation of
Bergson,” Continental Philosophy Review 34 (2001): 1–20.
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process that the things are resulted from. In other words, when he calls difference in space
external, or difference between results, he is suggesting that there is more fundamental
difference that makes the thing what it is from within: internal difference. Because our faculty
of understanding tends to translate continuous and qualitative process into discrete and
quantitative change, Deleuze claims that articulating internal difference requires a method
that is “something other than a spatial analysis, more than a description of experience, and
less (so it seems) than a transcendental analysis” (BCD 36/49). In short, thinking internal
difference requires a temporal analysis rather than a spatial one, and that it is what makes
the external difference possible.
In order to describe the two kinds of difference, Deleuze seems to utilize a set of
opposing terms. Here are some of the examples we will take a look at:
Difference in Space
External
Substance
Contradiction/ Negation
The determinations (les déterminations)

Difference in Time
Internal
Change/ Movement (Substance redefined)
Self-differentiation
THE Determination (LA détermination)

Table 1. Spatial- Temporal Difference

In addition to the distinction between internal and external difference, Deleuze suggests that
we rethink the notion of substance in terms of difference. In the following passage, he makes
a number of important claims:
In a word, duration is what differs, and this is no longer what differs from other things,
but what differs from itself. What differs has itself become a thing, a substance. […]
And just as difference has become a substance, so movement is no longer the
characteristic of something, but has itself acquired a substantial character. It
presupposes nothing else, no body in motion. Duration or tendency is the difference of
self with itself; and what differs from itself is, in an unmediated way, the unity of
substance and subject (BCD, 37-38/51-52).
In this puzzling passage, Deleuze seems to make the following claims:
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(1) Time as duration is ‘what differs from itself’ or the difference of self with itself.
(2) Difference (in time) has become a thing, a substance (Subsequently, movement
presupposes no body in motion).
(3) What differs from itself is the unity of substance and subject.
Let us begin with the claim (1), ‘time as self-differentiation.’ As noted, Bergson sees time as
a whole that goes through qualitative change. When it comes to duration as a continuous,
qualitative multiplicity, difference does not concern its relation to other things, but its
relation to itself. That is, the relation of the whole and itself with qualitative changes. Given
the claim (3), which we will not immediately engage in, Deleuze has Hegel in mind in his
reading of Bergson here. Defining time as self-differentiation is important for him precisely
because difference understood temporally through duration is a generative, vital force (élan
vital) in immediately differentiating from the self, without supposing negativity, that is, its
relation with other things (what it is not).
Later in the essay Deleuze draws our attention to Bergson’s example of color to show
how difference can be an underlying thing that generates other things. Bergson contrasts two
ways of thinking what colors have in common: first we can try to define the concept of color
by eliminating the particularity of each shade, that is, by dismissing in red what makes it
red, and so on. In this case we get a general, abstract idea of color under which different
colors are subsumed. In contrast, we can get ‘pure white light’ by putting different colors
together through a convergent lens. As opposed to the former, where the concept and the
colors are externally related, in the latter a white light as a power to become different colors
produces the differences that are internal to it. If the former is the spatial distinctions of
colors, the latter shows a difference as temporal variation where different shades are
conceived as “possible coexistence” of the white light (BCD 44/61).
The claim (2) concerns the notion of substance and, what I will call, ‘substance-based
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notion of time.’ Earlier we said that with the reversal of time and movement, time is not a
time of something but a form of change that everything else is subjected to. Deleuze does
not talk about time in terms of unchanging form here, but he is emphasizing the primacy of
time, that is not secondary to movement or a thing that moves. Time does not belong to a
body in motion as long as the moving body is subject to change.53 As the only form that is
not subject to change, time takes a role of the ground, in the sense that it does not
presuppose anything for it to be there.
This role of the ground with nothing presupposed has traditionally been taken by
substance in philosophy. The term substance (ὑποκείμενον: ‘to lie under’) refers to that which
underlies things or that which stands by itself independently of properties or events. In a
broader sense, it can also mean individual things or subjects upon which predicates
depend.54 With regard to time, it concerns an underlying thing that remains unchanged
through the course of change. Given this existing definition of substance, Deleuze’s claim
that time as self-differentiation itself becomes a substance seems to be absurd.55 Far from
“the unity of substance and subject,” time appears to denounce it by exposing things to
change and multiplicity. Also in (2), Deleuze argues that when time is understood as what
differs from itself, movement is no longer a movement of some thing, as it presupposes no
‘body’ that moves. When there is a movement, shouldn’t there be a thing that goes through
change?

In the metaphor of the hinge (cardo) of a door Deleuze uses in relation to the time “out of joint,” the
revolving motion belongs to the door as long as it repeats itself around the hinge. If the movement gets ‘off the
hinges,’ it would not be repeated or seen as a movement of the door.
54 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VII, 1029a 2-3 in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford
Translation, Vol.2, edit. Jonathan Barnes, trans. William David Ross (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1995).
55 In Bergsonism, Deleuze defines duration as “a becoming that endures, a change that is substance itself” (B
37).
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I do not think that Deleuze is trying to deny altogether the idea of individual
substances or the apparent existence of bodies and things in motion that constitute our
ordinary experience of time. Rather, he is suggesting that what we call substance is in fact
the results or products of a more profound process, what Deleuze calls a “movement of
difference.” Therefore, when he says time itself becomes a substance, the term substance
would not mean what it used to refer to. Time understood as the revised notion of substance
would have to be defined something like this: an underlying difference that produces ‘things’ or
the unity of substance and subject.
One way to think about substance is through Deleuze’s example given in the Logic of
Sense, the discussion of subsistent infinitives. He explains the notion of substance in terms of
an infinitive instead of a noun, using the example of the phrase “the tree greens.”56 When
we refer to a green tree, the substance/ subject is not the tree that has a property ‘green’ but
a power ‘to green.’ Substance is not what holds properties or attributes but it itself is
understood as a power to become them. What appear to be “things” and their properties to
us are in fact the expressions or variations of substance. Accordingly, difference is
understood not as a matter of substance possessing different properties or different
determinations, but of substance playing out its own power to differentiate. This is what
Deleuze means when he says, “difference has become a substance” in the above passage.
But what does it mean to think time in terms of difference? What is the problem with
the ‘substance-based’ time? As noted above, a substance (S) is, by its definition, what survives
change. If we are to understand time in terms of what S is, the past would simply be the
previous states of S, or the totality of them stacked up over time. Deleuze, drawing on
Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 20-21;
see also Claire Colebrook’s entry “Substance” in The Deleuze Dictionary, edit. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 278-279.
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Bergson, claims that it is important to consider the past without attributing it to individual
substances, in order to reveal the dynamic relations between the past and the present; the
past continues to operate and to be reconstructed in the present. With regard to the future,
the substance-based notion of time, assuming that which exists independently of changeable
properties, cannot sufficiently account for how ‘the new’ is produced. For example, in
ancient thought, the future dimension of time is related to the idea of ‘Perfect Year,’ in
which all of the celestial bodies are believed to return to their original position. Plato calls
this ‘the circle of the same.’57 Also, the mechanical notion of time introduced by modern
technologies operates upon the calculability of the future. The future of S as its virtual states
makes time open, but only to the extent that the future tendency is presumably predictable
by observing its present state.
In order to avoid reducing time to that of individual substances, Deleuze suggests that
we think of ‘a whole’ that goes through qualitative change, which individual substances are
only the manifestations of. Such a whole is ‘the open,’ as it becomes something other than
itself in its qualitative change. Since the whole has nothing external to it, the only
movement observed in it would be the movement of ‘self-differentiation.’ If there is only the
movement of the whole, and if there is no substance to which the movement can be
attributed to, time cannot be conceived as a measure: “Time itself unfolds instead of things
unfolding within it […] time is no longer subordinated to movement” (DR 88-89/120).
Therefore, Deleuze claims that time is a form in which the whole differs from itself and that
‘what differs from itself’ replaces the notion of substance (BCD 37/52). Time, in this sense,

“It is none the less possible, however, to discern that the perfect number of time brings to completion the
perfect year at that moment when the relative speeds of all eight periods have been completed together and,
measured by the circle of the Same that moves uniformly, have achieved their consummation” (Plato
Timaeus, 39d).
57

38

is a vehicle for the production of difference, through which any substance – including the
subject – is produced.
This idea of time as substance thus changes the relationship between other pairs of
philosophical terms in the Table 1, such as identity/difference, unity/ multiplicity and
determination /differentiation. When time as what differs from itself becomes substance,
the latter terms of these sets become primary: identity is derived from difference rather than
presupposed. That is, difference would not be situated between things that are already
determined, with its presupposed identity, but in the power of differentiation internal to
time itself. Thus Deleuze notes that “difference is not a determination but, in its essential
relation to life, a differentiation (différenciation)” (my emphasis, BCD 40/55).
4.2 Time as internal difference: Auto-affection
Contradiction vs. Self-differentiation
Let us now proceed to the third and the fourth rows of the Table 1:
contradiction/negation vs. self-differentiation, and the determinations vs. The
Determination. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze notes that “[t]he difference ‘between’
two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic.
However, instead of something that distinguishes itself from something else, imagine
something which distinguishes itself (Mais au lieu d’une chose qui se distingue d’autre chose,
imaginons quelque chose qui se distingue)[…]” (translation modified, DR 28/43). Let us begin
with what he calls empirical and extrinsic (or external) difference. In a bigger picture, this
concerns Deleuze’s critique of the dialectical method in articulating difference. I am not
interested in exploring his argument against the dialectic – which is developed in Difference
and Repetition in great detail –, or evaluating it. I want to simply show how Deleuze
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distinguishes his way of thinking difference from others. In this essay, he claims that both in
Plato and in Hegel the account for difference is based on the relations of negation and
contradiction. Specifically, Deleuze argues that in Hegel “the thing differs from itself
because it differs first from everything it is not, and thus difference goes as far as
contradiction” (BCD 42/58). That is to say, difference in Hegel lies in the logical relation of
negation, A and not-A. For example, we can speak about the difference of a book, only by
considering it with reference to other books, and to all the other objects that are not books.
Deleuze contends that this is a way of thinking difference in space where things relate to one
another externally. When the difference of a term is considered in relation to what it is not,
this difference can be said negative as well as external. Therefore, Deleuze seems to use
“negative” and “external” interchangeably as Borradori notes.58
Unlike the difference in Hegel’s account, difference in time is not defined by negative,
external relations. Then how can something be said different when it is not in relation to
what it is not? It still has a relation with itself in time. In the above passage, Deleuze
explains this in the language of ‘something that distinguishes itself’ without reference to
anything external to it. When considered temporally, difference need not involve any
external relations. This is how Deleuze puts it:
[W]e think duration differs from itself because it is first the product of two contrary
determinations, but we forget that it differentiated itself because it is first that which
differs from itself [elle s’est différenciée parce qu’elle était d’abord ce qui diffère avec soi]. […] It
is our ignorance of the virtual that makes us believe in contradiction and negation
(BCD, 42-43/59).
The notion of self-differentiation is essential in defining time as a power to produce internal
difference. As we have seen above, if time as substance is a power of becoming, it is able to
Giovanna Borradori, “The Temporalization of Difference: Reflections on Deleuze’s Interpretation of
Bergson,” Continental Philosophy Review 34 (2001): 1–20. 2.
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become what it is not only by differentiating from itself. Deleuze claims that it is by this
movement of difference in time that two terms that seem to logically negate one another are
produced. Here Deleuze attempts to explain how things are produced internally solely by
the self-differentiation of time. Time as differentiation is a whole – an open whole – not in
the sense of the totality of determinations, but in the sense that there is nothing external to
it. The whole cannot distinguish itself from something else but only from itself since it does
not have the exterior. This is why Deleuze warns us not to think duration in terms of
determination or the product of determinations. We will see more closely what he means by
determination.
The determinations vs. THE Determination
In this regard, it is true that Deleuze deploys Bergson’s idea of internal difference
against Hegel’s idea of contradiction as Widder states.59 However, I will show in what
follows that Deleuze’s definition of time as self-differentiation is Kantian as much as it is
Bergsonian. To begin with, Deleuze reconstructs Bergson’s account of time around ‘internal
difference,’ the term Bergson does not use to describe duration; the shift in Deleuze’s
concern from duration to difference becomes the point of departure where he develops his
own thought, philosophy of difference, by distinguishing himself from Bergson. The most
important reference for him in this transition is, I argue, Kant. Here are two reasons why I
“Deleuze contends that Duration and Simultaneity does not invoke a new psychologism but instead challenges
the physicist for confusing different types of multiplicity and continuing to treat time as the counting of
instants, Bergson offering the alternative metaphysics that modern physics needs. And he argues that the
significance of Bergson’s late work is that it demonstrates the process by which duration, as difference
actualizing itself, underpins social and moral history. Both defences accord with Deleuze’s larger thesis that
duration’s structure of a virtual past contracted into the actual present and propelling time into an open future
expresses a conception of internal difference, which Deleuze deploys explicitly against a Hegelian conception
of internal difference as contradiction” (Nathan Widder, “From Duration to Eternal Return,” in Time and
History in Deleuze and Serres, edit. Bernd Herzogenrath (New York: Continuum, 2012), 127-128). In this essay,
Widder claims that Bergson’s influence on Deleuze was significant but limited, given the fact that he deploys
the idea of discontinuity from Nietzsche’s conception of difference in quantity and the will to power.
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believe so: First, when Deleuze uses the term ‘determination,’ it mostly refers to Kant’s
achievement in relation to Descartes’s cogito.60 Second, Deleuze’s emphasis on Kant’s
‘Paradox of inner sense’61 strongly suggests a possibility that the internality of time comes
from Kant’s definition of time as the form of interiority.
Let us remember that in the passages above Deleuze distinguishes internal difference
in time not only from external difference but also from determinations. In Difference and
Repetition, he makes a distinction between the determinations (les déterminations) and ‘THE
Determination (LA détermination).’ He describes internal difference as “transcendental
Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines” as opposed to
“empirical difference between two determinations” (DR 86/ 116). This phrase is followed
by his reading of Kant, where he elaborates the difference between the Kantian cogito and
the Cartesian one. According to Deleuze, Kant discovered what is missing in the Cartesian
formula ‘I think, therefore I am.’ Here ‘I think’ (determination) determines what I am (the
undetermined), as ‘a thing that thinks.’ That is to say, the determination ‘I think’ is
supposed to imply directly the undetermined ‘I am.’ Deleuze notes that Kant found this
insufficient and claimed that there must be a third term that links the determination and the
indeterminate. Then under what form is the indeterminate existence (I am) determinable?
For Kant, this is the form of time. Time is a form through which the undetermined I
becomes determinable. In Deleuze’s terms, time as differentiation is what makes the
determinations possible, thus needs to be distinguished from them. Time as a middle term
for determination is what is missing in Descartes’s cogito, which relies on the existence of

Apart from the reference to Kant, the term “determination” also appears in the discussion of Artaud and
Abel in DR.
61 See DR 86/116-117, and Lecture on Kant - March, 21, 1978
(http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=58&groupe=Kant&langue=1).
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God.62
Time as ‘auto-affection’
In order to see what this middle term implies, Deleuze draws our attention to Kant’s
discussion of the paradox of inner sense. According to Kant, when the outside objects
appear to us, they appear in the form of outer sense, which is space; things that are in space
appear external to us and to one another. In this sense space is the form of exteriority. But
the paradox occurs when we try to intuit ourselves. Kant writes in the first critique,
Inner sense […] represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to
ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. For we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly
affected, and this would seem to be contradictory, since we should then have to be in a
passive relation to ourselves (CPR, B 153).
In the activity of thinking, there is a split between the I that thinks and the I that is being
thought, the latter of which is given to us in the way that the external objects appear to us.
In other words, ‘the I’ can be given or represented to me only in the manner in which I
appear to myself, rather than I as being in myself. Thus there is a sense in which ‘the I’
becomes passive in relation to itself when the activity of thinking turns inward. Kant stresses
that I am given to myself “not as I am for the understanding but rather as I appear to
myself” (CPR, B155). In thinking –an internal dialogue –, the I represents passivity as well
as activity. On the one hand, I am an active, spontaneous subject of thinking. On the other
hand, this I in the ‘I think’ becomes an object in ‘I think that ‘I think’.’ Thinking is a
repeated circular movement between the I (thinking I) and the I (being thought), while
producing the formula: I think (that I think (that I think…)). We might say that in turning
the I as a subject into the I as an object of thinking, there is a temporal delay. So, what

As a momentary self, the Cartesian cogito has to be preserved by something other than itself (aliqua causa) to
exist continuously. Only God can be the cause of the cogito’s continuity over time.
62

43

makes the I divided into two is time. Kant says that the subject can represent itself only by
the affection of a passive self, auto-affection. The form of self-affection is time, which is the
form of interiority. The subject can know itself only as it appears within time.63
It seems to me that what Deleuze finds intriguing in Kant’s account of time is that it
presents the way the subject experiences time, understood as auto-affection, or selfdifferentiation. This is why the discussion of ‘Paradox of inner sense,’ where Kant talks
about the problem of double-sided subject in self-knowledge, is particularly interesting for
Deleuze. In his book on Foucault where he raises the problem of subjectification
(subjectivation), Deleuze claims that Kant’s paradox of inner sense reveals the temporal
structure of subjectivity while summarizing his reading of Kantian time as auto-affection.
Deleuze writes,
According to Kant, time was the form in which the mind affected itself, just as space
was the form in which the mind was affected by something else: time was therefore
‘auto-affection’ and made up the essential structure of subjectivity (F 107/115).
What about the structure of subjectivity does the notion of time as self-affection reveal? For
Deleuze, it is the division between the fractured I (Je), and the passive self (moi). He writes
that in Kant “[i]t is as though the I were fractured from one end to the other: fractured by
the pure and empty form of time. […] Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a
passivity in the self […]” (DR 86/117). If the undetermined I becomes determinable only by
temporally differentiating itself from itself, it is time, paradoxically, that plays an active role
in the determination of the subject. For Deleuze, that the subject inevitably becomes passive
in its relation to time is important since it suggests that the passivity of the I as “a capacity to
experience affections” (DR 87/117-118) is not simply receptivity but a constitutive power.
Heidegger focuses on this point in his reading of Kant. For the discussions on the experience of autoaffection, see Leonard Lawlor, “Auto-Affection and Becoming,” in Environmental Philosophy 6, no. 1 (2009): 119.
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In other words, there can be a synthesis of time – which is passive itself – that constitutes the
I on the level of receptive sensibility. As we will see in the following chapter, Deleuze will
call this a passive synthesis of time.
Kant did not pursue his innovative idea of the fractured I, according to Deleuze;
although Kant substituted a self fractured by a line of time for the substantial self (DR
136/178), “the fracture is quickly filled by a new form of identity – namely, active synthetic
identity; whereas the passive self is defined only by receptivity and, as such, endowed with
no power of synthesis. […] here, synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new
form of identity in the I, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without
synthesis” (DR 87/117-118). It was Kant’s insight that there is something in sensible
intuition that cannot be reduced to, or grasped by concepts of the understanding. This
observation opened up the possibility of understanding time as a form, independently of its
content as in the order of heavenly bodies or the number of movement. However, this leaves
him with the problem of how the two faculties of a very different nature, receptive
sensibility and active understanding, can work together in accord. Kant believed that this
duality could be resolved by the synthesis that is carried out by imagination but requires the
unity of consciousness. Deleuze’s book on Kant presents the relationship of the faculties as
a central problem of the first critique. Kant’s project was essentially to define the condition
for the subject’s a priori knowledge. To secure the possibility of knowledge, Kant posited the
form of the object in general (object=X) as the correlate of the ‘I think.’ He thought that the
manifold would not be referred to an object unless we already have a form of object.
Although Kant ascribes synthesis to the faculty of imagination, this form of object
ultimately derives from the understanding. Therefore, the objects of intuition become
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subordinated to understanding as the legislative faculty, rather than imagination. It is the
unity of consciousness that enables the spatio-temporal relation subject to the categories of
the understanding.
Let us note that Deleuze is bringing together here Bergson’s idea of duration as that
which differs and Kant’s characterization of time as auto-affection. When Deleuze
establishes the idea of temporalized difference by redefining duration as ‘that which differs
from itself,’ it appears that he had in mind the notion of time as auto-affection, which is
temporal difference of the self from itself. In his book on cinema Deleuze writes, “Bergson is
much closer to Kant than he himself thinks: Kant defined time as the form of interiority, in
the sense that we are internal to time” (C2, 82/110). However, what Deleuze creates by
synthesizing the two does not resemble either of them. As he transformed the theory of
duration into the theory of difference, he reconstructs Kant’s account of time as the theory
of the passive self in relation to time; Deleuze relates the power of time to differ from itself
to the time beyond the unified subject, beyond consciousness. In this sense, for Deleuze,
Kant becomes the figure who opened up the possibility of ‘time beyond consciousness.’ 64
Deleuze’s account of the unconscious time, despite its debt to Bergson and Kant, is
genuinely an invention, given that duration for Bergson was coextensive as consciousness in
the early works such as Time and Free Will (L’Essai), and that the very ground for our
experience in Kant was not the split between the I and the self, but the transcendental unity
of apperception.

I limit my discussion on Deleuze’s Kantian reading of Bergson to ‘internal difference’ and temporal
difference. However, for the comprehensive understanding of Kant’s influence on Deleuze’s reading of
Bergson, one must look at the notion of intensity; it is on the notion of intensity that Deleuze disagrees with
Bergson and turns to Kant. Deleuze goes as far as to claim that duration must be thought in terms of intensive
difference. When he writes “[b]efore the distinction between difference of degree and difference in kind, there
is intensity” (DR 239/308), he targets Bergson directly by reviving Kant’s idea of intensity.
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In this chapter, we have seen how Deleuze’s view on the relationship between time
and movement developed from his reading of Bergson and Kant. I have shown that
Deleuze’s critical remarks on the subordination of time to movement aim at establishing the
notion of time as a force of differentiation. I have also discussed the implications of his
reference to Kant’s idea of time as an empty form and a form of auto-affection; I argued that
the significance of understanding time as self-differentiation lies in the way time defined as
such relates to the subject, and that this is why Deleuze was particularly interested in Kant’s
account of auto-affection, where the subject becomes passive in respect to time in
representing itself. In the following chapters, we will further examine this relationship of
time and the subject. In Chapter II, I give an extensive analysis of Deleuze’s three passive
syntheses of time that account for the production of subjectivity in the three modalities of
time – present, past and future. When we get to Chapter III, we shift our focus from
ontological account of time to socio-economic temporalities, and revisit the idea of time
subordinated to movement, in our attempt to examine the relation between time and the
movement of financial capital.
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II. Time and Subjectivity: Deleuze’s Three Syntheses of Time
In Chapter I, we have seen Deleuze’s critique of the traditional conception of time that is
subordinate to movement. By synthesizing Bergson’s view of time as duration and Kant’s
notion of auto-affection, Deleuze suggests the possibility of reconceiving time in terms of
temporalized difference. This newly defined time as a force to self-differentiate also calls
into question the notion of the subject as a substance that is supposed to endure through
time. In this chapter, we will look more closely at the role of time in the subject formation
by analyzing Deleuze’s passive synthesis of time given in the second chapter of Difference and
Repetition, especially the pages 70-96 (96-128). I will provide an expository account of the
three syntheses developed in these remarkably dense pages, while concentrating on the
question of the relationship between time and subjectivity; as time is reconceived as a
structure that constitutes the subject rather than a subjective form of experience, the subject
is no longer taken as an independent substance, but as a result of a temporal synthesis. We
shall see that Deleuze’s account of the syntheses is not only a theory of time, but more
importantly, a theory of the subject based on the notion of ‘the fractured I’ or ‘dissolved
self.’
One might wonder why we need to look to Deleuze to examine the relationship
between time and subjectivity, when it has already been recognized and taken up by the
thinkers in the phenomenological tradition as a central problem. A comprehensive answer
to this question requires a historical consideration of Deleuze’s relationship to
phenomenology, for which this chapter cannot possibly provide an exhaustive account.65 A

See for instance, Éric Alliez’s De l’impossibilité de la phénomenologie: Sur la philosophie française contemporaine
(Paris: Vrin, 1995), where the author discusses how French philosophy since the early 1980s developed,
departing from what it poses as the contemporary impossibility of phenomenology. For the comparative
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short answer would be the following: For the purpose of our inquiry, I find Deleuze to be
particularly insightful in that he provides, as my reading will illuminate, an account of the
subject formation both in terms of the ontological structure of time and of the socioeconomic structure of capitalism. This chapter will establish the ontological ground for the
production of the subject as a temporal synthesis, which will be considered with respect to
the temporality of capital in Chapters III and IV.
The central aim of this chapter is to frame the temporal synthesis as a process of
subject formation, which Deleuze later calls ‘subjectification (subjectivation).’ For this
purpose, I focus on Deleuze’s treatment of memory in the three syntheses that he claims to
be crucial in subjectification as a temporal process. I claim that Deleuze’s concept of
‘Memory’ (or pure past) developed from Bergson’s theory of pure memory and his
conception of Nietzsche’s ‘Forgetting’ make up the temporal structure that produces the
subject. By temporal structure I mean the relationship of the present with the past and the
future. To see time as a structure entails understanding the present is not simply given, but
produced by a temporal synthesis; in Deleuze’s system, we see that the ontological Memory
represents a repetition of the past coexisting with the present and that Forgetting makes this
repetition as a repetition of the different. It follows that the present subject is a product of
certain temporal relations, with differing degrees of repetition and novelty. It is my
analysis of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, see Leonard Lawlor, Thinking Through French Philosophy
(Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), especially the chapters on Deleuze and
Merleau-Ponty (“The End of Phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty,” & “The End of
Ontology: Interrogation in Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze”); Fred Evans’s “Unnatural Participation: MerleauPonty, Deleuze and Environmental Ethics,” Philosophy Today 54 (2010): 142-152; Pierre Montebello’s
“Deleuze, une Anti-Phénomenologie?,” Academia (Retrieved from
https://www.academia.edu/22639068/Deleuze_une_Anti-Ph%C3%A9nom%C3%A9nologie) that explains
in which sense Deleuze chose Bergson as his philosophical inspiration contra Merleau-Ponty; Jack Reynolds &
Jon Roffe’s “Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: Immanence, Univocity, and Phenomenology,” Journal of the British
Society of Phenomenology 37, no.3 (2006): 228-51. For Deleuze’s relation with Husserl, see Joe Hughes’s analysis
of the problem of genesis in Husserl and Deleuze in Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation (London & New
York: Continuum, 2008).
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contention that the production of subjectivity should be understood in terms of the MemoryForgetting relation, which exceeds individual consciousness. This chapter will also prepare
the readers for the link between Deleuze’s view on time in his early works and his analysis
of the subjectification in capitalism that appears in his later collective works with Félix
Guattari, discussed in the following chapters.
But when we say that time is not a subjective form but constitutive of the subject, what
kind of time are we talking about? How can the subject be passive in respect to time? Let us
take the example of memory; there is a kind of memory that concerns recalling past events.
When I try to remember what I did on May Day three years ago and think of the people I
met in the metro and the song I heard in the streets, the function of memory concerns a
reproduction of the images. When we try to recall something, we seem to retreat from what
is happening in the present so as to place ourselves in the pool of memories – what Deleuze
calls ‘the past in general’ – and then choose a specific image or information that we are
searching for. We may call this a voluntary memory in the sense that we can bring ourselves
to it when we want to at will. But there is another kind of memory that is involuntary or
unconscious. It can be triggered by a sensation, such as a melody or a smell that brings us
back to a certain moment in the past. These elements of the past that suddenly appear
without a conscious effort to recall can be powerful and even disruptive. As in the case of
flashbacks, one may feel that she is reliving the past moment in the present. That there is an
unconscious memory suggests that the subject can be put in a passive relation to time. The
subject can actively engage the past in the present moment by the active exercise of
recalling, but can also be affected or interrupted by the past in any given moment. The
subject is ‘subject to’ time both in actively engaging herself in temporal life, but at the same
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time, is passively affected by the irresistible force of time. Deleuze’s passive synthesis will be
useful to examine what sort of ‘temporal structure’ enables this to happen.
This paradoxical relationship between time and the subject makes Kant a key figure
for understanding Deleuze’s synthesis as a theory of subjectification. As we saw in Chapter
I, Deleuze finds the dual structure of the subject in Kant’s distinction between the
transcendental subject and the empirical self. Deleuze appreciates Kant’s notion of time as a
form of auto-affection, which expresses the split between the active ‘thinking I’ and the
passive ‘self.’ But he laments that Kant did not pursue the idea of this double structure of the
subject, when he posits the unity of transcendental subject as a ground for the possibility of
experience.66 Instead of presupposing the transcendental unity of apperception that secures
the synthetic identity, Deleuze sees the ‘doubling’ of the subject and its relation to time as
the essential structure of subjectivity. Therefore, we will begin this chapter by explaining
how Deleuze develops his theory of temporal synthesis by revising Kant’s synthesis.
Drawing on Maimon’s critique of the Kantian notion ‘transcendental,’ he argues that
synthesis can be a passive, generative process that does not require a synthetic unity as a
ground. In the second section, we look specifically at how Deleuze modifies ‘the
transcendental’ as a temporal synthesis based on Bergson’s concept of the virtual, while
explicating the details of Deleuze’s argument in the three syntheses. As noted earlier,
Memory – empirical and transcendental – will be the key notion here. When we get to the
last section, we will observe the reversal of time and the subject, which is analogous to the
reversal of time and movement: “Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul, or the
spirit, the virtual” (C2, 83/111). We see that time is not an a priori form of sensibility but a
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999) (Henceforth abbreviated as CPR), A106.
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form of the formation of the subject itself, through the doubling between the self and an
‘other.’
We will see that Deleuze’s synthesis of time concerns a temporality that conditions
the ordinary experience of time demarcated by the limit of consciousness. Thus we may say
that it elaborates the time of ‘the unconscious’ underlying consciously experienced time. We
will not discuss Deleuze’s psychoanalytic account of the syntheses here, but the notion of
primordial repetition will be crucial. Earlier we said that Deleuze critiques the idea of
repetition underlying the traditional theories of time. However, the notion will take on a
different meaning in this chapter. In his passive synthesis of time, Deleuze explains three
modalities of time – past, present and future – in terms of repetition, which turns out to be the
production of difference in time. As what constitutes ‘the unconscious,’ the passive
syntheses invite us to think time without a pre-existing subject (time itself) and to think
difference in time without presupposed identity (difference itself).

1. Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s syntheses
As preparatory work for the analysis of Deleuze’s theory of temporal synthesis, this section
sketches the implications of the passivity of synthesis by situating Deleuze’s transcendental
method in the context of the Kantian and the Post-Kantian tradition. In his attempt to
redefine ‘the transcendental,’ Deleuze reconceives temporal synthesis as a generative
movement from the unconscious, pre-individual field to individual consciousness. The
section consists of the following parts: (1) A brief summary of Kant’s account of synthesis,
(2) Deleuze’s critique of Kant, specifically of his notion of ‘the transcendental’ based on

52

Maimon’s genetic method, and (3) the passive synthesis as the transcendental field of the
unconscious.
Deleuze’s passive synthesis of time is a reformulation of Kant’s three syntheses.67 68
Unlike Deleuze’s synthesis, Kant’s synthesis does not concern itself with the theory of time
so much as with the relation among the faculties of the mind. Kant classifies the functions of
the mind and attributes them to different faculties. In the process of cognition, the receptive
faculty of sensibility and the spontaneous, active faculty of understanding take part. As
noted in the previous chapter, Kant’s theory of the faculties led him to the difficulties in
explaining how the faculties that are different in nature can accord themselves with one
another. Thus, for Kant, a synthesis that fills in the gaps between the two disparate faculties
– sensibility and understanding – was necessary. He assigns the act of synthesis to the third
faculty – imagination – that can mediate between the two and has the ability to represent
objects when they no longer appear to us. The three syntheses concern how the faculties of
sense, imagination, and understanding work harmoniously so that the sensible manifold is
unified under the a priori forms of experience in the subject.

For similar readings of Deleuze’s synthesis as a reworking of Kantian syntheses, see Henri Somers-Hall,
Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2013); Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s ‘Difference and Repetition’: A Reader’s Guide (London and New York:
Continuum, 2009); Daniel Smith, “Analytics: On the Becoming of Concepts,” in Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 122-145.
68 It is quite obvious that Deleuze borrows the term ‘passive synthesis’ from Edmund Husserl. He mentions the
Husserlian terminology of ‘retention’ in Difference and Repetition (DR 71, 73 and 80), and yet he curiously does
not engage actively with Husserl – but makes explicit references to Hume, Bergson and Nietzsche – in his
account of passive synthesis. My discussion of Deleuze’s transcendental method in this chapter is limited to his
engagement with Kant and Maimon, however, it has to be noted that the problem of genesis that shapes his
transcendental philosophy was central in the Husserl scholarship in France; see commentaries on genetic
phenomenology, for example, Derrida’s Le probleme de la genese dans la philosophie de Husserl (Paris: PUF, 1954
and 1990),” and Gerard Granel’s Le sens du temps et de la perception chez E. Husserl (Paris: Gallimard, 1968). For
a comparative discussion of Husserl’s and Deleuze’s passive syntheses in this regard, see Turetzky’s “The
Passive Syntheses of Time,” in Cosmological and Psychological Time, edit. Yuval Dolev and Michael Roubach
(Springer, 2016), 177-202.
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For Deleuze, Kant was innovative in defining the sensibility as an independent
faculty from the understanding and showing that there is something that can only be
grasped by sensibility. However, Kant was limited in thinking of sensibility merely as
receptivity and failed to see the possibility of synthesis on the sensibility level. Deleuze will
claim therefore that Kant, in order to secure the possibility of knowledge, presupposed
harmony among faculties based on the legislating faculty, the understanding, without
elaborating how the synthesis occurs. Each one of Deleuze’s passive syntheses describes a
condition under which the three stages of Kant’s active synthesis occur. If Kant’s first two
syntheses are grounded by the unity of transcendental apperception, for Deleuze the third
synthesis results in a ‘fracture’ of the I rather than the unity; the unity of the consciousness
in Kant is replaced by the ‘dissolved I.’ In Deleuze the unity is not presupposed but
considered as derived from the multiple, unconscious, ‘larval’ selves: “It is these three
syntheses which must be understood as constitutive of the unconscious” (DR 114/150).69
The synthesis in Kant
Kant talks about a threefold synthesis in the ‘Transcendental Deduction’70: synthesis
of apprehension in the intuition, of reproduction in the imagination, and of recognition in
the concept (CPR, A97-105). Each of them corresponds to the faculties of sense,
imagination and understanding. All of these faculties have an empirical employment as well

For a more detailed discussion on Deleuze’s treatment of ‘larval subjects’ and organic synthesis, see John
Protevi, “Larval Subjects, Autonomous Systems and E. Coli Chemotaxis,” Deleuze and the Body, edited by
Laura Guillaume and Joe Hughes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 29-52.
70 Kant’s deduction, where the account of three syntheses is given, examines whether the application of
concepts to objects can be justified. According to Kant, deduction is not required for the pure forms of
intuition but for the use of categories as the pure concepts of the understanding. We do not need to examine
the legitimacy of the former since there are no manifolds that are not given through space and time. But that
the phenomena are necessarily subject to the concepts needed to be justified. For Kant, synthesis proves that
the categories by which manifolds are synthesized have not only a subjective necessity – custom, as Hume
argued – but also objective validity.
69
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as a transcendental one. The transcendental employment of faculties concerns a priori (pure)
forms of intuition and concepts that are independent of empirical contents of experience.
For instance, empirical imagination brings empirical diversity to recognition and
transcendental imagination subsumes pure intuition under the unity of apperception. Kant
talks about the three sources of the mind that contain the conditions of the possibility of all
experience: sense, imagination, and apperception. According to Kant,
On these are grounded 1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; 2) the
synthesis of the manifold through the imagination; finally 3) the unity of this
synthesis through original apperception (CPR, A94).
By apprehension, we locate the manifold in a certain time and space. Kant says the
manifolds would not be represented (contained in one representation) unless we distinguish
the time in the succession of impressions (CPR, A99). Reproduction concerns retaining
former representations that are accompanied one another so that the mind will transition
from one to the other even when the object is not present. The synthesis of reproduction is
performed by the transcendental faculty of the imagination. However, according to Kant,
we would not be able to unify the manifold without the form of recognition. For Kant,
appearances themselves are not objects. What enables us to see them as an object of
representations is the form, ‘something in general =X.’ Kant says it can be nothing other
than “the formal unity of the consciousness,” or the unity of apperception that gives our
cognitions the unity that constitutes the concept of an object (CPR, A105).
Kant says that these syntheses are not only of the contents of an empirical condition
but also a transcendental one: a priori synthesis concerns the a priori forms of intuition (space
and time themselves) and of the understanding (categories), whereas the empirical synthesis
regards the empirical contents of those forms that are subsumed under the unity of
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apperception (question of how an object is constituted). For example, empirical
apprehension in intuition gives the diversity in space and time (and diversity of space and
time themselves) a form of the determinable by placing it in specific space and time.
Kant defines synthesis as “the act of putting different representations together, and of
grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge” (CPR, A77/B109). According
to Kant, we are hardly conscious of this function of synthesis. It is “a blind but
indispensable function of the soul”(CPR, A78/B103). However, since the synthesis is an
activity that requires more than receptivity, Kant thinks that it cannot be performed by
sensibility; if sensibility could perform a synthesis then what is given to it would be already
given as synthesized. Thus he attributes the activity of apprehension and reproduction to the
imagination. In the first Critique, the imagination plays a mediating role between sensibility
and understanding. First, in the Deduction, it relates phenomena (the diversity in space and
time) to the understanding and space and time themselves to the categories by
transcendental synthesis. The imagination performs the synthesis under the legislating
faculty, the understanding. Second, the imagination schematizes. Schema is a “third thing,
which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the
appearance” (CPR, A173/ B176). If synthesis is the determination of a certain space and
time in conformity with the categories, the schema is “a spatio-temporal determination
which itself corresponds to the category, everywhere and at all times” (PCK 18/28). The
imagination’s schematization presupposes the synthesis. Schema concerns how the
understanding applies to the phenomena that are already subject to it by the synthesis.
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Deleuze’s critique of Kant’s synthesis
But according to Deleuze, Kant’s attempt to solve the problem of duality between the
sensibility and understanding through synthesis is unsuccessful. Kant locates synthesis in
the imagination, but the imagination synthesizes only under the legislation of the
understanding. He does not explain how the imagination can be subjected to the
understanding. Understanding, the legislating faculty is what enables Kant to go beyond the
empirical association that Hume attributes to the principle of human nature. However,
Deleuze claims that Kant simply presupposes the harmony among the two disparate
faculties, rather than showing how it is generated. In his remarks on schematism Deleuze
says,
It [schema] brings spatio-temporal relations into correspondence with the logical
relations of the concept. However, since it remains external to the concept, it is not
clear how it can ensure the harmony of the understanding and sensibility, since it
does not even have the means to ensure its own harmony with the understanding
without appeal to a miracle (DR 218/281).
Deleuze claims that Kant did not successfully show in the first Critique how the
imagination can mediate the sensibility and the understanding despite being external to
concepts.71 In his critique of what he calls ‘the model of recognition,’ Deleuze points out
that common sense as a concordia facultatum – the harmonious exercise of all the faculties – is
presupposed in Kant’s syntheses.

In his book on Kant, Deleuze raises the same problem: “The fact that spatio-temporal relations can be
adequate to conceptual relations (in spite of their difference in nature) is, Kant says, a deep mystery and a
hidden art” (PCK 18/29); see also Immanuel Kant, letter to Marcus Herz, 26 May 1789, in Immanuel Kant:
Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99, ed. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 150-156.)
But Deleuze also finds the answer in Kant, in the role of imagination in the Third Critique. He argues, in the
account of the Sublime where the imagination is not subordinated to the understanding, the accord among all
the faculties is genuinely engendered in the form of ‘free play,’ rather than simply assumed (PCK 51/75).
Deleuze writes, “Kant was the first to provide the example of such a discordant harmony, the relation between
imagination and thought which occurs in the case of the sublime” (DR 146/190). See also “The Idea of
Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics” in Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974), edit. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael
Tormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 56-71.
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In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason he [Kant] describes in detail three
syntheses which measure the respective contributions of the thinking faculties, all
culminating in the third, that of recognition, which is expressed in the form of the
unspecified object as correlate of the ‘I think’ to which all the faculties are related.
Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a psychological
consciousness: the transcendental synthesis of apprehension is directly induced from an
empirical apprehension, and so on. In order to hide this all too obvious procedure, Kant
suppressed this text in the second edition (DR 135/176, emphasis added).
For Kant, the first two syntheses are grounded by the third synthesis of recognition. Deleuze
argues that Kant had to assume a Cogito that “expresses the unity of all the faculties in the
subject” (DR 133/174) as a ground. This was necessary for Kant, according to Deleuze,
since he conceived sensibility as a pure receptivity, deprived of the power to synthesize.
Thus, the synthesis that requires activity and spontaneity had to be attributed to
understanding. Kant was not unaware of the possibility of the synthesis prior to
consciousness in the A edition – in apprehension and reproduction – but did not develop
this insight. In the B edition he moves away from this unconscious kind of synthesis and
subordinates the overall activity of synthesis to the consciousness. “For Kant as for
Descartes, it is the identity of the Self in the ‘I think’ which grounds the harmony of all the
faculties and their agreement on the form of a supposed Same object” (ibid.). Thus, Deleuze
explores the possibility of the synthesis without presupposing sens commun or the identity of
the self, by reconceiving sensibility. He thinks that the sensibility, despite its receptivity, is
capable of syntheses. The self is also understood differently without the predetermined
unity, as a passive self. According to Deleuze, “[t]he passive self is not defined simply by
receptivity – that is, by means of the capacity to experience sensations – but by virtue of the
contractile contemplation which constitutes the organism itself before it constitutes the
sensations” (DR 78/107).
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Redefining the Transcendental
In the above passage, Deleuze also raises the problem of Kant’s transcendental
method. He calls Kant’s synthesis ‘active’ and his reconfiguration of it ‘transcendental
passive.’ It is important at this point to see how Deleuze modifies the Kantian distinction
between the empirical and the transcendental. Generally speaking, the empirical regards the
principles that are derived from our ordinary, conscious experience, whereas the
transcendental concerns the conditions of the experience. ‘The transcendental’ is to be
distinguished from ‘the transcendent,’ which denotes what exceeds the possibility of
experience. In Kant, the transcendental as the condition for the possibility of experience is
not itself an object of experience, but the a priori forms that make experience possible.
Deleuze thinks that the transcendental condition should tell us about more than a mere
possibility of experience. Deleuze’s reconfiguration of the transcendental is largely based on
Bergson’s critique of the notion of the possible. I will elaborate further on this claim in the
last section of the chapter (‘3.1 The virtual as the new transcendental’) after examining the
notion of the virtual in Deleuze’s synthesis. Here let us briefly see what Deleuze finds
problematic about defining the transcendental as the condition of the possibility of
experience. First of all, Deleuze thinks that Kant finds the transcendental condition in the
empirical. As Daniel Smith notes, “Kant had assumed that there are a priori ‘facts’ of reason
(knowledge, morality) and sought the condition of possibility of these facts in the
transcendental,”72 thus entailed a ‘conformism.’ To begin with the facts and derive the
condition for their possibility from them is, in Bergson-Deleuzian terms, to trace the
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transcendental from the empirical, or to look for the condition in ‘the conditioned.’73 If
Deleuze is right, Kant is confusing the distinction of the transcendental and the empirical
that he himself suggested. Another problem Deleuze sees is that conditions of possible
experience are “too general or too large for the real. The net is too loose that the largest fish
pass through” (DR 68/94). As Moulard-Leonard puts it, the conditions of possibility for
Kant are “negative conditions of necessity” in the sense that without them there could
supposedly be no meaningful experience. Deleuze wants the transcendental to be the
condition of real experience rather than a general, abstract condition of possible
experience.74
Thus Deleuze suggests, “the condition must be a condition of real experience, not of
possible experience. It forms an intrinsic genesis, not an extrinsic conditioning” (DR
154/200). For Deleuze, the condition of real experience should provide a genetic account of
the experience without positing any external principle, such as the transcendental unity of
apperception that guarantees a concordia facultatum. As Joe Hughes notes, Deleuze’s account
of the passive synthesis “takes up the Kantian syntheses and describes them from the point

The distinction between the possible and the real comes from Bergson. Deleuze says in his essay ‘Bergson,’
“What Bergson critiques in the idea of the possible is that it presents us a simple copy of the produce, projected
or rather retrojected onto the movement of production, onto invention” (Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and
Other Texts (1953-1974), edit. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Tormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 30).
It is in “The Possible and the Real” (Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle Andison (New York:
Philosophical Libarary, 2007), 73-86) that Bergson advances a critique of ‘the possible.’ According to Bergson,
we think of ‘the possible’ as something prior to the real. That is, we think that for something to be realized, it
must first be possible. He gives an example a work of art that is not yet created, in the description of a
conversation he once had about the future of literature during the Great War. The interlocutor asks him
whether he perceives “certain possible directions” of the great dramatic work of tomorrow. Bergson responds
by pointing to the fact that the work of tomorrow that is to take place is not yet possible, but when a man of
talent creates the work, then and only then, it will become retrospectively possible. Upon its realization, it
begins to ‘have been always possible.’ Despite the fact that the possibility is a reality of a thing retrojected onto
the past, we mistakenly think that for something to be realized, it must first be possible. The possible is “the
mirage of the present in the past” (82).
74 Valentine Moulard-Leonard, Bergson-Deleuze Encounters: Transcendental Experience and the Thought of the Virtual
(State University of New York Press, 2008), 170.
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of view of a transcendental genesis.”75 Later in the chapter, we will see how Deleuze uses
the virtual-actual schema to show the transcendental genesis of time and subjectivity.
Is Deleuze’s criticism of Kant for overlooking the problem of genesis fair? It seems to
me that their disagreement on the transcendental comes from the differing concepts of
experience. For Kant, experience consists of representations unified in the consciousness, the
given to the ‘I.’ Thus, the Kantian transcendental concerns the necessary condition under
which the experience defined as such occurs: the condition of the possibility. For Deleuze,
experience does not begin with representations and the unity of consciousness, but as the
process where the representations and conscious states themselves are generated. When
understood as a continuous, productive process, experience is not demarcated by ‘the given’
in the consciousness. Therefore, the transcendental for Deleuze as the condition of
experience should look beyond the Kantian notion of phenomenon and the limit of
consciousness. As Sauvagnargues puts it, Deleuze “releases experience from its moulding
through an originary subject: experience is no longer, in the manner of phenomenology, a
seizure of originary conditions of the given for consciousness.”76 We will demonstrate in
what follows how Deleuze develops his critique of the Kantian transcendental method
based on Salomon Maimon’s genetic method, especially the generation of sensation by the
unconscious synthesis.
Maimon: the possibility of the ‘unconscious’ synthesis
We said that Deleuze finds Kant’s synthesis as an attempt to bridge the gap between the two
faculties to be unsuccessful, because it relies on the external principle that Kant presupposes.
Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s ‘Difference and Repetition’: A Reader’s Guide (London and New York: Continuum,
2009), 90.
76 Anne Sauvagnargues, “The Problematic Idea, Neo-Kantianism and Maimon’s Role in Deleuze’s Thought”
in At the Edges of Thought, Edinburgh University, 44-59. 48.
75
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Deleuze demands that the transcendental condition explains how the experience is
generated. Before we move on to Deleuze’s own account of synthesis, we need to see what
it entails to analyze experience from a genetic point of view. On this point Deleuze draws
on Salomon Maimon, a Post-Kantian thinker, who tries to solve the duality between the
sensibility and understanding using Leibnizian differentials. His central claim is that the
transcendental should be defined as a genetic condition of the experience, which involves
understanding perception in terms of a synthetic relation between differential elements. The
details of Maimon’s argument against Kant’s transcendental method, while intriguing, are
not immediately relevant to our inquiry here.77 Thus we will keep our focus on his account
of the unconscious synthesis.
Let us first look at the notion of ‘the unconscious’ in Leibniz,78 which Maimon’s
claim regarding the unconscious nature of the differentials is rooted. Leibniz distinguished
the sensible and the unconscious sensibility. He acknowledged that there are latent
memories that are not brought into consciousness, but later come to mind when something
reminds us of them “as when hearing the opening words of a song is enough to bring back
the rest”79 (Leibniz 1714:208). He also distinguishes perception from apperception;
apperception is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of perception (ibid.). So, for
For a more detailed discussion of Maimon and Deleuze, see for example, Simon Duffy’s analysis of
Maimon’s critique of Kant on Mathematics in Deleuze and the History of Mathematics: In Defense of the ‘New’
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2013); Anne Sauvagnargues’s “The Problematic Idea, Neo-Kantianism and
Maimon’s Role in Deleuze’s Thought” in At the Edges of Thought, edit. by Craig Lundy and Daniella Voss
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 44-59; Daniela Voss’s Conditions of Thought: Deleuze and the
Transcendental Conditions (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) and “Maimon and Deleuze: the
viewpoint of internal genesis and the concept of differentials” Parrhesia 11 (2011): 62-74. Commentaries on
Maimon that Deleuze refers to in DR include Martial Guéroult’s book, La philosophie transcendentale de Salomon
Maimon (Paris: Alcan, 1929) and Jules Vuillemin’s L’héritage kantien et la revolution copernicienne (Paris: PUF,
1954).
78 The notion of ‘the unconscious’ discussed in this chapter is to be distinguished from the Freudian model of
the unconscious that involves the process of repression.
79 G.W.F. Leibniz, New Essays on the Human Understanding, trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981[1714]), 52.
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Leibniz, there is perception that we do not apperceive, thus is not immediately available to
consciousness. In this sense we may say that Leibniz discovered ‘the unconscious.’ He
explains this in terms of minute perceptions (petites perceptions, perceptions insensibles) that
constitute the sensible. What is sensible in the Kantian sense is, according to Leibniz, a
result of synthesis on the level of unconscious sensibility. For example, the sound of the sea
is made up of minute perceptions of water drops. The feeling of hunger becomes notable
when the lack of sugar reaches a certain level. Deleuze notes that for Leibniz, consciousness
is not what grounds the synthesis, but it is a matter of threshold.80 Minute or inconspicuous
perceptions are not parts of conscious perception but “differentials of consciousness.”81 For
example, when the colors yellow and blue are blended, they enter into a reciprocal
determination of differentials that produces green.
𝑑𝑏
𝑑𝑦

=g

In other words, green becomes a conscious perception when the reciprocal relationship
between blue and yellow reaches a certain point. So, from the genetic point of view,
perception does not presuppose an object that affects us but one that consists of the
reciprocal determination of differentials. Deleuze writes that for Leibniz, “space-time ceases
to be a pure given in order to become the totality or the nexus of differential relations in the
subject, and the object itself ceases to be an empirical given in order to become the product
of these relations in conscious perception” (ibid.). If sensibility for Kant submits to
transcendental conditioning, Leibniz explains it in terms of the principle of continuity and
internal genesis.

Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1993), 88.
81 Ibid., 89.
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Maimon claims that this Leibnizian method of the reciprocal determination of
differentials replaces the Kantian transcendental method of conditioning. In his account of
differentials, Maimon draws on Kant’s Anticipations of perception, where Kant explains
sensation in terms of intensive magnitude.82 He notes that sensations such as color, light or
heat spread between the lowest degree of consciousness and a fully conscious perception.
Accordingly, our consciousness runs between varying degrees of sensible intuition. Maimon
conceives differentials as intensive magnitude, from which extensive magnitude is
generated. “For example, the different degrees of heat and cold are perceived by means of
the rising and falling of a thermometer: it is given as a unity and thought as a plurality
through comparison. With quanta, intensive magnitude is the differential of the extensive,
and the extensive is, in turn, the integral of the intensive.”83 The differentials, infinitely small
differences, in their reciprocal determination constitute an object of cognition with a
determined magnitude. The differentials themselves are not yet given to consciousness, thus
constitute the transcendental field of ‘unconscious.’
Maimon calls the genetic differential elements of intuitions ‘presentations
(Darstellungen),’ which the Kantian representations (Vorstellung) are generated from. Maimon
argues that any sensible representation should be considered as a presentation: “sensible
representations in themselves, considered as mere differentials, do not yet result in
consciousness […] this is not representation, i.e. a mere making present of what is not [now]
present, but rather presentation, i.e. the representation of what was previously not as [now]
existing.”84 If the re-presentation (vor-stellung) of an object is a copy or reproduction of the

Salomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Philosopjhy, trans. Nick Midgley, Henry Somers-Hall, Alistair
Welchman, and Merten Reglitz (New York and London: Continuum, 2010), Chapter 7.
83 Ibid. 69.
84 Ibid. 20.
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object that relates externally to its representation, presentation suggests the internal genetic
process that does not presuppose the reality of the object external to it.85 This refers us back
to our earlier discussion of Deleuze’s distinction between ‘what presents itself ‘and ‘what is
represented,’ as well as that between appearing (apparition) and appearance (apparence).86 For
Deleuze, representation implies activity and unity, whereas presentation relates to passivity
and diversity.
In support of Maimon’s transcendental method, Deleuze says:
Maimon’s genius lies in showing how inadequate the point of view of conditioning is
for a transcendental philosophy: both terms of the difference must equally be thought
– in other words, determinability must itself be conceived as pointing towards a
principle of reciprocal determination (DR 173/225).
According to Deleuze, his reconfiguration of Kant’s transcendental method along the line of
internal genesis is to pursue the initial object of Kantian synthesis. Kant’s first two syntheses
seem to concern the problem of genesis – how a representation of objects is generated in
time. Kant posits the possibility of, what we might call, ‘unconscious synthesis’ when he
says, “we are seldom ever conscious”(CPR, A78/B103) of the syntheses in sense and
imagination. But later in the third synthesis of recognition, the question becomes why the
consciousness and its unity is required for us to have representations. Kant calls the mind’s
consciousness of itself as the subject of its representations, ‘transcendental apperception.’
(CPR, A106-108) The transcendental apperception that ties appearances together as one
experience is a ground of the syntheses as well as of subjectivity. Without it, representations
would not be the representations of a thing, or my representations. Kant claims that this
numerical unity is not given empirically, but has to be there prior to any experience.

For a more detailed discussion on ‘presentation’ in Maimon, see Samuel Atlas, From Critical to Speculative
Idealism: The Philosophy of Solomon Maimon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), especially Chapter IV.
86 See Chapter I, 3.3 ‘Time as an empty form’
85
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Deleuze wants to complete Kant’s unfinished investigation by revisiting the problem
of the genesis. He thinks that the transcendental as a genetic account should not presuppose
the unity but explain how it is produced. He believes that the syntheses can be rewritten
without assuming the unity of consciousness as the transcendental ground of subjectivity.
Thus, for Deleuze, the synthesis concerns not only how representations are generated but
also how the subjectivity is produced in time.
Let us remember that Deleuze finds the subject’s passive relation to time in his
comparison between the Kantian and the Cartesian ego. In Kant, the ‘I think’ determines
the undetermined existence ‘I am,’ but only under the form through which the latter
becomes determinable – the form of time. Deleuze sees the third term determinable as the
passive self (what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition). This passive subject, however, is
not a pure receptivity as Kant described. According to Deleuze, Kant understood this
passive self as mere receptivity, and thus he had to posit a new form of active synthetic
identity by resurrecting ‘the I’: “It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution […]
here, synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I,
while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis” (DR 87/118). Deleuze
will argue that the synthesis occurs before any conscious activity intervenes. He calls this a
passive synthesis of time.
Passivity of the synthesis: Transcendental-unconscious subject
Since Deleuze wants to explain the condition of experience without the presumed
subsumption of sensibility under the faculty of understanding, he will seek to show that the
sensibility itself has a power of synthesis and thus synthesis is a generative movement from
sense to thought. As the a priori forms of sensibility in Kant are space and time, Deleuze also
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discusses the synthesis of the sensible in two different ways. We said earlier that in
Maimon’s Leibnizian reading of Kant, time and space are not a pure given, but a synthesis
or a binding together of differential relations that constitutes the subject and the object.
Drawing on this point, Deleuze demonstrates the generation of the space as the form of
outer sense and of the object with his account of the synthesis of differential elements that
he calls intensities. To explain the production of the subject and of time as the form of inner
sense, Deleuze presents ‘the passive syntheses of time’ that describes the way the passive self
is affected by time and constitutes subjectivity. Unlike his theory of intensity that is
generally received as an account for the production of objects in space, Deleuze’s passive
synthesis of time is not widely appreciated as a theory of the production of the subject. In
the next section, I wish to demonstrate the ways in which such a reading is justified.
Before we move on, it is perhaps helpful to see how Deleuze’s reworking of the
transcendental method is related to his notion of time as self-differentiation that we have
seen in the previous chapter. We said that Deleuze draws the definition of time as
differentiation by creatively combining Bergson’s duration as ‘that which differs from itself’
and Kant’s notion of time as auto-affection. In his appropriation of the transcendental as
well, Deleuze brings in Bergson’s idea of the virtual, which he believes to be a conceptual
framework for the time of the unconscious.
Like Bergson, Deleuze believes that our experience is what is filtered through our
consciousness that tends toward practical needs. We perceive things not by adding parts but
by subtracting from the whole what does not meet our needs. What is given to us is given as
limited or even altered by the tendency of human understanding, for example, the need for
action and reaction leads us to see things as substances that remain unchanged throughout
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time. It is also necessary to attribute identity to the subjects as agents of action. In our
ordinary experience, we do not question the unity of the subject, or that of the ‘things’ that
are presented to us as objects.
In order to complement the time of consciousness that is centered on the present,
Deleuze turns to Bergson’s peculiar theory of memory, which affirms the virtual existence of
the past in the present. He finds it convincing to posit different coexisting levels of time as a
transcendental condition for the present. To put it in other words, time can be effectively
seen as a co-determining structure between the time of the actual, consciousness and the
time of the virtual, unconscious time.87 When Deleuze writes “[d]ifferentiation is the
movement of a virtuality actualizing itself,” (BCD 40/55-56) he is introducing his project of
transforming Bergson’s theory of the virtual into a transcendental account of time:
articulating the time of the unconscious.

2. The Passive Syntheses of Time: The Formation of the Subject
2.1 Time and Subjectification: Memory as Auto-affection
“[T]he subject, at root, is the synthesis of time.”88
We have seen that Deleuze’s passive synthesis of time is to provide an explanation
for how Kant’s active syntheses are generated. This task involves reconstructing Kant’s
notion of ‘the transcendental.’ With Deleuze, the Kantian transcendental-empirical scheme
is recast as the virtual-actual distinction. Since our focus here is the relation between time
Bergson, in the early works, limits duration to consciousness in distinguishing it from the material objects.
However his later theory of memory develops the workings of our mind that cannot be identified with
consciousness. It is for this reason that Deleuze says Bergson’s theory of memory is more essential than that of
duration.
88 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature. trans. Constantin V.
Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 93.
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and the subject formation, our discussion of Deleuze’s synthesis of time will be centered on
how the virtual-actual scheme structures the relation between the present, the past and the
future.
Many readers of Deleuze have approached the passive synthesis from the point of
view of genesis, specifically, as a movement from sensibility to the production of thought
(dynamic genesis). Joe Hughes says that the passive synthesis is “Deleuze’s account of the
dynamic genesis,” which he defines as a process that “begins in sensibility and sets of the
‘explosive’ line of the faculties as it travels from the imagination to memory to thought.” 89
Another key commentator of Difference and Repetition, Henri Somers-Hall reads Deleuze’s
passive synthesis as an account of “the organization of experience which does not rely on
the activity of a subject.” Framing the problem in this way, he raises the question of
“explaining how subjects come into being,” however, his primary focus seems to be
showing Deleuze’s synthesis as an alternative to the Kantian notion of synthesis. 90 Others
treated Deleuze’s analysis as a theory of time; Jay Lampert analyzes Deleuze’s arguments in
terms of ‘logics of time’ corresponding to different temporal modalities such as succession,
coexistence and simultaneity, and how these logics apply to historical events and to the idea
of history itself.91 James Williams characterizes Deleuze’s idea of time as “a genuine
multiple philosophy of time” and emphasizes the “irreducible multiplicity of dimensions” of
time as the result of syntheses.92

Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s ‘Difference and Repetition’: A Reader’s Guide (London and New York: Continuum,
2009), 86.
90 Henri Somers-Hall, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 56-57.
91 Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History (London and New York: Continuum, 2006)
92 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 10.
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My reading differs from those listed above; I treat Deleuze’s passive synthesis as an
account for the production of the subject. I claim that it provides an ontological ground for
his theory of subjectification that he develops throughout his oeuvre, independently and
together with Guattari. As a preparation for the discussions to follow on the subject
formation through socio-economic temporalities (Chapters III & IV), our analysis of the
passive synthesis here centers on establishing time as a structure of subjectivity. The key
notion will be that of ‘Memory,’ through which Deleuze defines the virtual and puts
together time and subjectification explicitly. Therefore I will restructure the three syntheses
around the notion of memory – habit-memory, recollection-memory and transcendental
memory (Forgetting).
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Deleuze defines time as self-differentiation
and relates it with Kant’s auto-affection, thus rendering the subject passive in relation to
time. Here we will see more closely how Deleuze develops Kant’s notion of auto-affection
as a model of subject formation. In his book on Foucault where he raises the problem of
subjectification,93 Deleuze claims that Kant’s paradox of inner sense reveals the temporal
structure of subjectivity.
Memory is the real name of the relation to oneself, or the affection on self by self.
According to Kant, time was the form in which the mind affected itself, just as space
was the form in which the mind was affected by something else: time was therefore
‘auto-affection’ and made up the essential structure of subjectivity. But time as subject,
or rather subjectification, is called memory (F 107/115, emphasis added, translation
modified).
Here Deleuze argues that (1) time understood as an auto-affection forms the structure of
subjectivity and that (2) the form of time involved in subjectification is memory. On the first

‘Subjecfication’ is a translation of the French term, subjectivation. This is to be distinguished from
‘subjection,’ which translates assujettissement. I discuss this distinction in detail in the section ‘The Problem of
Subjectification in Deleuze’ in Chapter IV.
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point, he does not mention it explicitly in the text, but he is referring to Heidegger’s reading
of Kant,94 which we cannot discuss here in full; In Kant and the problem of metaphysics,
Heidegger says “time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity.”95 He
notes that time is “in the subject” does not simply mean the subjective character of time, but
the very temporal character of the self.96 In Kant, as pure self-affection, time concerns the
mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity. Time enables the mind to be
what it is, thus forms the basis of selfhood. The self is not given, but constituted through and
only through time. The subject is no other than the self that is able to affect itself. 97 Thus
Heidegger writes, “Time and the ‘I think’ are no longer opposed to one another as unlike
and incompatible; they are the same.”98
If Heidegger highlights the temporal character of transcendental apperception,
Deleuze focuses more on articulating a structure of time under which the subject is
constituted, which results not in the unity, but the fracture in ‘the I.’ He wants to show what
we might call a reversal of time and the subject: it is not that time is in us but we are in time.
According to the second point Deleuze is making here, we should turn to the notion of
memory in order to understand this reversal. Deleuze’s account of memory relies much on
Bergson’s theory of pure past, but only combined with the Nietzschean concept of

In Foucault, Deleuze says that Foucault reads Nietzsche through Heidegger, in that he starts to rethink ‘the
outside’ in terms of temporality rather than spatiality toward the end of his career (Gilles Deleuze, Foucault,
trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1986)). According to Deleuze,
Foucault’s interest in the problem of subjectification and time was developed from Heidegger’s reading of
Kant. See Foucault, ‘Le retour de la morale’ (entretien avec G. Barnbedette et A. Scala, 29 mai 1984), Les
Nouvelles litteraires, no. 2937, 28 juin 1984, 36-41.
95 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1962), 194.
96 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 193-197.
97 In Chapter I, Section 4.2, I discussed ‘auto-affection’ in terms of the activity of thinking turned inward,
where we observe the split between the active thinking I and the passive self as an object of thought. I provide
an extensive analysis on this split, or the ‘doubling’ of the subject in Chapter IV, Section 1.1.
98 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 197.
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Forgetting. As we will see below, these figures – Bergson and Nietzsche – provide crucial
inspiration for Deleuze’s three passive syntheses. In terms of the relation between
subjectivity and memory, the first two syntheses will bear on the two aspects of memory,
which Deleuze defines as a ‘line of subjectivity’ in Bergsonism: contraction-subjectivity and
recollection-subjectivity. The third synthesis reveals the power of forgetting within memory,
using Nietzsche’s eternal return as a model. So, in the following I will show how the passive
syntheses produce subjectivity, as they constitute present, past and future in time. I will
focus on the role of memory – and forgetting – to highlight how time as auto-affection forms
the structure of subjectivity.
2.2 The first synthesis of habit: originary subjectivity
In the three syntheses that correspond to the present, past and future, he shows that
the operation of repetition constitutes time as well as the subject. In the first synthesis, we
see how time is constituted as the present, of which the past and the future are said to be
only dimensions. The second synthesis shows how the present and the future can be
considered as a result of the synthesis of pure Memory, or what he calls the ‘Being of the
past.’ In this sense, it can be argued that each one of the three syntheses seems to present an
account of time independently from one another. However, there is also a sense in which
they constitute one structure of time as a whole, in which they play different specific roles.
When we get to the third synthesis, Deleuze says that the first synthesis is the foundation
(fondation) of time, the second, the ground (fondement) of time and the third, the
‘ungrounding (effondement) ’ of time (DR 91/123). I am more interested in showing the
latter, the relation between the three temporal dimensions that the three syntheses reveal, as
well as its implications for the production of subjectivity.
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The first synthesis of the present seems to accomplish two things: On the one hand, it
explains how the active synthesis of apprehension in Kant is generated. Unlike Kant who
subordinates the imagination as a faculty of synthesis to the legislation of the understanding,
Deleuze portrays the synthesis as a spontaneous operation of what he calls ‘vital primary
sensibility,’ from which both sensations (subjective) and qualities (objective) are produced.
On the other hand, the first synthesis demonstrates how the subject can be understood as a
product of temporal synthesis. Deleuze describes a preliminary form of subjectivity as the
pre-individual ‘egos’ that respond to the surroundings, the yet-to-be objects. I hope to clarify
in the following these ideas that constitute Deleuze’s version of the transcendental field.
Contraction as impersonal memory
In the first synthesis, Deleuze claims that there is an operation that occurs in the
imagination prior to any sort of active reflection or memory, which he calls “contraction.”
Deleuze uses this Bergsonian term99 to refer to the psychological formation of a ‘case’ in our
imagination as well as the organic formation of the body through the contraction of
elements.100 According to Deleuze, a succession of instants is not enough to constitute the
temporal dimension of the present; there has to be something that is prolonged in the
succession of passing instants and there has to be an activity of retaining one instant when
another appears (DR 70-71/97). Deleuze says that it is the imagination as a contractile power
that synthesizes two independent instants into one another. As Joe Hughes also points out,
Deleuze’s claim that a succession of instants cannot form time echoes Bergson’s notion of
The term ‘contraction’ comes from Bergson’s theory of memory, which we will return to in the next section
on the second synthesis. In his reading of Bergson, Deleuze contrasts ‘contraction’ with pure repetition of
matter, where we find only discontinuous moments that are external to one another (BCD 45).
100 Eugene B. Young et al. The Deleuze and Guattari Dictionary (Norfolk: Bloomsbury, 2013), 73; for the
contraction on an organic level, Deleuze talks about contraction in terms of need, desire and fatigue in the
section on the first synthesis, which we do not discuss in depth here.
99
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elementary memory101 – that time cannot be produced without memory that connects two
instants. Contraction in the first synthesis can be seen as ‘an impersonal memory’ in that it
gathers successive moments together.
Deleuze claims that it is through this contraction that we form habit, by drawing a
relation between successive instants: “In essence, habit is contraction” (DR 73/101).
Contraction as habit is not what is opposed to dilation or relaxation. This process of
habituation involves repetition obviously, but also an act of “drawing off something new”
from repetition. For example, when A-B-A-B-A… occurs, the mind retains something from
the passing instants of A-B and anticipates that B will appear after A. That is, the mind
expects that the case AB would perpetuate. Here the mind draws a relation that is not found
in the terms A and B themselves, but external to them. Hence Deleuze says “[r]epetition
changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which
contemplates it” (DR 70/96). Strictly speaking, if there are only the alternating cases (or
types) of A and B without that which contemplates it, we would not be able to call it a
repetition since it would simply be an instantaneous appearance of a discrete element that
disappears before the other appears: for whom would it be a repetition? So, we should say
that we could speak properly of repetition only in relation to the mind that contemplates on
the change and difference. Although we cannot yet properly speak of the object-subject
distinction since it is the production of the subject that Deleuze’s synthesis is trying to
capture, but the emergence of contemplating minds on the status of matter as mens
momentanea marks the preliminary relation between the two.

Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s ‘Difference and Repetition’: A Reader’s Guide (London and New York: Continuum,
2009), 131.
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Let us then consider where the contemplating mind stands in relation to matter and
empirical subjectivity. Deleuze seems to talk about the distinction in terms of three levels of
repetition: repetition in-itself, repetition for-itself and repetition for us.

Repetition in itself

instantaneous repetition
of matter (succession of
instants)

Repetition foritself
passive synthesis
(living present)

Repetition for-us
actively represented
repetition
(empirical present)

Table 2. Levels of Repetition

The first one concerns the status of matter or, as seen above, the cases that appear
momentarily without an observer. It is a repetition of matter in itself, not in relation to
anything. There is nothing that endures on this level, but only a succession of instants that
marks an “aborted moment of the birth” of time in Deleuze’s term. It is not until the third
moment that we have an empirical subject and the present as an actively represented
repetition. This is the empirical present that we are conscious of. The passive synthesis we
are dealing with in this section is an intermediary between these two. It constitutes a
preliminary distinction between matter and the activity of contraction. The imagination as a
contractile power or a contemplative mind synthesizes discontinuous instants by drawing a
relation between them. It is a pre-reflective activity that occurs in the mind, not by the mind.
Deleuze writes, “from the instantaneous repetition which unravels itself to the actively
represented repetition through the intermediary of passive synthesis” (DR 76/103-104). He
gives an example of a chicken that pecks grain. What we see as pecks in the perceptual
synthesis is comprised of cardiac pulsations in an organic synthesis that leads to a nodding
of the chicken’s head. The organism draws something different in its body through repeated
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pulsations. The point at which the pre-reflective mind can no longer contract is marked by
fatigue.
Habit as bodily memory
What does this passive synthesis have to do with subjectivity? According to Deleuze,
as the living present is constituted in time, an “originary subjectivity” emerges. Deleuze
defines the self – or any organism – in terms of habit. For Deleuze, an active subject is made
up of the selves that are themselves contraction and contemplation (contractile
contemplation): “Underneath the self which acts are little selves which contemplate and
which render possible both the action and the active subject” (DR 75/103). He first defines
the originary subjectivity as a ‘vital primary sensibility.’ It is a sensibility that does not
belong to an active subject, prior to recognition, representation, and even prior to sensations
that we normally attribute to an active subject. Here he is suggesting that we think of
synthesis not only as a perceptual process but also as an organic synthesis. Later in the text
Deleuze gives an example of an eye. “The eye binds light, it is itself a bound light” (DR
96/128). An organism develops a habit of seeing as it adapts itself to the light stimuli. As
Malabou notes, the eye is produced by the material it contracts.102 So, contraction is both
action and reaction. The organism can develop sight only by being exposed to light, but at
the same time it should be able to actively respond to the stimuli in determining how the
stimuli would be reproduced on a particular part of its body. It is passive in relation to an
empirical subject of representation, but active in relation to matter. Deleuze says that this
primary sensibility is a constituent passivity that makes up the system of “dissolved selves”

Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic, trans. Lisabeth During (New
York: Routledge, 2005), 61.
102
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or “larval subjects” (DR 78/107). As the eyes themselves are contracted matter, it is not that
the selves contemplate themselves but they are contemplations.103
Let us return to the problem of memory. The synthesis of habit in imagination
produces a living present or the present in general in time. Deleuze notes that this grounds
empirical memory as the activity of imagination: “[T]he active syntheses of memory and
understanding are superimposed upon and supported by the passive synthesis of the
imagination” (DR 71/98). We saw in Kant’s synthesis memory is understood as
reproduction performed by imagination as an ability to produce the image of the objects of
past perception when they are no longer present. But for Deleuze, reproduction as an
activity of imagination is an active synthesis of memory and thus is to be grounded by the
passive synthesis.
Deleuze does not say this explicitly, but I claim that the relation between the
synthesis of habit and that of memory cannot be adequately understood without reference to
Bergson’s distinction between two forms of memory: habit-memory and recollectionmemory (or pure memory). Habit-memory is an automatic action to the environment
acquired by repetition. It concerns a pattern of bodily actions in the sensory-motor
mechanism. Habit is what enables us to recognize the object that we encountered before
without having to seek consciously the past perception of it. Here is Bergson’s example:
When we try to learn a lesson by heart, we need to decompose and recompose its parts and
repeat the same effort. Like other habitual bodily exercise, the lesson is stored in a
mechanism so that the beginning of the lesson would automatically trigger the memory of
In the first passive synthesis of habit that precedes the subject-object distinction, the relations between
contractions are called signs– contractions referring to one another (DR 77/106). Deleuze develops the idea of
‘sign’ further in Chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition in terms of ‘the object of encounter,’ which we examine in
the following section, 2.3. He also develops a more comprehensive theory of signs in his book, Proust and Signs
(University of Minnesota Press, 2000), where he reads Proust’s novel using four types of signs.
103
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the entire lesson. This is a kind of memory that can be brought to the present at any
moment, as an automatic reaction to external stimuli or to a present perception.
Recollection-memory is different altogether. According to Bergson, it is like an event in our
life. It is a memory of something that bears a date and a place and thus “unable to occur
again.”104 Bergson describes “the radical difference between that which must be built up by
repetition and that which is essentially incapable of being repeated.”105 Habit-memory serves
a practical purpose and proves its utility by its being in the present, or more precisely, in the
present action. On the contrary, in order to access a recollection-memory we have to
“withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have the power to value the
useless” (ibid.). Thus habit-memory relates to bodily perception and recollection memory to
pure memory (‘memory par excellence’). We will return to this notion of pure memory in
the section on the second synthesis.
Habit-memory makes the originary subjectivity Deleuze mentioned earlier more
clear. In Bergsonism, Deleuze discusses ‘contraction-subjectivity (la subjectivité-contraction)’ as
one of the two aspects of memory that signify subjectivity: the body of an organism
becoming more than an instant in time, but contrive a contraction of the experienced
excitations (B 53/47). We may say that the repetition of an organism’s response to the
external stimuli forms the time of the present, as well as a preliminary subjectivity as a
pattern of habituated response.

Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy M. Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books,
1991), 80.
105 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 83.
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Transition to the second synthesis
The contraction-subjectivity is, however, only one of the two aspects of memory as
the province of the line of subjectivity (ibid.). We have yet to look at ‘recollectionsubjectivity’ that Deleuze introduces in the second synthesis of the past. According to
Deleuze, memory in the active synthesis depends on both the first and the second passive
synthesis: “The passive synthesis of habit constituted time as a contraction of instants with
respect to a present, but the active synthesis of memory constitutes it as the embedding
(emboîtement) of presents themselves. […] the active synthesis of memory may well be
founded upon the (empirical) passive synthesis of habit, but on the other hand it can be
founded only by another (transcendental) passive synthesis which is peculiar to memory
itself” (DR 81/110, translation modified). The first synthesis concerns contraction on the
level of matter and body as a habituated response to the environment. It shows the
emergence of elementary subjectivity as a ‘presentized’ bodily memory. The synthesis of
habit is ‘empirical passive’ in that, when seen from a conscious subject, it operates in the
present action, but its operation is almost automatic and thus is not always represented to
our consciousness. The synthesis of memory that we will discuss below is considered to be
transcendental passive, in the sense that it deals with the kind of memory that is not brought
to our present action or consciousness without changing its nature.
2.3 Second synthesis of memory: Bergson’s pure past – the unconscious
We have seen that the passive synthesis of habit produces an elementary subjectivity
as well as the present in time by contracting the moments that would otherwise disappear
instantaneously. In the second synthesis, we will see that the contraction in the present is a
manifestation or an aspect of another contraction on a deeper level. So contraction takes on
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a different meaning, as the synthesis reveals a new way to understand the relation between
the present and the past. Deleuze calls the first synthesis a foundation of time and the
second, a ground of time: “Habit is the originary synthesis of time, which constitutes the life
of the passing present; memory is the fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the
being of the past” (DR 80/109).
Memory as the ‘being of the past’
The second synthesis that deals more directly with the auto-affection of Memory as
subjectification is, according to Deleuze, necessary for the structure of time itself. The
second synthesis concerns the possibility of the past in general rather than particular
moments in the past.106 As we will see below, Deleuze’s idea of the past is larger than what
was once present, and his notion of Memory is more than what we remember: There is a
kind of memory that we are not conscious of, and this necessitates positing a kind of past
that exists outside of the limit of our consciousness. Deleuze calls this kind of the past,
where unconscious memory is conserved, ‘the being of the past.’ The term gives the past an
ontological status and distinguishes it from our psychological experience of the past – we
tend to think that time is a succession of presents and that the past is formed after the
present, as it fades away. Deleuze claims that such understanding of the past is limited when
it comes to the problem of the passage of time. How does the present moment pass and
become past? Is it a new present that forces the actual present to pass? Deleuze says that the
present would never pass if it has to wait for a new present to come. For the present
moment to pass, it has to be past at the same time as it is present (DR 80-81/109-110).
The distinction between the past in general and the particular moments in the past are related to that
between ‘memory-image’ and ‘pure-memory.’ The former is a mental representation of what used to be present
and the latter is an event we experienced but are no longer aware of; see also Jay Lampert’s Simultaneity and
Delay: a Dialectical Theory of Staggered Time (New York: Continuum, 2012), 137-147.
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Following Bergson, Deleuze holds a seemingly counterintuitive claim that the past and the
present coexist. He reconstitutes Bergson’s argument as the paradoxes of the past. The first
paradox is that the past is contemporaneous with the present. The past would not be
constituted unless it constitutes itself at the same time as it is present. From this, it follows
that since each past is contemporaneous with the present, all past is coexistent with the
present.
If the entire past coexists with the present, what differentiates the present from the
past? Both Bergson and Deleuze claim that there is a difference in kind – rather than a
difference in degree – between the present and the past; it is not that the past is a weak copy
of the present, but they differ from each other in their modes of being. In Bergsonism,
Deleuze defines the relationship between the present and the past:
The present is not; rather, it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not, but it
acts. Its proper element is not being but the active or the useful. The past, on the
other hand, has ceased to act or to be useful. But it has not ceased to be. Useless and
inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word (B 55/49-50).
Hence, the being of the past. The past does not cease to exist, but it only ceases to be in the
present. As we have seen above in the distinction between habit-memory and recollectionmemory, the present is constituted by practical needs. The past is not active in the present
yet it is conserved in its own way. We will see how the past can be contemporaneous with
the present without being in the present in the virtual-actual schema.
Let us look more closely at the relationship between the present and the past, using
Bergson’s famous diagram of the inverted cone. For Bergson, the present and the past as
dimensions of time are each represented as perception and memory in our temporal life.
Perception is my body’s response to the objects and the environment surrounding it, thus it
is based on the practical need for (re)action. However, memory does not relate to the
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immediate bodily need and for this reason it is not always present in the consciousness: it is
not ‘useful.’ It is in the background and brought to attention when called for. Memory does
not exist, but subsists. Bergson calls this mode of being ‘the virtual’ as opposed to the
actuality of body and perception.
The actual and the virtual differ in nature, but this does not mean that they do not
interact. As we know from experience, perception and memory cannot be separated. For
our bodily response to the surroundings, the recognition of objects is necessary. To
recognize an object, we seem to use our recollections from past perceptions almost
automatically. Thus, we may say memory is always in operation when we perceive things.
In the same way, we cannot form a memory without being able to perceive. Perception not
only adds something new to memory, but also modifies the pre-existing memory. Bergson
explains this relationship between perception and memory or that of the actual and the
virtual through the famous diagram of the inverted cone.

Figure 5. Bergson’s inverted cone of memory

The cone SAB represents the totality of the stored memory. The summit S indicates the
present, where my body as a center of action is located. My body as a ‘system of sensation
and movements,’ is like a hole in the continuity of things in that it “holds back everything
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that interests it about the object, letting the rest go by” (B 52/46).107 The body’s reaction to
the object is determined by perception. At the two ends of the cone are found pure
perception (the summit) and pure memory (the base), which are supposed only as
hypothetical ideas; pure memory at the base AB is not related to the body or to perception,
whereas pure perception is not shadowed by memory. But actual perception or memory
happens between these two ends, by the constant movement of the cone as a whole
contracting itself to the point S. In the formation of perception and memory, two kinds of
movement occur; one is a descending movement of the virtual memories in the cone to the
point S, which produces perception as a result. As the base of the cone AB contracts itself
down to the point S, the body in the present is also moving across the plane of the actual
representations of the world. The other is an ascending movement of perception made at S
into the cone, which forms the planes such as A’B’ and A”B” within the cone. These two
movements are simultaneous and reciprocal; the planes A’B’ and A”B” are added by a new
perception, but at the same time, each plane is a contraction of the entire memory cone in
different degrees. In other words, a new plane AⁿBⁿ is formed by different repetitions of the
AB. As long as the point S is in movement, the planes between S and AB continue to be
multiplied. As Jay Lampert says, “every memory is ready to be repeated at every moment in
the present. Each is relayed virtually at each moment, and each, or all, might be actualized
at any given moment, albeit in a different way relative to each new present.”108
We can now locate the two kinds of memory we have seen above in the cone. Habitmemory that serves the present would be situated at the bottom part of the cone near S:
memories constituted by repeated perception and bodily response. Habit-memory stays
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Deleuze calls this “need-subjectivity” (B52/46).
Lampert, Simultaneity and Delay, 145.
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close to the body so that it can be brought to the present immediately whenever related
perceptions occur. Recollection-memories that are not useful for perception and hardly
called upon, thus are situated on the planes near the base AB. The double movement that
forms these planes shows that the actual emerges from the virtual, and the virtual is
mobilized by the actual.
Therefore, with Deleuze’s second synthesis of memory a present moment is a most
contracted state of the entire past. He writes, “[t]he present can be the most contracted
degree of the past which coexists with it only if the past first coexists with itself in an infinity
of diverse degrees of relaxation and contraction at an infinity of levels (this is the meaning of
the famous Bergsonian metaphor of the cone […]” (DR 83/112). Every actual present
moment has to go through the double movement of the entire memory cone, the virtual.
The past is not formed after the present as a feeble copy of it, but rather as a condition of the
present. Deleuze notes that as a condition, “the pure element of the past in general pre-exists
the passing present” (ibid., emphasis added). The past, in this sense, is the ground
(fondement) of time, whereas the present is the foundation (fondation) of time.
Memory and Subjectification: the time of the unconscious
Bergson’s theory of memory, on which Deleuze bases the second synthesis, is
peculiar in that it places an emphasis on the kind of memory that exceeds the boundaries of
consciousness and gives it an ontological status.109 Memory (with ‘M’) for both Bergson and
Deleuze is virtual, inactive and unconscious. Yet it is what constitutes time as a whole – the

Deleuze distinguishes the Bergsonian notion of the virtual as the unconscious from the Freudian
unconscious: “We must nevertheless be clear at this point that Bergson does not use the word ‘unconscious’ to
denote a psychological reality outside consciousness, but to denote a nonpsychological reality – being as it is in
itself” (B 56/50).
109
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whole that differentiates itself and produces the present as its fruit. Here is the set of
concepts corresponding to the actual-virtual pair that Deleuze utilizes:
The Virtual
Ontological past
- Pure past (the being of the past)
- Pure memory/ Memory
- Transcendental memory

The Actual
Psychological past
- Old (former) presents
- Memory images
- Empirical memory

Subsistence
Past
Memory
The unconscious
Passive synthesis

Existence
Present
Perception
The conscious
Active synthesis
Table 3. The Virtual and the Actual

Deleuze uses various terms to indicate the ontological past: pure past, the being of the past,
Memory, pure memory, transcendental memory, etc. Pure past and the being of the past are
to be distinguished from our common understanding of the past as an accumulation of old
presents. Pure memory and Memory (Mémoire) are Bergson’s terms, contrasted with
particular image-like memories (souvenirs) that are mental representations of specific
moments in the past. In order to emphasize that the virtual memory functions as a condition
for the psychological memory at the actual level, Deleuze uses the term ‘transcendental
memory’ that differs from empirical memory in the Kantian sense.
The second synthesis of memory not only constitutes time as the past but also
produces a form of subjectivity. In Bergsonism, Deleuze calls the kind of subjectivity that
emerges from the Bergsonian pure memory ‘recollection-subjectivity.’ We said that a
survival of the past preserved in itself and the realm of the virtual reveal a temporal
dimension outside consciousness. The pure, ontological past working in the background of
our psychological experience of time suggests that the production of the subject involves the
temporal structure beyond the time of individual consciousness. Below I will examine the
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problem of subjectification in time in relation to Deleuze’s claim that time as subjectification
is Memory, by showing the subject formation is structured by the actual-virtual schema.
If our consciousness is present-oriented and tending toward practical need, as
Bergson-Deleuze holds, how can an individual, conscious subject access the virtual? Since
pure memory cannot be brought to our consciousness at will, the question becomes how we
can get to the memory itself without reducing it to a former present or actual present.
Deleuze seems to address this problem when he talks about the ways in which the present is
understood in relation to the past. In both the first and the second syntheses, the present is a
product of contraction. In the first synthesis it is a contraction of successive instants that are
independent from each other (DR 82/112). The originary subjectivity appears as a point of
synthesis but it is still a synthesis of passing present. According to Deleuze, the second
synthesis ‘deepens’ the first one. In this synthesis the present is understood as the most
contracted state of the entire past. Here the contraction in the present is seen as the outcome
of the actualization of the virtual memory. The relation between the present and the past in
the second synthesis has important implications for what is repeated in the present; what
appears to be repeated in the present, thus to our consciousness is a manifestation of what is
more profound. In short, the present can be understood as a moment in actual present that
passes, but also as a locus of the actualization of the virtual.
Deleuze explains this double dimension of the present with two kinds of repetition,
in terms of which the present can be thought in relation to the past: bare and clothed
repetition. The former concerns independent instants reappearing at different times, and the
latter a repetition of coexisting levels of the whole. For example, if an image of a
Diplodocus dinosaur comes to my mind after seeing Dippy (a public sculpture of
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Diplodocus in Pittsburgh) the day before, it can be seen as a simple repetition of the same
image of Diplodocus dinosaur at the actual level. But viewed from the virtual dimension, the
perception of the sculpture itself is already a contracted differences– my past perceptions of
dinosaur statues, dream images, the color of the scarf surrounding the neck of the dinosaur,
the speed at which the bus I was on was passing the sculpture, etc.: a synthesis of the
coexisting levels of the whole. This perception then forms a level in the virtual whole, as a
memory ready to be actualized at any moment. The recollection-image that seems to be a
repetition of the same at the actual level is a contraction of a differential level of the whole,
which itself is already a contraction: the actualization of the virtual. The seemingly repeated
of the image of Dippy is, at the virtual level, resulted by the synthesis of differences
contracted. In this regard, Deleuze says that clothed-virtual repetition can be called a
repetition of difference; it is a repetition of the pure past understood as the open whole that
can be repeated or contracted differently in each present moment. Bare-actual repetition,
however, concerns the return of the same (DR 84/114).
Subject as the locus of actualization
We have seen two forms of subjectivity produced by the syntheses of time. If the first
synthesis of habit shows the emergence of subjectivity as a memory stored in the body, the
second synthesis of memory explains how the habit-memory gets preserved in the memory
that exceeds the conscious subject, in the time of the unconscious. In the latter, the subject is
constituted as the virtual memory actualizes itself in the present. With the actual-virtual
scheme, the subject seems to be always in the making, rather than the unified center of
temporal synthesis.
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Let us now examine the place of the subject in the second synthesis, using Bergson’s
inverted cone. In the cone, the actual present is represented as the point S, where the body
and the consciousness of the subject are located, and where the two movements in the cone
– descending and ascending – intersect. In our active synthesis at the actual level, the subject
seems to be placed in the trace of the point S, as successive moments of former and actual
presents. But at the virtual level, the subject has to be understood in terms of the present as a
contraction of the pure past that forms coexisting levels in the cone beyond the passing
moment. In Deleuze’s term, it is as if the present doubles itself as it reflects itself and forms
an extra dimension to the present (DR 80/109).110

Figure 6. The bifurcation of the present

Deleuze notes that on the level of active synthesis of memory, the past appears to be a former present. It
seems to be trapped between two presents – former present (ancient présent) and actual present (actuel présent).
He argues that the actual present contains an extra dimension where it reflects itself as it forms the memory of
the former present. He calls this the present’s ‘own representativity’ in its representation of the former present.
We will return to this problem of ‘bifurcation’ in our analysis of the third synthesis.
In his book on cinema, Deleuze speaks of the bifurcation of time in the present, which he calls the
‘crystal image of time.’ The figure below demonstrates a splitting of the instant into the present and the past,
which coexists with the present that it was.
110

Deleuze writes: “What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time: since the past
is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each
moment as present and past […] it splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass
on, while the other preserves all the past” (C2, 81/108-109).
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The doubling of the present indicates the two-fold movement that involves the
contraction of the cone. When a plane in the cone contracts with the present, a past emerges
from Memory. At the same time, the virtual produces a new actual present, which also
enters into the virtual memory. In this sense, the subject as the locus of actualization is
constituted by the oscillation between the summit and the base of the cone. Memory, the
being of the past, is what produces the present as it differentiates from itself. In this selfdifferentiation of Memory, the subject is formed at the very splitting between the actual
present and the coexisting levels of the past.
Deleuze’s passive synthesis of the past based on the actual-virtual schema does not
present the concept of a subject who makes conscious decisions or holds intentionality. In
contrast, it aims to demonstrate that there is something outside of the consciousness that
renders these things possible. If Kant’s second synthesis of reproduction concerns the
memory as previous conscious perceptions, Deleuze’s synthesis of memory shows how the
reproduction is conditioned by the unconscious, virtual memory. By giving an ontological
status to memory, both Bergson and Deleuze challenge the idea that the past is constituted
after the present as its duplicated or weakened form: “Only the present is ‘psychological’;
but the past is pure ontology; pure recollection has only ontological significance” (B 56/51).
The pure past as a condition for the psychological time of consciousness never ceases to
exist, but it only ceases to be present or to be useful. What constitutes recollectionsubjectivity in this synthesis is the reciprocal relation between the two realms of the actual
and the virtual.
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Empirical and transcendental memory: Forgetting within Memory
The second synthesis of the past shows us Memory as the being of the past, different
from our ordinary sense of memory. Deleuze calls this sort of memory that introduces the
realm of the virtual ‘transcendental memory’ as opposed to the empirical, psychological
memory as former presents. Here we will see how the active synthesis of memory at the
actual level is grounded by the passive synthesis of memory at the virtual level. We will be
introduced to the two senses of ‘forgetting’ Deleuze uses in relation to the empirical and
transcendental memory.
According to Deleuze, empirical memory “may be represented beyond forgetting by
active synthesis, in so far as forgetting is empirically overcome” (DR 85/115). For example,
empirical memories of a specific event, like what I did last Thursday, can be recovered by a
conscious effort when temporarily lost. In most cases this sort of empirical forgetting is
overcome if I go back and read the email correspondences around that time or look at the
pictures taken then. However, transcendental memory is related to what Deleuze calls
essential or absolute forgetting, since it concerns the present that was never present or actual.
“Transcendental memory does not address memory without addressing the forgetting within
memory” (DR 140/183, emphasis added). Virtual memory is contingently ‘immemorable’
for the empirical memory, since it cannot be accessed with a conscious effort to recall.
But why do we call it forgetting, if it has never been actualized in our consciousness
and never been an object of empirical memory? To answer this question, we need to
understand how the virtual in Deleuze works as the transcendental in the Kantian sense,
that is, as the condition for the possibility of experience without being the object of
experience itself. As we have seen in the first section of this chapter, Deleuze redefines the
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transcendental as the condition of real experience, rather than possible experience. Deleuze
contends that the transcendental synthesis of imagination in Kant that conditions the second
synthesis of reproduction is merely derived from the workings of empirical memory. Unlike
the Kantian a priori forms that are independent of empirical contents, the transcendentalvirtual memory in Deleuze grounds empirical-actual memory (reproduction) as it itself goes
through constant change. As Williams notes, Memory is a foundation for time without
being an unchanging ground.111 Transcendental memory is always working in the
background when empirical memory is produced. That is to say, we cannot recall a memory
without having it go through the whole of time. Even when I recall what I did last
Thursday, the memory retrieved is not the same as the memory initially formed. A past
event is never recovered as it was, but relived when brought back in the present at the actual
level as empirical memory. Put differently, Memory never stays the same but is
reconstituted, re-situated, and renewed every time it is remembered: the virtual memory
renews itself constantly in its self-differentiating movement. When Deleuze says that
transcendental memory concerns the forgetting within memory, he means that it can only
produce empirical memory as renewed. We will examine more closely this idea of
‘Forgetting’ as the renewal of the transcendental - ontological Memory in the next section.
Why then are the workings of transcendental-virtual memory underneath empiricalactual memory hardly noticeable? Most of the time our consciousness is limited to the level
of active syntheses that concludes in the recognition of an object. In a rare moment, however,
we run into objects that reveal the process itself leading up to recognition. Let us return to
the example of Dippy. Suppose that I see the sculpture every morning on the way to work,
James Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2011), 76.
111
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and I recognize it as the same object automatically without having to recall my past
perceptions of it. One day, it may ‘speak’ to me in the way that it unexpectedly brings up a
memory from my childhood. In this moment the recognition of it as the same object gets
delayed or even fails, interrupted by the memories that I would not have been able to recall
otherwise. Deleuze calls this a transcendental form of memory or the ‘nth’ power of
memory, in the sense that it takes the faculty of memory beyond its empirical contents that
can be voluntarily retrieved. The transcendental operation of memory takes us to ‘what can
only be recalled’ but cannot be sensed, imagined, or thought. It is the object that cannot
simply be recognized– “the object of encounter,” as Deleuze calls it – that forces empirical
memory to its transcendental operation.112 This shows that the empirical function of
memory is conditioned by the contraction of the virtual memory, the whole of time.
As that which conditions the active synthesis of reproduction in Kant (empirical
memory), Deleuze’s passive synthesis of the past shows the transcendental operation of
Memory (transcendental memory). In this synthesis, the present is produced by the virtual,
and subjectivity is understood as the locus of actualization. In the following section on the
third synthesis of the future, we will look more closely at the notion of ‘Forgetting’ that
seems to define the way in which Memory grounds time in its self-differentiation.

Deleuze presents the discussion of transcendental exercise of the faculties in the chapter “The Image of
Thought” in DR. Here Deleuze critiques Kant for presupposing harmony among faculties and shows how the
harmony is generated. He finds the model for the accord between faculties without a legislating faculty, in
Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Sublime,’ where the faculties relate to one another in the form of ‘free play.’ When the
ordinary function of the faculties reaches its limit – i.e. facing the object of encounter, comparable to the object
of the sublime in Kant – it arises what Deleuze calls the ‘transcendental exercise.’ The harmony between the
faculties in their transcendental exercises or in their ‘nth’ power takes the form of ‘discordant harmony’ in the
sense that each of the faculties communicates with another based on its radical difference from the others (DR
146/190). In a sort of forced movement from sense to memory, and from memory to thought, all faculties are
unhinged and it is this discord of the faculties that forms a harmony. Deleuze writes: “The transcendental form
of a faculty is indistinguishable from its disjointed, superior or transcendent exercise. […] The transcendent
exercise must not be traced from the empirical exercise precisely because it apprehends that which cannot be
grasped from the point of view of common sense” (DR 143/186).
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2.4 Third synthesis of the future
We have seen in the second synthesis that the self-differentiating movement of
Memory is the ground of time as well as subject formation. If the second synthesis explains
the time of pure past, and the present and the future as its dimensions, why do we need a
third synthesis? Is there anything more to be said about memory? How can memory be a
category of the future?
Memory as reminiscence
In the section called ‘Inadequacy of memory: the third synthesis of time,’ Deleuze
explains why the pure past understood as reminiscence is insufficient (DR 87/118). Here he
juxtaposes Bergson’s pure past as ‘the past that was never present’ with Platonic
reminiscence to discuss the equivocation of Memory (“all the ambiguity of Mnemosyne was
already implicit in the second synthesis of time.” DR 88/119). Plato’s doctrine of
reminiscence describes the moment of learning, which “implies a distinction within the soul
between a ‘before’ and an ‘after’; it implies the introduction of a first time, in which we
forget what we knew, since there is a second time in which we recover what we have
forgotten” (DR 87/118). Deleuze notes that the Platonic theory of reminiscence introduces
a sort of transcendental memory inaccessible through empirical memory as a source of
knowledge, as opposed to the innateness of knowledge in Descartes. However, the memory
that we recover here is a mere replaying of past events in the present. The pure past here is
reduced to ‘a mythical present’; it is a memory that can be brought back to the mind by
recovering what had been forgotten.
This time undoubtedly finds its ground in an it-self – that is, in the pure past of the
Ideas which arranges the order of presents in a circle according to their decreasing or
increasing resemblances to the ideal, but also removes from the circle those souls
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which have been able to preserve or recover the realm of the in-itself. The Ideas none
the less remain the ground on which the successive presents are organized into the
circle of time, so that the pure past which defines them is itself still necessarily
expressed in terms of a present, as an ancient mythical present (DR 88/119,
emphasis added).
The Platonic reminiscence is also irreducible to the present empirically construed, in that it
cannot be represented by active synthesis, but the pure past in this sense is expressed in
terms of a present, an ancient mythical present. That is, it is a recollection of the past as it
was. The pure past of the Ideas serves as a ground in that the present is evaluated by its
resemblance to the ideal state in the past – its relation to the static virtual, actualized as the
same.
However, it is important to note that Deleuze is neither questioning the validity of
Bergson’s theory of Memory as the virtual, nor completely equating the notion of pure past
with Platonic reminiscence. He simply finds it limited for the account of the future, more
precisely, for the account of repetition as a category of the future. Deleuze revisits the
example of involuntary memory later in the text, in the ‘Note on the Proustian experiences,’
where he discusses its relevance to the third synthesis. He says: “The Proustian formula ‘a
little time in its pure state’ refers first to the pure past, the in-itself of the past or the erotic
synthesis of time, but more profoundly to the pure and empty form of time […]” (DR
122/160).
The problem Deleuze finds in the pure past as reminiscence is that it constitutes time
in terms of a repetition of the same (the present as a repetition of the pure past of the Ideas),
i.e., time in a circular form. As I argued in the previous chapter, Deleuze ultimately aims to
construe a notion of time based on difference by freeing time from movement. His account
of the temporal syntheses serves the same purpose, but in terms of the three dimensions of
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time. The synthesis of the future will prove itself to be a synthesis of difference that enables
the production of the new. In the first synthesis we see how the subject is formed through
habit-memory. This involves a task of showing habit not as a simple repetition but drawing
something new. The second synthesis explains pure memory (pure past) that habit is a
repetition of. Here we see that the repetition of Memory is its self-differentiating movement.
The subject is now understood as a locus of actualization of the virtual memory. The third
synthesis will present habit and memory in a different relation: forgetting becomes more
essential as a force of repetition than habit or memory.
It seems to me that the transition from the second to the third synthesis is different
from that between the first and the second syntheses. The second synthesis of the past
complements or conditions the first one, however, the third synthesis of the future changes
the dynamic between the three syntheses since it takes the other syntheses as its object of
synthesis. According to Deleuze, the present is an agent (repeater), and the past is a
condition (repetition itself). The synthesis of the future produces what is independent from
both the agent and the condition (‘that which is repeated’) (DR 94/125). As it ‘overturns’
the agent and the condition of time, I believe the third synthesis accomplishes two things:
(1) the dissolution of the self (or, the account of the fractured I and the passive self) and (2)
the liberation of time from its subordination to movement. It is not accidental that Deleuze
opens the discussion on the third synthesis with these two themes, the problem of Cogito
and limits of memory. With regard to these two themes, the two most important references
in the third synthesis are given – Kant and Nietzsche: Kant for the relationship between
time and subjectivity and Nietzsche for the doctrine of eternal return.
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Eternal return and the synthesis of the future
First, let us look at the role Forgetting plays. We said above that the pure past
understood as reminiscence raises a problem of circular time. Deleuze attempts to break the
circle with Nietzsche’s eternal return as the return of the new and Kant’s ‘straight line of
time.’ As we have noted, Deleuze explains the subjectification process in time in terms of
memory, and for the subject’s relation to the future, we need to see how transcendental
memory works. Memory in its ordinary sense denotes a recollection or a replay of past
events. Deleuze, in redefining memory as that which reconstitutes and renews itself over
time, introduces the idea of ‘memory with forgetting.’ He distinguishes two kinds of
forgetting: empirical and essential forgetting (DR 140/183). Empirical forgetting concerns
empirical memory, or what Deleuze calls ‘a contingent past,’ which is the empirical content
of the past. Essential forgetting, however, has to do with the being of the past, or the past in
general. It concerns a renewability of Memory in its repetition. “Forgetting [L’oubli] is no
longer a contingent incapacity [impuissance] separating us from a memory [souvenir] which is
itself contingent: it exists within essential memory as though it were the ‘nth’ power of
memory [la nième puissance de la mémoire] with regard to its own limit or to that which can
only be recalled” (ibid.). Forgetting constitutes a power of becoming new within memory. It
frees one from an ossified past and gives a chance of becoming.
It is from Nietzsche’s eternal return that Deleuze derives this idea of Forgetting as a
repetition of the new, or as he calls a repetition as ‘a category of the future.’ As we look at
Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, we will limit ourselves to his interpretation of eternal return
with regard to the idea of Forgetting. In his book on Nietzsche, Deleuze refers to a passage
from Thus spoke Zarathustra, where Nietzsche contrasts a circular image of time with a non-
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circular one and describes eternal return as a passing moment (NP 48/75, see also DR
297/380).
Behold this gateway, dwarf!’ I went on: ‘it has two aspects. Two paths come together
here: no one has ever reached their end. This long lane behind us: it goes on for an
eternity. And that long lane ahead of us – that is another eternity. ‘They are in
opposition to one another, these paths; they abut on one another: and it is here at
this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is written above it:
“Moment.” ‘But if one were to follow them further and ever further and further: do
you think, dwarf, that these paths would be in eternal opposition?’
‘Everything straight lies,’ murmured the dwarf disdainfully. ‘All truth is crooked,
time itself is a circle.’
‘Spirit of Gravity!’ I said angrily, ‘do not treat this too lightly! […] From this gateway
Moment a long, eternal lane runs back: an eternity lies behind us.’
‘Must not all things that can run have already run along this lane? Must not all things
that can happen have already happened, been done, run past? ‘And if all things have
been here before: what do you think of this moment, dwarf? Must not this gateway,
too, have been here – before?113
Deleuze’s reading of eternal return in this passage focuses on two things: 1) the ‘Moment
(Augenblick)’ as a present moment where the passage of time diverges into the past and the
present, and 2) how the repetition in the Moment should be understood. Deleuze claims
that eternal return as “a synthesis of time and its dimensions” provides the answer to the
problem of the passage of time (NP 48/75), and that Zarathustra’s strong rejection of the
circular image of time in this passage is the key to apprehending ‘what it is that returns’ in
the eternal return understood as such.

Friedrich W. Nietzsche, ‘Of the vision and the riddle’, Thus spoke Zarathustra, trans. R.J. Hollingdale
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2003), 178 (emphasis added).
113
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Let us begin with the second point. According to Deleuze, the cyclical time that the
dwarf or ‘Spirit of Gravity’ advocates here is the idea that ‘what is to come’ seen from the
present moment is nothing but the repetition of
‘what has already happened.’ That is to say, the
eternal line stretched to the past and to the future
Figure 7. The circular image of time

forms a closed circle. Thus, time unfolds like the

two ends of the same thread. As in the Platonic reminiscence, the present is understood in
terms of the replay of the past. A’ and A’’ differ only in their degrees of similarity to A that
grounds both of them. In this picture, there is nothing new to come in the future. This leads
us to think of ‘eternal return’ as the return of the same.
Deleuze notes that this idea that “eternal return means the return of Everything, of
the Same and the Similar” is exactly what Nietzsche tries to resist (e.g. Zarathustra’s
nightmare in the section ‘The Convalescent’) (DR 298/381). He writes,
He knows that a circular repetition would necessarily be of this type. That is why
Zarathustra denies that time is a circle, and replies to the dwarf: 'Spirit of Gravity, do
not simplify matters too much!’ By contrast, he holds that time is a straight line in
two opposing directions. If a strangely decentred circle should form, this will be only
‘at the end’ of the straight line ... (ibid.)
If eternal return does not denote a repetition of the same, what is it that returns? What does
Deleuze mean by ‘a straight line of time’ and a ‘decentered circle’? We said that Deleuze
reads eternal return at the “Moment,” as a passing moment (l’instant qui passe). Zarathustra
and the dwarf are at the gateway, where time diverges into two opposite directions. From
this point time past runs in one direction and time to come runs in the other, both eternally.
So, for Deleuze eternal return concerns what returns in this moment that passes. About the
repetition in the ‘Moment,’ Deleuze says,
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It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself that constitutes being […] It
is not some one thing which returns but rather returning itself is the one thing which
is affirmed of diversity or multiplicity. In other words, identity in the eternal return
does not describe the nature of that which returns but, on the contrary, the fact of
returning for that which differs (NP 48/75-76).
According to Deleuze, repetition does not involve the identity of what returns but the fact
that something returns. What is tricky about this returning thing is that it returns differently
every time it returns: It returns as that which differs from itself. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, Deleuze defines time in terms of self-differentiation. So, if eternal return describes a
passing moment as Deleuze says, it is a repetition of self-differentiating movement of time:
“Returning is the being of that which becomes” (ibid.).
In his book on Nietzsche, Deleuze sees the eternal return itself as a synthesis of time
that explains the passage of time. It shows that the present must coexist with itself as what is
past as well as what is to come. In the second synthesis we have seen that for the moment to
pass, it has to be present at the same time it is past. For the moment to be the present as well
as the past it has to enter a relation with itself – the doubling of the moment itself. In this
sense, the eternal return seems to denote the return of this dynamic relation between the
past and the present in every moment: a present moment is considered as the most
contracted state of the entire past. But this raises a further question concerning whether the
present is a mere repetition of the past. This is where the eternal return as the synthesis of
the future comes into play. Since what returns in the moment is the autonomous, selfdifferentiating movement of time, the synthetic relation of the present and the past should be
able to produce something new. What is produced by the self-differentiation does not
resemble the condition or the agent of repetition. Without this third term, the process of
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differentiation would be merely a reproduction, a repetition of the same. Thus, we
misinterpret the expression eternal return if we understand it as “return of the same.”
Let us note here that the image of time as a straight line Deleuze uses here is more
complicated than what is commonly conceived as the linear notion of time that relies
heavily on causality. What differentiates Deleuze’s straight line of time from linear time is
that it is still based upon repetition. Time as a whole repeats its self-differentiating
movement, allowing the moment to pass as well as producing the new in the moment to
come. In this sense Deleuze calls this repetition in the eternal return a decentered circle.
Eternal return affects only the new and concerns only the third time of the series. “[I]f
eternal return is a circle […] it is a constantly decentred, continually tortuous circle which
revolves only around the unequal” (DR 55/78). Time is a straight line in the sense that the
future exceeds the past as condition and the present as the agent, i.e., that which conditions
the production of it. It is a straight line with a decentered circle at the end in that the novelty
of the future is produced by the present moment entering into a relation with the entire past
that returns every moment in its self-differentiation.

Figure 8. The straight line of time: self-differentiation of Memory
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Earlier we discussed the pure past as a ground of time in terms of Memory. It seems that
Deleuze terms the production of the new from the synthetic relation between the pure past
and the present, Forgetting. That the present is a contraction of the pure past –actualization
of the virtual – relates to the self-differentiation of Memory. That the present as the actual
reconstructs the whole of time as the virtual concerns Forgetting. We may say forgetting is a
condition for the complete renewal or overturning of transcendental memory; it enables the
moment to come to be ‘unequal’ to what it is born out of. Thus, Deleuze says that
Forgetting makes repetition a category of the future.
[R]epetition is the thought of the future; it is opposed to both the ancient category of
reminiscence and the modern category of habitus. It is in repetition and by repetition
that Forgetting becomes a positive power and superior unconscious (for example,
forgetting as a force is an integral part of the lived experience of eternal return) (DR
7-8/15).
Let us remember that Deleuze redefined the relationship between time and movement by
articulating time as what differentiates itself from itself. In his account of the passive
synthesis, he discusses this self-differentiating movement in terms of repetition, that is, a
repetition of Memory. Repetition describes the fact that this movement recurs, thus
ultimately the force that enables time to pass. In the synthesis of the future, this repetition
turns out to be a repetition of difference, Memory with Forgetting. Forgetting is a force of
repetition that enables the production of the new. As Ansell-Pearson notes, it is due to the
Forgetting that “we are given the chance of becoming.”114 It is in this synthesis that time
ceases to be a circle and becomes liberated from movement.

Keith Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 200.
114
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Empty form of time and the passive self
How is subjectivity defined in the synthesis of the future? If the Forgetting enables
the production of ‘the new’ by overturning the past as a condition, what does this entail in
terms of subjectivity? Deleuze describes this time of the future as an “empty form of time”
and the subject produced under this form “the fractured I,” deploying Kant’s terminology.
As we have already discussed in the previous chapter, the Kantian legacy is significant in
Deleuze, especially in his account of passive self and the empty form of time. By defining
time as the ‘empty form,’ Kant addresses the problem of the split between the I and the self.
Kant observed that there is a split between ‘the I as thinking subject’ and ‘the I as an object
that is thought’ when we try to intuit ourselves: ‘the I’ can be given to me only as I appear to
myself, rather than as I am in itself (CPR, B156). According to Kant, we intuit ourselves
only as we are internally affected by ourselves, that is, by the affection of a passive self. It is
under the form of time that we affect ourselves. From Kant’s notion of time as a form of
auto-affection, Deleuze develops the idea that “[t]ime signifies a fault or a fracture in the I
(Je fêlé) and a passivity in the self (moi dissous)” (DR 86/117).
Time as a fracturing force to the unity of the I concerns the independence of the
future from the present and the past. Here is the passage where Deleuze explains the
relationship between the three syntheses:
The first synthesis, that of habit, constituted time as a living present by means of a
passive foundation on which past and future depended. The second synthesis, that of
memory, constituted time as a pure past, from the point of view of a ground which
causes the passing of one present and the arrival of another. In the third synthesis,
however, the present is no more than an actor, an author, an agent destined to be
effaced; while the past is no more than a condition operating by default. The
synthesis of time here constitutes a future which affirms at once both the
unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of its production,
and the independence of the work in relation to its author or actor (DR 93-94/125).
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Here Deleuze writes that the synthesis of the future involves the agent (present) and the
condition (past), but the future itself as a product is not tied to either of them. Thus, the
synthesis that constitutes the future in time is characterized as ‘groundless (sans-fond),’ or
‘un-grounding.’ From the viewpoint of the subject, this synthesis is manifested in a break
between the before and the after of an act that supersedes both the condition (past) and the
agent (present). According to Deleuze, there are three moments in this ‘un-grounding’ act:
first, there is a time at which the imagined act is supposed ‘too big for me,’ which
determines the a priori past, the before. The second time is the present of metamorphosis or
a doubling of the self to become equal to the act. In the third time where future appears, the
act becomes coherent, leaving the self ‘fractured.’ (DR 89/120-121)
To put it in Kant’s terms, the three moments above demonstrate a synthesis of the
active I and the passive self:
(1) ‘the I’ conditioned by the past
(2) the split of ‘the I’ or doubling of the self in the present
(3) the self, going beyond the condition, that becomes unequal and incoherent with
‘the I’
What returns in time in the third synthesis is the fracture in the I and the caesura in time
that overturns its empirical content and its ground. Time returns as an empty form. So,
Deleuze says eternal return is “the secret coherence which establishes itself only by
excluding my own identity, the identity of the self, the world and God” (DR 90-91/122).
But why is this time an empty form? Deleuze says that since the future as a product
of the synthesis is not bound to the present as actor or the past as condition, the only thing
that remains unchanged in this synthesis is the form of time that brings about the new: “time
is the most radical form of change, but the form of change does not change” (DR 89/120).
From the viewpoint of the subject, the form of time that ruptures the I in the present
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concerns the subject’s becoming capable of an act that exceeds its past condition. Deleuze
says this act is “adequate to time as a whole” (ibid.). In the split of the subject, the passive
self becomes equal to the act as it is forced beyond the determinations of the active I, to the
open whole. It takes upon itself a self-differentiating movement of the whole that becomes
an ‘Other.’ The act divides the before and the after, and the I and the self into two unequal
parts. As discussed earlier, when time is conceived as a form of qualitative change in the
whole, it ceases to be subordinated to movement. This time as an empty form that forces the
subject to the open, and that exceeds individual substances, is a model of time liberated
from the overly simple cycles of time.
Reconstructing Kantian ‘Recognition’: Resonance
What does Deleuze’s synthesis of the future tell us about Kant’s synthesis? In Kant, the
second synthesis of reproduction leads to the third synthesis of recognition that requires the
transcendental unity of apperception. In Deleuze’s passive synthesis, the unity is not
presupposed. He explains how the recognition is produced by the reciprocal determination
of different temporal series that resonate with one another. If ‘the transcendental object=x’
was the pure form of perception in Kant, with Deleuze, we locate the object = x in the pure
past, a past which was never present. It is a virtual object that can only be accessed by
transcendental Memory with Forgetting.
Let us look at Proust’s famous example of involuntary memory Deleuze discusses.
The taste of madeleine invokes Marcel’s memory of the village of his childhood, Combray.
Suppose that M refers to the taste of madeleine. In terms of recognition, this Proustian
experience would be explained by the resemblance between M1 (M in the past moment T1)
and M2 (M in the present moment T2). It is the identity of M underlying the two that enables
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the recognition of M2. However, such an explanation is only a superficial description of
what is happening in the present, according to Deleuze. If it were to simply a matter of
recognizing the identity of the two, it would not have been accompanied by the fragment of
the pure past, i.e. Combray. Also, the account of recognition does not explain why the
sensations in two different moments, supposedly the same, were presented as distinct rather
than merged together as in our ordinary recognition. Deleuze says that this is an example of
resonance that makes recognition possible. He points out that it is actually Combray (X) that
brings M1 to the distinctive moment of M2 and even produces the identity of M1 and M2,
which constitutes the resemblance of the two series: “if the two series succeed one another,
they nevertheless coexist in relation to Combray in itself as the object=X which causes them
to resonate. […] Identity and resemblance are therefore once again the result of a
differenciator” (DR122/160). In the recognition of M, it is the transcendental unity of the
subject and the supposed form of the object as its correlate together that work as the
fundamental ground to identify empirical objects M1 and M2, whereas in the ProustDeleuzian scheme, the identity comes after the resonance of the disparate series M1 and M2,
which is produced by the difference itself, Combray. It is a synthesis of difference in the
sense that the identity in the present moment is grounded by the difference of the two series.
With resonance, Deleuze provides the genetic account of recognition without the
presupposed unity of the transcendental subject. The object=X here is Combray, a past that
was never present. It is not what simply enables us to recognize the taste of madeleine as the
same taste we had before, but presents two distinct moments as different and has them
resonate with one another. Deleuze says that in the voluntary memory or conscious
perception, something essential escapes – the past’s being as past: “Combray rises up again
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in the present sensation in which its difference from the past sensation is internalized.”115 In
this invocation, Combray rises up in an absolutely new form. It rises up in a “pure past,
coexisting with the two presents, but out of their reach, out of reach of the present voluntary
memory and of the past conscious perception.”116 Deleuze defines the power of involuntary
memory as follows: the difference in the past moment, the repetition in the present one.

3. Time and the Production of the Subject
3.1 The virtual as a new transcendental: Critique of the ‘possible’
In this chapter we have seen that Deleuze, in reconstructing Kant’s synthesis as the
time of the unconscious, defines the transcendental condition with the virtual. We said that
Deleuze critiques Kant for tracing the transcendental from the empirical; Kant defined the
transcendental as a condition of possible experience. Deleuze, following Bergson, raises a
problem with the notion of the possible.117 When the possible is defined as ‘what is not
impossible,’ this non-impossibility of a thing is a condition of its realization. The possible
defined as such precedes the real; something becomes possible only retrospectively after
having been realized. It designates what has once been realized and then retrojected into the
past. The problem with the idea that the possible is pre-existent to the real is that it reduces
‘the new’ to a mere rearrangement of former elements.118 Against this idea, Bergson claims,
“it is the real which makes itself possible, and not the possible which becomes real” (ibid.).
Deleuze says,
Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis: The Athlone Press, 2000), 60.
Ibid., 61.
117 Henri Bergson, “The Possible and the Real,” The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle Andison (New York:
Philosophical Libarary, 2007), 73-86.
118 Ibid., 85.
115
116
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What Bergson critiques in the idea of the possible is that it presents us a simple copy
of the product, projected or rather retrojected onto the movement of production, onto
invention. But the virtual is not the same thing as the possible: the reality of time is
finally the affirmation of a virtuality that is actualized, for which to be actualized is
to invent. Because if the whole [tout] is not given, it remains that the virtual is the
whole [le tout].119
Deleuze’s transcendental method based on the virtual-actual scheme affirms that the virtual
as the whole differentiates itself without any pre-existent ideal. It is to affirm “the
continuous creation of unforeseeable novelty” that, according to Bergson, philosophy never
frankly admitted (ibid.). The affirmation of novelty concerns only the third synthesis of the
future, where the virtual is defined as a condition for the actual, but an open, constantly
changing one.
We can talk about the condition for novelty as a condition because the virtual-actual
relation is formal. The actual concerns how things are, and the virtual is about how things
could be otherwise. The contents may change, yet the relation between the two stays the
same. It forms a structure, but it is itself an empty form. There are different ways in which the
virtual can be described, but here I dealt exclusively with its temporal dimension –
Memory.120 The first synthesis explains the force of repetition – contraction – that enables
the movement of actualization of the virtual. In the second synthesis, this contraction
constituting the present turns out to be that of the entire past. It shows how the virtual as
Memory conditions the actual. If the first two syntheses deal with the actualization of the
virtual, the third one seems to define the relation itself of the virtual and the actual. The
virtual is the condition of the actual but it is also reconstituted by what is actualized: The

Deleuze, “Bergson, 1859-1941,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974), edit. David Lapoujade, trans.
Michael Tormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 22-31, 30 (translation modified).
120 For a discussion of the difference between the possible and the virtual in Difference and Repetition, Elizabeth
Grosz, “Thinking the New: Of Futures Yet Unthought,” in Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory and Futures,
edit. Elizabeth Grosz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 15-28.
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actual-virtual relation is based upon a mutual transformation.121 As Daniel Smith puts it,
“the actualization of the virtual also produces the virtual.”122 One way to think about how
the actual changes the virtual is that it constrains. As one thing actualizes, the ways in which
it could be otherwise change accordingly. For example, when candidate X is elected
president, not only the relation between the actual terms change, but also the virtual is
reorganized in the way that it forms a different problem structure both from the previous
one, to which the election of X to the presidency was given as a solution and from the one
that the election of Y or Z would have produced.
The idea of the virtual is different from ‘the possible’ defined either as anything that
is not impossible or some preceding condition of the real. The former gives an overly
optimistic view of the production of the new, whereas the latter reduces the new as a mere
rearrangement of what is formerly actualized. Deleuze tries to bring back the production of
novelty to the transcendental field, against the Kantian idea of the possible, however he is
not blindly praising the novelty, either. As he did with the image of time as a straight line
with a decentered circle, he invites us to think of time as a structure of the synthetic relation
between the virtual and the actual that brings difference in its repetition.
3.2 Subjectification in time
We began the section with Deleuze’s assertion that subjectification in time is
Memory. In his synthesis of time, Deleuze shows the virtual-actual relation in terms of
Memory (Being of the past) and Forgetting (the future), both of which exceed the conscious,
Understanding the virtual-actual schema in terms of reciprocal determination is not without controversy. As
Dale Clisby points out, some readings suggest the implicit priority of the virtual or a “hierarchy of influence”
between the virtual and the actual, which challenges the reciprocity between the two (Dale Clisby, “Deleuze’s
secret dualism?,” Parrhesia 24 (2015): 127-49); see for example Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamour of Being,
trans. L Burchill (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Peter Hallward, Out of This World: Deleuze
and the Philosophy of Creation (London & New York: Verso, 2006).
122 Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 253.
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present-oriented subject. In doing so, he replaces the notion of the unified subject as a
ground for temporal syntheses with ‘subjectification,’ a process of the subject formation.
Subjectivity is always in the making in a certain structure of time that determines how the
present relates to the other non-actual – but equally real – dimensions of time, the past and
the future. As Ansell-Pearson says, “[s]ubjectivity is virtual, never ours, and we are given
the chance of becoming.”123 Time is no longer a form of subjective experience but an
autonomous form under which the subject is produced. It is in this sense that Deleuze’s
synthesis of time overturns the relation between time and subjectivity.
With regard to subjectification, the virtual–actual scheme demonstrates the relation
between the time of the unconscious and an empirical subject. I have elucidated the virtual,
sub-representational structure of time that produces forms of subjectivity in terms of
Memory – contraction-subjectivity from habit-memory and recollection-subjectivity from
the Being of the past. And the third synthesis proves the power of Forgetting within this
Memory that puts the subject through a radical break between the passive self and the
fractured I. Here the transcendental memory as the virtual reveals itself to be ‘self-renewing’
in its actualization, rather than ideally pre-existent to what is realized. To an empirical
subject in the present, this movement is manifested as a fracture or a caesura, where ‘the I’ is
confronted with the virtual selves competing with one another. The moment of this
‘tremendous’ act/ event is said to be equivalent to ‘the whole of time,’ since this is the
moment where the complete renewal of the virtual is presented. This is where the
transcendental condition makes itself known to be repeated in the moment. This is how
novelty is presented to an empirical self. It shows itself in the form of an act/ event that
Keith Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 200.
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entirely re-maps the virtual, how the actual subject could be otherwise. It results in a
profound divide between the ‘before’ and the ‘after.’ It is the renewal of transcendental
Memory that reveals itself to the subject in the form of a fracture. The third time empties the
empirical contents and redirects the pre-existing patterns formed by habit and memory.
Time as a form of change that itself does not change (the virtual-actual schema) renders the
subject passive in relation to a temporal structure.

We have seen thus far Deleuze’s critique of time subordinated to movement, his
notion of time as self-differentiation, and the synthesis of time based on the virtual-actual
structure that produces the subject. In the following chapter we will examine how this newly
defined transcendental structure of time relates to the socio-economic conception of time. If
there is an ontological structure of time that produces subjectivity, what does it tell us about
the socially and historically constructed time? Is there any temporal structure imposed by a
socio-economic system that may conflict with our ontological condition for becoming?
What would the production of ‘the new’ in the synthesis of the future imply in terms of a
social structure? We will explore these questions by looking at the problem of
subjectification in capitalism that Deleuze discusses in his later works in collaboration with
Guattari. We will be focusing on the tension in the subject formation between different
temporalities: the virtual-actual structure as an ontological condition for becoming and a
temporality imposed by an economic system, capitalism.
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III. Time in Contemporary Capitalism: A System of Debt
In the previous chapters, we have looked at Deleuze’s notion of time defined as a selfdifferentiation and as a structure that constitutes the subject. In chapter one, we discussed
Deleuze’s critique of time subordinated to movement. I argued that his critique aims at the
substance-based notion of time and its relation to the concept of the subject understood as
that which survives change. When time is reconceived in terms of the production of
difference in its self-differentiation, the movement-time relation is overturned. In chapter
two, we said that this newly defined notion of time functions as a structure that produces the
subject. I focused on the temporal structure related to Memory, which Deleuze equates with
‘time as subjectification.’
In this chapter, we will examine how the relationship between time and the subject
discussed in ontological terms in the first two chapters changes when we take the socioeconomic conceptions of time into consideration. In particular, I am interested in looking
into the kind of movement to which our sense of time under current economic system is
subordinated, i.e., the movement of capital. Thus I shall define the temporality
characteristic of financial capitalism and examine how it functions in the process of subject
formation. I will do so by putting Deleuze’s early theory of time and his later work on
capitalism in conversation with each other.
Deleuze’s account of the passive synthesis of time in Difference and Repetition (1968)
suggests that we see time as constitutive of the subject, rather than a subjective form of
experience. In his later works written with Félix Guattari under the heading of ‘Capitalism
and Schizophrenia,’ Deleuze discusses capitalism as a ‘point of subjectification
(subjectivation),’ though not specifically as a temporal process. Thus I will attempt to bring
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these seemingly separate discourses together, in order to establish a coherent theory of
subjectification throughout Deleuze’s oeuvre. We will also discuss some possible challenges
that such reading may face.
Some of the immediate challenges of this task would be determining how to
characterize the temporality of financial capitalism and bringing up to date Deleuze and
Guattari’s work on capitalism dated back to the 1970s, where global financialization was
just about to begin. As for the former I dwell on Deleuze’s insight in his 1990 essay on the
societies of control, where he observes that the social control in contemporary capitalism
takes the form of ‘debt’ and open circuits of banking. Concerning the latter, I will keep the
focus on Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Marx’s theory of money in L’Anti-Oedipe (1972),
with an emphasis on the transformation of money in the credit system and show that their
view on credit and debt sheds light on the structure of financing today. Here is what I
attempt to accomplish specifically in the following: First I will present an extensive analysis
of the concept of ‘financial capital’ and of the systematic dependency of financial capitalism
on debt. Then I demonstrate how debt functions as a form of social control by analyzing its
temporal structure. Unlike other temporal forms of capitalist control – such as labor time or
cycles of production – that demarcate the subject’s experience of time externally, debt
imposes moral obligations to the past upon her own conscience; thus, its impact on the
subject is originated from her internal feeling of guilt. When guilt prevails, one perceives
time as a dominant past and a limited future. This will prepare us for a more detailed
analysis of the subjectifcation process through debt in the next chapter, where I claim that
the temporal structure of debt results in the failure of synthesizing time as future, and thus in
the production of a ‘melancholic subject.’
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1. Time and Capitalism
In this section, I examine the ways in which the relation between time and movement can
be defined with regard to the circulation of capital. We begin with various types of monetary
movement articulated by Marx to identify the specificity of ‘financial capital.’ Then we
move onto Deleuze’s reading of Marx, with a focus on the distinction between money used
for the exchange of commodities and money as financing. It will be noted that his reading of
Marx was greatly influenced by Suzanne de Brunhoff, a French Marxist economist, who
tried to reinvigorate Marx’s theory of money in the 1970s by applying it to a more
developed form of capitalism with universalized credit relations. I develop Deleuze’s
distinction between two forms of money further to elaborate new forms of power in
contemporary financial capitalism. When we get to the next section, we will see that time in
the circulation of financial capital serves as that which generates quantitative difference in
monetary value and that this ‘power’ of time reproduces the asymmetry between debtor and
creditor.
1.1 Time and the movement of capital
In what follows, I attempt to apply Deleuze’s idea of ‘time subordinated to
movement’ to a particular kind of movement that appears to dominate the perception of
time under financial capitalism. In the most general sense, time under the capitalist mode of
production is defined according to monetary movements, not only because time is equated
with ‘the quantitative reality of labor’ as Marx put it,124 but also because time itself is

In Marx, the laborer is conceived as labor time personified as the quantitative determination of labor. We
have seen in the first chapter that time in antiquity was secondary to movements, in that it was conceived as a
measure of the number of movements. Éric Alliez notes in his reading of Marx that with the idea of labor time,
time is conceived as the matter and measure of equivalence. He quotes Marx: “Just as motion is measured by
time, so is labor by labor time; it is the living quantitative reality of labor” (Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy,
124
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evaluated by the number of movement of monetary growth, that is, the creation of interest.
In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish contemporary capitalism from the older
forms of capitalism based upon the idea of financial capital, that is, the self-generating
function of capital. Thus I take the circulation of capital as the kind of movement to which
our sense of time under financial capitalism is subordinated. As Marx explained in Capital,
we can think of four major types of movements in relation to money circulation:
(1) Exchange between commodities: Commodity–Commodity’ (C-C’)
(2) Exchange between commodities with the use of money as a medium:
Commodity–Money–Commodity’ (C-M-C’)
(3) Use of commodity for profit: Money–Commodity–Money’ (M-C-M’)
(4) Creation of profit by investment: Money–Money’ (M-M’)125
These four movements correspond to the different stages in the transformation of money
into capital. The (1) C-C’ cycle is barter, an exchange of products without using money.
Eventually money is introduced to facilitate barter in the (2) C-M-C’ movement.
Subsequently the transition from the (2) C-M-C’ to the (3) M-C-M’ occurs. This shift is
significant because money begins to serve a different purpose after the transition; in C-M-C’,
transactions are made through money as a medium, because the value of C and that of C’
are incommensurable. Here money is used as a standard measure of value. In the case of the
process M-C-M’, however, money goes beyond its original function as the measure of value
and becomes the end of the transaction itself. Here the commodity is only the means to gain
profit, evaluated not for its use value but for its resale value. If money in the C-M-C’ is a
medium for the simple exchange of commodities, money in the M-C-M’ is capital. The

trans. Frida Knight, in Collected Works 6 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 127, cited in Eric Alliez,
Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time, trans. George van den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996), xvi.).
125 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol.1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin Books,
1992), 247-257.
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circulation of capital reaches its culmination in the (4) M-M’ that does not involve any
commodities or exchanges between them.
The differences in nature of the last two circuits from the first two deserve careful
examination. Marx discusses the transition from money as a medium of exchange (C-M-C’)
to money that serves its own reproduction (M-C-M’) in terms of Aristotle’s distinction
between the art of household management (oikonomia) and that of wealth-getting
(chrematistics).126 In Book I of the Politics, Aristotle distinguishes the natural movement of
oikonomia driven by needs from the unnatural movement of chrematistics driven by the desire
for the accumulation of wealth.
There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household
management, the other is retail trade: the former is necessary and honorable, while
that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by
which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason,
is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of
it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this
term interest (τόκος), which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the
breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. That is why of all
modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural. 127
According to Aristotle, the art of wealth-getting as a part of household management
(oikonomia) concerns the social and natural resource economies, whereas wealth-getting in
the form of retail trade (chrematistics) involves the manipulation of wealth for the sake of
increasing monetary exchange benefits of the individual owner. Aristotle critiques the latter
as the secondary use of the goods where one makes a gain out of money itself. Furthermore,

Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol.1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin Books,
1992), 342.
127 Aristotle, Politics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol.2, edit. Jonathan
Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1258a39-1258b8 (emphasis added)
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115

he notes that usury – what we have described as (4) M-M’– is ‘the most hated sort,’ where
money is used to increase at interest.128
Far from being the most ‘unnatural’ movement, the M-M’ seems to have become a
very common form of monetary transaction in today’s financial capitalism with its
‘normalization of debt.’129 In the chapters on money that appear in the beginning of Capital,
Marx’s discussion of credit money concerns money-capital that circulates between financial
capitalists and industrial capitalists, who need to borrow money to keep their companies
growing. For the industrial capitalists to pay back the money they owe with interest, they
need to put it into production to create profit. For the financial capitalists, this particular
credit money as interest-bearing capital functions as self-generating capital in the M-M’,
independently of the process of production. But the movement of financial capital today
involves a much wider group than industrial capitalists and takes a far more sophisticated
form than usury, thus we need to look beyond what Marx says about the circulation of
money as a general equivalent. Deleuze and Guattari write,
[I]t is unfortunate that Marxist economists too often dwell on considerations
concerning the mode of production, and on the theory of money as the general
equivalent as found in the first section of Capital, without attaching enough
importance to banking practice, to financial operations, and to the specific circulation
of credit money – which would be the meaning of a return to Marx, to the Marxist
theory of money (AO 230/276).130

For detailed comparative analysis of Aristotle and Marx on this point, see Éric Alliez, Capital Times: Tales
from the Conquest of Time, trans. George van den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996),
xvii and 3-9.
129 Lisa Peñaloza and Michelle Barnhart, “Living U.S. Capitalism: The Normalization of Credit/Debt, Journal
of Consumer Research, Vol. 38, No.4 (2011): 743-762.
130 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and
Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1983), Henceforth abbreviated as AO.
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Many commentators read this passage as the point of break between Deleuze and Guattari
with Marx.131 However, I hope to show in the following how their reading of Marx’s theory
of money makes it more relevant to the current economic system. Ultimately I aim to
articulate the temporality of capital through the M-M’ circuit, but in order to do so, we have
to take a detour to see why the M-M’ circuit is considered to be a predominant form of
monetary movement in the financial capitalism. In what follows, we will look at Deleuze
and Guattari’s reading of Marx’s theory of money in two aspects: 1) the dualism between
two kinds of money, i.e., the formation of means of payment and the structure of financing,
and 2) the movement of financial capital in the M-M’ circuit.
1.2 Deleuze’s reading of Marx through Suzanne de Brunhoff
Two forms of money: exchange money and credit money
With the introduction of credit money, the role of money in the capitalist production
takes two different forms: the formation of means of payment and the structure of financing
(AO 229/275). Deleuze and Guattari argue that there is incommensurability between these
two flows of money – one measuring a purchasing power determined as ‘income,’ the other
measuring the true economic force, financial capital (AO 237/286). They write,
it is not the same money that goes into the pocket of the wage earner and is entered
on the balance sheet132 of a commercial enterprise. In the one case, there are
impotent money signs of exchange value, a flow of means of payment relative to
consumer goods and use values, and a one-to-one relation between money and an
imposed range of products (“which I have a right to, which are my due, so they’re
mine”); in the other case, signs of the power of capital, flows of financing, a system
of differential quotients of production that bear witness to a prospective force or to a
long-term evaluation, not realizable hic et nunc, and functioning as an axiomatic of
See, for instance, Simon Glezos, The Politics of Speed: Capitalism, the State and War in an Accelerating World
(London: Routledge, 2011), 195; Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2012), 168.
132 Balance sheet denotes a report that shows the financial position of an enterprise – assets (what it owns),
liabilities (what it owes) and equity (shareholders’ equity).
131

117

abstract quantities. […] The extreme importance in the capitalist system of the
dualism that exists in banking between the formation of the means of payment and
the structure of financing, between the management of money and financing of
capitalist accumulation, between exchange money and credit money (AO 228/274275).
In this passage, we see the contrast between the ‘real’ money used to purchase products with
the ‘demonetized’ form of money that goes to the industrial capitalists from banks, the
financial capitalists.133 The distinction is drawn between powerless money for exchange and
the power of capital, a flow of means of payment and a flow of financing, and finally, the
correspondence between money and commodities and differential quotients that determine
future production. As we will see, this distinction informs that between C-M-C’ and M-M’.
In his seminar at Vincennes given in 1971, Deleuze says that he borrows the idea of
dualism between the forms of money from Suzanne de Brunhoff.134 The originality of
Brunhoff’s reading of Marx lies in her attempt to synthesize Marx’s theory of money as a
general equivalent and his analysis of the specific circulation of money in the system of
credit and banking,135 which makes an important contribution to a revival of Marx’s concept
of money in the 1970s. Following Brunhoff, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the
significance of Marx’s view on money today lies in what it draws on the circulation of credit
money – to banking practice, to financial operations (AO 230/277).

The abstraction of exchange relations and commodity forms has been noted by the readers of Marx, Guy
Debord and Jean Baudrillard. Debord describes capital “accumulated to the point where it becomes image” as
the ‘spectacle,’ (The Society of the spectacle, trans. Ken Knabb (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets, 2014)),
whereas Baudrillard observes a system of signs in the consumer society, where the economic exchange value is
converted into the ‘sign exchange value’ (Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign
(Saint Louis: Telos Press Publishing, 1981)).
134 Gilles Deleuze, Lecture on December 21, 1971. Retrieved from https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/121.
Deleuze also mentions Bernard Schmitt, a neo-classical French economist, who he claims to make the same
claim about the dualism of two forms of money as Brunhoff’s.
135 See Suzanne de Brunhoff, Marx on Money, trans. Maurice J. Goldbloom (London: Verso, 2015 [1967]) and
“Marx’s Contribution to the Search for a Theory of Money,” in Marx’s Theory of Money: Modern Appraisals,
edited by Fred Moseley (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
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Let us then look at Brunhoff’s discussion of the two kinds of money, presented in
Marx on Money and L’Offre de Monnaie [The Money Supply].136 She talks about them in terms
of two different systems: Monetary system (money as the general equivalent for its exchange
value), and credit system (money as capitalist financing). Monetary system concerns a
simple money circulation that involves circuits of the exchange of commodities. In her
discussion of monetary system, Brunhoff refers to Marx: “For example, if a manufacturer
receives money on Friday from his banker, he pays his workers on Saturday, who spend
much of it immediately at the grocer’s, etc., and the grocer brings the money back to the
banker on Monday.”137 This circulation of commodities can be expressed as the C-M-C’
circuit above. According to Brunhoff, money in the simple circulation, as an abstraction in
relation to social process of production, has a social determination; its value is validated
immediately when you exchange it with a product. However, in the case of the latter, credit
money, money appears as if it has private origin – a debtor-creditor relation – and then it is
‘socialized’ only afterward, when put into the process of production. If I, as a manufacturer
(industrial capitalist), take out a loan from the bank (financial capitalists) to upgrade
equipment (commercial credit), I can pay it back with interest only if I make profit by
investing it in a productive process. This monetary circulation does not involve one-to-one
relations between money and products, but since the capital was invested in the productive
process, it concerns the M-C-M’ circuit. In her terms, commercial credit is “on the
borderline between monetary system and the credit system.”138
In addition to commercial credit in the M-C-M’ circuit, there is another element that
constitutes credit money: bank credit. Bank credit concerns loans that commercial banks or
Suzanne de Brunhoff, L’Offre de Monnaie (Paris: Maspero, 1971).
Brunhoff, L’Offre de Monnaie, 120.
138 Brunhoff, Marx on Money, 81.
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other financial institutions issue. If Aristotle discussed the M-M’ circuit in terms of usury
and chrematistics, its modern form is found in banking practices.139 It takes a highly
dematerialized form in that it does not involve the circulation of ‘real’ money, but is only
expressed as a transfer of balances and IOUs. As Brunhoff points out, credit money is not
socialized immediately, but only when it is distributed via private relations of credit-debt
and put into a process of production. It has to be transformed into the money as a means of
payment.140 Echoing Brunhoff, Deleuze and Guattari write,
Thus in credit money, which comprises all the commercial and bank credits, purely
commercial credit has its roots in simple circulation where money develops as means
of payment (bills of exchange falling due on a fixed date, which constitute a
monetary form of finite debt). Inversely, bank credit effects a demonetization or
dematerialization of money, and is based on the circulation of drafts instead of the
circulation of money. This credit money traverses a particular circuit where it
assumes, then loses, its value as an instrument of exchange, and where the
conditions of flux imply conditions of reflux, giving to the infinite debt its capitalist
form (AO 229/275, emphasis added).141
In the above passage, Deleuze and Guattari note that we have, on the one hand, a simple
money circulation where workers and wage earners use money for daily spending, and on
the other hand, the movement of financial capital, involved in the cycle of loaned, interestbearing capital: one engaging directly with commodity exchanges or indirectly through

“Usury as such does not only continue to exist, but is even freed, among nations with a developed capitalist
production, from the fetters imposed upon it by all previous legislation. Interest-bearing capital retains the
form of usurer's capital in relation to persons or classes, or in circumstances where borrowing does not, nor
can, take place in the sense corresponding to the capitalist mode of production; where borrowing takes place as
a result of individual need, as at the pawnshop; where money is borrowed by wealthy spendthrifts for the
purpose of squandering […] ” (Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol.3, trans. Ben Fowkes
(New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 600).
140 Brunhoff, L’Offre de Monnaie, 119-120.
141 The section Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of two kinds money is part of their account of different types
of social machine. Thus the section ‘civilized capitalist machine’ treats a number of other issues around the
development of the system. For a detailed discussion on the birth of capitalism, see Jay Lampert, Deleuze and
Guattari’s Philosophy of History (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 114-142.
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production and the other concerning the production and reproduction of capital itself. We
will return to the problem of finite and infinite debt in the next section.
If we look at the way we use ‘real’ money and credit money in our daily life,
however, the differences in their form do not appear to be so significant. We seem to be able
to convert dematerialized bank credit into a circulation of money with no difficulty. I get
groceries with my credit card, and I pay my credit card bill when I receive a paycheck by
direct deposit. If I take out a loan from the bank to buy a car, the borrowed money goes into
a purchase of the commodity. These transactions do not provide us with any reasons to
believe that bank credit is a different kind of money from the wage I earn. What do Deleuze
and Guattari mean when they call one ‘a true economic force’ and the other ‘a powerless
sign’? What makes the two different in terms of power? Let us proceed to Brunhoff’s
discussion of the convertibility of moneys.
The convertibility between two forms of money
In the credit system that results in the dematerialization of money, we have different
forms of money in circulation – bank notes, coins and credit money (drafts, bills, etc.). For
money to be used as a general equivalent, various types of money need to be made
convertible into one another, so that they would form a homogenous whole. As Brunhoff
points out, when we look at the relationship between moneys, we necessarily face the
problem of the value of money. She notes that money does not have its own value as a base
fixed directly by social labor, and “[t]he modification of relations of money-commodity
equivalence appears (becomes apparent) through the changes in the relations of equivalence
between moneys.”142 That is to say, the introduction of credit money into the commodity
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economy changes the nature of the value of money. The question regarding the value of
money concerns how the system combines the two forms of money. To put it simply, what
we can exchange with a certain amount of money is determined by something external to
that specific exchange relation itself, that is, the amount of money that is created and
circulated. Brunhoff continues, “the reciprocal convertibility of moneys in circulation
implies that it would be recognized as the equivalence of various types of money that form a
homogenous whole. […] Yet it appears that money today, all credit money, escapes this
problem of identification from the moment that gold no longer circulates or is exchangeable
for bills or deposits.”143 As she notes, the value of money has become problematic since the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the gold standard monetary system in 1971. The
value of the U.S. dollar is no longer fixed against gold, and the creation and the destruction
of money is not restricted by the amount of gold held in reserve.
The question then becomes: how is the value of money determined? How is the
convertibility between two forms of money guaranteed? Deleuze and Guattari observe that
despite the disparity of the two, banks participate in both fields of money and functions as a
pivotal point between payment and financing. Deleuze and Guattari refer to Marx on this
point: “The central bank is the pivot of the credit system.”144 And it is not coincidental that
what Brunhoff finds most interesting about Marx’s theory of credit money is his analysis of
the role of banks – “it incorporates the problem of money into that of financing in a new
way.”145 The role banks play is crucial to understand the conversion between money as a
means of payment and financing. Brunhoff writes,
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The structure of means of payment is dominated by the role of monetary base
(monnaie centrale) that assures the homogeneity of moneys while these are issued in
the decentered fashion from the indefinite series of private relations between banks
and borrowers. The centralization of the guarantee of convertibility goes hand in
hand with the decentralization of the issuance.146
The argument that Brunhoff presents in this passage can be summarized as the following:
(1) The monetary base determines the structure of the value of money as means of payment.
(2) It is this centralization that guarantees the convertibility of the two forms.
(3) The control through centralization is contingent upon the distribution of money in a
decentralized fashion, i.e. private debtor-creditor relation between banks and individuals.
We need to define some terms to understand what is discussed here. The monetary base
(hereafter ‘MB’; also called, central bank money or high-powered money) is defined as “the
sum of currency in circulation and reserve balances (deposits held by banks and other
depository institutions in their accounts with the Federal Reserve).”147 The MB indicates
money, the level of which is controlled by the central bank, which is, in the United States,
the Federal Reserve Banks (hereafter ‘the Fed’). The Fed can alter the MB, and the money
supply by controlling interest rates and reserve ratios. First, by lowering interest rates, they
can make borrowing money cheaper and encourage individuals to take out more loans and
increase spending. Second, reserve ratios concern the portion of commercial banks’ deposits
required to be stored in reserve: the deposits that are not loaned out to customers, and that
need to be kept in case the customers want to withdraw from their account. Thus, by
lowering reserve requirement, the Fed can allow commercial banks to lend more of their
deposits to customers. With the current system of ‘fractional reserve banking,’ where only a
fraction of deposits must be kept in reserve for withdrawal, most banks are required to hold
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a 10% of their liabilities in reserve (either in the form of vault cash or deposits with the
Fed),148 and the rest can be loaned out to customers. Commercial banks and other
depository institutions borrow from the central bank to meet the reserve requirement when
they do not have enough cash on hand. The central bank controls the supply of money,
using these two methods, and as Brunhoff notes, “[t]he creation of money by the central
bank can modify the degree of convertibility between bank money and the monetary
base.”149
In sum, the introduction of credit money into the commodity economy changes the
nature of the value of money. The value of money concerns how the system combines the
two forms of money – “Only in the centralized system can the different kinds of money
become homogenous and appear as the components of an articulated whole.”150 The central
bank is what guarantees a convertibility of different sorts of money – both bank notes and
credit money (drafts, bills, etc.) between each other.151 In other words, the central bank
determines how much of the bank money is converted into other forms of money that are
legal tender.
Dissimulation by the banks
We have seen that in the system of credit there are various forms of money, and this raises
the problem of the value of money. As the convertibility between two forms of money
becomes an issue, the role of banks is considered to be crucial. It is the banks that control
the money supply – through monetary policy (central bank) and issuing loans (commercial
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banks) –, which determines the value of money as a means of payment. However, Deleuze
argues that the convertibility is fictitious in his 1971 seminar:
This convertibility is completely fictitious; it depends on the attachment to gold, it
depends on the unity of the markets, it depends on the interest rate. In fact, it is not
made in order to function, it is made, according to Suzanne de Brunhoff, in order to
dissimulate the capitalist operation. The fictitious convertibility, the theoretical, the
constant, of one form of money to another, assures the dissimulation of how it
works.152
As mentioned earlier, the United States went off of the gold standard in 1971, the year in
which Deleuze’s above seminar was given. But the other factors he mentions upon which
the convertibility is dependent seem to be still relevant to current economic system. Deleuze
claims here that the capitalist system becomes functional not through the convertibility itself,
but by instituting a fictitious convertibility between the two kinds of money. That is to say,
for the system to function, it is necessary for the subjects involved in economic activities to
believe that the various forms of money are convertible into one another.
According to Deleuze, it is important to note that money as purchasing power and
money as financing, despite the fact that they are made to be convertible in the centralized
system, are in fact governed by different logic; one according to the law of exchange and the
other to the creation and destruction of money. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the
fictitious nature of the convertibility is concealed by the role of banks. Thus they talk about
the dissimulation of the dualism between the two forms of money in terms of the two
aspects of banking practice:
Hence one is correct in speaking of a profound dissimulation of the dualism of
banking practice. But this dissimulation does not depend on a faulty understanding
Gilles Deleuze, Lecture on December 21, 1971. Retrieved from https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/121,
cited in Christian Kerslake, “Marxism and money in Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia: On
the conflict between the theories of Suzanne de Brunhoff and Bernard Schmitt,” Parrhesia, No.22 (2015): 3878, 45 (translation modified); Kerslake argues that Deleuze represents Brunhoff’s position inaccurately here.
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[méconnaissance] so much as it expresses the capitalist field of immanence, the
apparent objective movement where the lower or subordinate form is no less
necessary than the other (it is necessary for money to play on both boards), and
where no integration of the dominated classes could occur without the shadow of
this unapplied principle of convertibility […]” (AO 229/275-276).
Here Deleuze and Guattari note that banks are not simply performing a mediating role, but
a ‘dissimulating’ one in the mutation of financial capital into payment money. They also
observe that the distinction between social classes is perpetuated with the illusion of the
convertibility, or of a homogeneous whole of money. The need for dissimulation shows the
dependency of the reproduction of financial capital upon the function of money as means of
payment. On this point, they refer to Brunhoff.153 She writes, “the duality cannot be
reabsorbed for it corresponds to the nature of money as a specific social relation
dissimulating the relations of production and of reproduction of capital.”154 The necessary
dissimulation in question brings us back to the very nature of credit money and the problem
of its ‘socialization’ noted earlier. We said that the flow of financing is not immediately
socialized, but only when it is converted into the circulation of money that engages labor,
production and commodity exchanges. When money is provided to wage earners, it is
presented as a means of payment, but neither the principle that governs the creation of that
money nor the power of banks over the value of money is revealed.
For example, when the central bank decides to increase the money supply using the
two means mentioned above, it is done through commercial banks, which increase the
amount of money in circulation by issuing more loans to their customers. For monetary
They cite Brunhoff in the following page. “Brunhoff, L’offre de monnaie (reference note 73), p. 124: ‘The very
notion of a monetary mass can have a meaning only relative to the workings of a system of credit where the
different kinds of money combine. Without such a system, one would have only a sum of means of payment
that would have no access to the social nature of the general equivalent and that could serve only in local
private circuits. There would be no general monetary circulation. Only in the centralized system can the
different kinds of money become homogeneous and appear as the components of an articulated whole.’ And
with regard to the objective dissimulation in the system, see pp. 110, 114” (AO 230/276).
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policy to have the expected impact on the commodity economy, individuals are supposed to
increase their spending by borrowing more from commercial banks. In this process, the
banks earn interest on their money capital. As money supply increases, the value of
currency decreases, so does the purchasing power of money. Again, it is crucial to
understand that banks do not simply distribute and provide money for commodity
circulation, but also create money in the form of debt. As we will see shortly, the amount of
money in circulation always far exceeds that of legal tender produced by the central bank,
since commercial banks can create balances by lending money that they do not have in
reserve.155 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari summarizes the role of banks as the
following: “if the flow of financing-money, or credit money, involves the mass of economic
transactions, what banks govern is the conversion of the credit money that has been created
into segmentary payment-money that is appropriated, in other words, coinage or State
money for the purchase of goods that are themselves segmented (the importance of the
interest rate in this respect). What banks govern is the conversion between the two kinds of
money, and the conversion of the segments of the second kind into any given good” (MP
226).
Already as early as 1971, Brunhoff warns us of the structural instabilities generated
by the ‘credit cycle.’ She points out that there is a precariousness of the socialization of bank
money (la monnaie scripturale), the private origin of which becomes manifest when facing the
limitation of its convertibility into monetary base. When credit is overextended, the
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fictitiousness and fragility of financial capital is exposed in a moment of financial crisis,
where the gap between two kinds of money becomes conspicuous. She writes, “the status of
money as general equivalent is continuously threatened and reconstituted by the conditions
of workings of centralized system.”156
In short, for the capitalist system to function, the money earned by workers in
exchange of their labor and the money earned by the self-reproduction of financial capital
must be presented as the same money. It is important that money is perceived as a
homogeneous whole, despite the disparity between the two: one that is immediately
socialized through its exchange value to commodities, and the other concerning the value of
money itself. It needs to be assured that money existing as numbers and balances is
socialized, and transformed into the means of payment. The convertibility of two moneys
seems to be secured by the amount of debt created by the commercial banks. However, the
law that governs the creation of money is different from that which applies to the productive
process and commodity exchange. The value of money as purchasing power in the latter is
subject to the former. As Deleuze and Guattari note, “There is no common measure
between the value of the enterprises and that of the labor capacity of wage earners” (AO
230/277). We may say that what is dissimulated is not only the dualism between the two
kinds of money but the asymmetry in power between wage earners and financial capitalists.
1.3 The power of financial capital: Fictitious capital
If Brunhoff emphasized the necessary interdependency of the two forms of money
and the precariousness of the value of money in the system of credit, Deleuze focuses more
on the power relation involved in the dualism. In the lecture given in 1971, he claims that
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the fundamental duality of money indicates the difference in power, which refers back to
what he said in AO about the difference between money that goes into the wage earner’s
pocket and the money that goes in and out of banks. He says, even when we make it seem
that one can be converted into the other, “it does not matter because it does not change
anything about their difference in nature. They do not carry the same power at all. One is
indeed a sign of economic power, the other, not at all – it is, to the letter, the sign of
impotence of wage earners; one defines the structure of financing, the other defines a whole
of the means of payment.”157 That is, money as purchasing power is subordinated to the
power of financial capital that concerns the creation and destruction of money.
Creation of Money by Banks: Money Multiplier
What makes money as means of payment “impotent (powerless)”? What results in the
difference in power? What makes the operations of power in the financial capitalism
complex is that the antagonism between classes –bourgeoisie and proletariat, capitalists and
workers, etc.–, which was crucial in Marx’s critique of capitalism, seems much less obvious
in the capitalism in its current form. It appears that anyone can participate in finance
markets in the form of shares and stocks.
As a way to conceive the implications of the difference in power between financing
and money as purchasing power in the current context of financial capitalism, I suggest that
we consider the concept of ‘money multiplier.’ The monetary base (MB) we discussed above
is also called ‘high-powered’ money since an increase in the MB leads to the creation of a
multiple of the amount of money. Money multiplier shows how the adjustment made to MB
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can lead to the creation of money through loans made by commercial banks and financial
institutions.
For example, we have Bank A and Bank B, each of which has $100,000 in deposits
and no excess reserves. Both of them have $90,000 in loans. Let us suppose Customer X
deposits $1,000 in Bank A. Since the reserve ratio set by the Fed is 10%, Bank A must keep
$100 in reserve and makes $900 in loans. Bank A has $101,000 in deposits and $90,900 in
loans. In this way, the Bank A creates $900, which did not exist before. Below is the amount
added to Bank A’s balance sheet:
Bank A
Assets
Liabilities
----------------------------------------------------Reserves $100
Deposits $1,000
Loans $ 900

Let’s say Bank A loans $900 to Customer Y, who deposits the money at her account with
Bank B. As $900 is added to the balance of Y’s account, Bank B’s total deposit goes up to
$100,900. It can then loan out 90% of the new deposit amount $900, $810 to Customer Z,
creating an additional $810 of money. As this circuit of deposit and loan is repeated, more
money is created as below:
Original deposit =
Bank A lending =
Bank B lending =
Bank C lending =

…

$1,000
$ 900 [$1,000 × 0.9]
$ 810 [$ 900 × 0.9]
$ 729 [$ 810 × 0.9]

-----------------------------------------------------------Total money supply increased = $10,000158

Here we see that an increase of $1,000 in the deposit generates $10,000 of money over
time.159 Money multiplier is “the amount of money the banking system generates with each
Example modified; “Money Multiplier,” in N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Macroeconomics (Mason:
South-Western Cengage Learning: 2008), 329-330.
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1

dollar of reserves.”160 If R is a reserve ratio, money multiplier is: 𝑅. In this example, R is

1

,

10

thus the money multiplier is 10. “The higher the reserve ratio, the less of each deposit banks
loan out, and the smaller the money multiplier.”161
Money supply = Monetary base × Money multiplier

The money multiplier shows that the central bank’s control over money supply relies on the
amount of loans that commercial banks and other depository institutions give out to
customers. Also, we see that how bank credit as financial capital represented as the circuit
M-M’ expands exponentially over time, without necessarily being converted into exchange
money, or put into the production process. The newly generated money as loans, while
added to the total amount of debt, potentially earns the banks interest, the surplus value of
capital itself. Deleuze and Guattari call money created by banks, “an instantaneous creative
flow that the banks create spontaneously as a debt owing to themselves, a creation ex nihilo”
(AO 237/286). As the prices of other commodities, the value of money as purchasing power
is determined by the supply (and demand) of money through the creation and destruction of
money. Thus, Deleuze says that trying to compare money as purchasing power and money
as structure of financing on the same measure is like trying to measure astronomical
distances in centimeters.162
Interest-Bearing Capital (M-M’): Filiative Capital and Debt
Deleuze and Guattari consider this self-expanding capital as a defining element of financial
capitalism. In Anti-Oedipus, they quote Marx’s remark on the M-M’ movement: “instead of

There are assumptions in this calculation; we assumed that people deposit all of their money in the banks
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simply representing the relations of commodities, it [money] enters now, so to say, into
relations with itself. It differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus-value; as the
father differentiates himself qua the son” (Marx, Ch.4 The general formula of capital,
Capital p.256) (AO 227/273). From this idea of self-differentiating capital, they derive the
concept of ‘filiative capital.’ Deleuze and Guattari claim, “the capitalist machine begins
when capital ceases to be a capital of alliance to become a filiative capital. Capital becomes
filiative when money begets money” (ibid.). We will return to this idea of financial capital in
its self-differentiation shortly, in the following section.
Let us note that on the other side of this expansion of capital in the credit system, we
have the expansion of debt; whenever new money is created by commercial banks, new debt
is introduced to economy.163 When the credit-debt relation implies the obligation for
repayment with interest, debt claims become an object of trade and form a market of its
own. Even if the mortgage loan you take out is used as exchange money for your house
(thus not necessarily a form of financial investment), the newly originated mortgage of
yours is sold to and traded between investors (such as pension funds, mutual funds,
insurance companies, etc.) as an asset in the secondary mortgage market. Then it becomes
part of the circuit of financial capital that generates surplus value of its own.
Based on the dualism between exchange money and credit money, and the idea of
financial capital, Deleuze says that not only is there a use of money that concerns solely the
generation of money itself, but also it has become the primary use of money. If financing is
In a report called “Money Creation in the Modern Economy” (Quarterly Bulletin Q1, 2014), three economists
from the Bank of England’s Monetary Analysis Directorate stated that money is created as ‘debt.’ They stated
that most common assumptions about banking practices are wrong. It is not that banks lend out household
savings to consumers or entrepreneurs. Rather, they create money by making loans. Banks are not only
intermediaries but also the creators of deposit money. As they note, “[w]hen a bank makes a loan, it
simultaneously creates a matching deposit in the borrower’s bank account, thereby creating new money.” The
central banks determine the quantity of loans and deposits not by controlling the quantity of central bank
money, but by setting interest rates.
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what ultimately determines the flow of capital, and if it is no longer regulated by the law of
exchange, we need to redefine monetary movements accordingly, based on financialization.
Thus Deleuze suggests that economic relations under the condition of financial capitalism
are understood in terms of an asymmetrical power relation, debtor-creditor relationship,
rather than exchange. He writes, “there are no forms of exchange, there are no forms of
equivalence. […] There is a whole circuit of debt that emerges from the circulation of its
finite elements.”164
Deleuze and Guattari observe that the systemic structure and the desire of economic
subjects are interrelated: “In a sense, it is the bank that controls the whole system and the
investment of desire” (AO 230/276). According to them, it is the dissimulation that
“ensures the Desire of the most disadvantaged creature [by the system] will invest with all
its strength, irrespective of any economic understanding or lack of it, the capitalist social
field as a whole” (AO 229/276). They write,
Who is alienated? […] one no longer knows who is alienated or who does the
alienating. Who steals? Certainly not the finance capitalist as the representative of
the great instantaneous creative flow, which is not even a possession and has no
purchasing power. Who is robbed? Certainly not the worker who is not even bought,
since the reflux or salary distribution creates the purchasing power, instead of
presupposing it. […] For everything is then based on the disparity between two kinds
of flows, as in the fathomless abyss where profit and surplus value are engendered:
the flow of merchant capital’s economic force and the flow that is derisively named
“purchasing power” – a flow made truly impotent that represents the absolute
impotence of the wage earner as well as the relative dependence of the industrial
capitalist. This is money and the market, capitalism’s true police (AO 238-239/287).
Here they seem to suggest that the dissimulation with regard to the power of moneys serve
to mask the profound gap between finance capitalists and wage earners. As noted earlier,
antagonism between economic classes is not conspicuous in financial capitalism, and it is
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because the class distinction has been replaced by the distinction between two kinds of
money. As Jason Read points out, money as the common object and symbol to both
financial capitalists and workers introduces “the condition for the incorporation of desire
into capitalism. Money extends the illusion that we all participate in the system as equals;
the dollars you and I earn are the same dollars that the wealthy invest to make billions.”165
Deleuze and Guattari’s observation on the dissimulation is interesting if we consider
it with respect to our perception of economic reality. A recent study on American public’s
assessments of economic mobility166 shows that there is an overall overestimation of upward
social mobility. Davidai and Gilovich demonstrate that “[p]articipants vastly overestimated
the amount of upward mobility, estimating a 43% likelihood of a person born into the
poorest quintile rising to the top three quintiles – a value significantly higher than the actual
30% chance of this happening.”167 Relatedly, another study shows that Americans broadly
underestimated the actual level of wealth inequality. Respondents believed that the top
quintile holds 59% of the wealth when it is in fact 84%.168 The power of financial capital
seems to lie not only in its self-expansion independently of exchange money but also in the
power to mask its function in the system.

2. Force of time: Temporal Structure of Debt
We have seen in the first section that the predominant form of monetary movement in
contemporary capitalism is found in the structure of financing rather than exchange. By
Jason Read, ‘The Age of Cynicism,” in Deleuze and Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008),
139-159, 153.
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comparing the power of money in the C-M-C’ circuit with the M-M’ circuit, Deleuze and
Guattari show that credit money holds the true economic power that predicts the movement
of exchange money. In what follows, we will look at the temporality immanent to financial
capital through the concepts in economic theory and a philosophical analysis of interest and
debt. I hope to show how time under financial capitalism gets subordinated to monetary
movement, and how this ‘monetized time’ comes into play in the production of indebted
subjects.
2.1 Time value of money: Time subordinated to monetary movement
Much literature has been published on how time under the capitalist mode of
production is conceived in terms of labor time, thus as a quantified time.169 Here we will
place the focus on the circulation of financial capital, shown in the M-M’ circuit, following
Deleuze and Guattari. The flow of capital can by no means be separated from the social
production, but as we have seen, it carries the power to determine the value of money itself,
including wages.
Time Value of Money
Financial capital is money used for investment rather than purchase, provided by
lenders for interest. Deleuze does not refer to this, but the concept of ‘Time Value of Money
(TVM)’ in economic theory will be helpful for our consideration of the relationship between
time and financial capital. The TVM theory, considered to be central in financial
management, suggests that the value of money is determined by time, taking account of

See, for instance, Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical
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interest.170 It concerns the so-called ‘inherent monetary value of time.’ The TVM formula
consists of the ideas such as the present value (PV), future value (FV), and interest rate (i);
the future value of money equals the present value multiplied by 1+interest rate to the n
power. Here n stands for the number of time periods.
FV=PV× (1+i)n
In the M-M’ movement, according to this formula, money generates itself by repeating its
present value to the ‘nth’ power, that is, over time. The TVM is supposed to show two
things: first, the value of money decreases over time. A hundred dollar today is worth more
than a hundred dollar in a year, since it can earn interest over time when invested. Second,
it shows that time is believed to produce monetary value, as the circulation of financial
capital repeats.
As we have seen in the earlier chapters, time for Deleuze is a vehicle through which
difference is produced. We said that repetition in time cannot be a return of the same, but a
movement of differentiation; time as a whole repeats its movement of self-differentiation
while undergoing qualitative change. Deleuze’s critique of time subordinated to movement
is aimed at the substance-based notion of time. Rather than talking about time as a measure
of the movement of individual substances, he suggests that we understand time as a force by
which everything is subject to produce itself anew. Time liberated from movement reveals
an ‘ontological renewability’ of all that is subject to time.
Here in TVM, however, repetition in time necessarily generates difference in
quantity, thus a repetition of quantitative difference. In fact, in the beginning of Difference and
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Repetition, Deleuze discusses the difference between repetition (repetition that generates
difference) and generality (repetition of the same) in economic terms: “Repetition as a
conduct and as a point of view concerns non-exchangeable and non-substitutable
singularities. […] If exchange is the criterion of generality, theft and gift are those of
repetition. There is, therefore, an economic difference between the two” (DR 1/7).
According to Deleuze, exchange is a transaction between things of equivalent value, thus
substitutable, whereas gift and theft are based upon asymmetrical relations or
irreplaceability. Repetition within the framework of financial capitalism seems to be the
circulation of capital that multiplies itself over time. This circulation is limitless since its
motive is not qualitative difference but quantitative difference between M and M’.
With regard to the circulation of finance capital in the M-M’ circuit, Marx says,
unlike the qualitative difference between C and C’ in the C-M-C’ circuit, “the extremes M,
M are quantitatively different, even if not qualitatively. This quantitative difference
presupposes the exchange of non-equivalents.”171 The accumulation of capital through the
M-M’ circuit also differs from the creation of surplus value through production. According
to Marx, the identity of surplus value and surplus labor sets a qualitative limit to the
accumulation of capital. That is, the total working day sets the limit of how much labor can
be exploited. But “if surplus-value is conceived in the irrational form of interest, the limit is
only quantitative, and beggars all fantasy.”172
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The power of time: the self-generation of capital
Here we observe an interesting parallel between the notion of time understood as
self-differentiation and the self-expansion of financial capital. Considering the operation of
money noted above, it is perhaps not hyperbolic to say that under financial capitalism, what
carries the power to differentiate from itself is capital, rather than time. When time serves to
increase interest on borrowed capital, its creative force is taken over by the generative power
of capital. Let us consider the concept of interest, which gives time to multiply monetary
value, and potentially ‘monetizes’ time itself. Marx has wittily describes the power of time
with regard to interest-bearing capital, quoting Price: “Money bearing compound interest
increases at first slowly. But, the rate of increase being continually accelerated, it becomes in
some time so rapid, as to mock all the powers of the imagination. One penny, put out at our
Saviour’s birth to 5 percent compound interest, would, before this time, have increased to a
greater sum, than would be contained in a hundred and fifty millions of earths, all solid
gold.”173 With interest, capital takes a life of its own, in its exponential growth over time.
Speaking of life, let us recall that Deleuze and Guattari characterize the selfdifferentiation of financial capital in terms of filiation, the metaphor of which comes from
Marx’s remarks on the M-M’ circuit. We see that Marx discusses interest in terms of
generation. He writes in the section ‘Interest-Bearing Capital’ in the Volume 3 of Capital,
“[l]ike the growth of trees, so the generation of money (τόκος) seems a property of capital in
this form of money capital.” 174 He notes that the Greek word for interest, ‘τόκος’ literally
means ‘birth’ or ‘what has been born.’ As Éric Alliez notes, “τόκος, interest, whose root tekevokes the son being called by the name of the father, cuts itself off from the order of phusis
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and of natural reproduction to become the symbol of a monstrous filiation.” 175 The most
aberrant movement of capital, in its insistent quantitative expansion, resists the creative
force of time as the production of qualitative difference.
Our discussion of the time of capital leads us to bring together Deleuze’s conception
‘time as an empty form’ and Marx’s idea of capital as ‘money form without content.’ Marx
calls money lent to expand and accumulate its quantitative value ‘fictitious capital,’
distinguishing it from money borrowed or lent for other purposes. He says, “capital appears
immediately in this form [interest-bearing capital], unmediated by the production and
circulation processes. […] Instead of the actual transformation of money into capital, we
have here only the form of this devoid of content.”176 Marx calls this particular kind of MM’ circulation in the credit system, ‘money form without content.’ It is fictitious in that the
creation of money, as seen in our discussion of money multiplier, does not have any
physical substance. The bank’s capital basically consists of liabilities, i.e., claims and IOUs
issued by companies and households: “The greater part of banker’s capital is therefore
purely fictitious and consists of claims (bills of exchange) and shares (drafts on future
revenues).”177 We may relate the notion of financial capital as money form without content
to Deleuze’s definition of time as an empty form in the third synthesis.178 As time as an
empty form in Deleuze denotes the idea of time liberated from movement, capital seems to
Éric Alliez, Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time, trans. George van den Abbeele (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), xvii.
176 Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 516.
177 Ibid. 600.
178 Drawing on Berthoud who sees chrematistic exchange as an exchange between different moments of time,
thus an exchange that gives a price to time (Arnaud Berthoud, Aristote et l’argent, Maspero, 1981, 78), Alliez
claims that chrematistics is a question of time, specifically the exchange value of time, freed from the
movements that it was measuring (ÉricAlliez, Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time, trans. George van
den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 12-13). He argues that chrematistics is, in
Deleuze’s terms, a pure order of time, time that gets unhinged. “If money bears within itself an ineffaceable
debit, it is because time, converted into the money form, is discovered as an empty form, a pure order of time,
quantitative and differential, measurable and coinable, which nothing can come to fill” (Ibid. 13).
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be liberated from commodity exchange in its empty form. Under the structure of financing,
time serves to measure the self-expanding movement of financial capital, thus becomes
subordinate to capital. I will elaborate further on this point in Section 3.2, where the
synthesis of the future is discussed in relation to the time of capital.
But time alone does not earn financial capitalists interest. The circulation of financial
capital takes a formation of the social relation, that is, debtor-creditor relationship. The
perpetual movement of self-expanding financial capital is fueled by the cycle of debt
multiplication. If the ‘power’ of time is exercised in its generation of difference in monetary
value, as we said above, it would have radically different effects on the debtor and the
creditor. Put in Deleuze’s terms, the M-M’ circuit of capital, as it repeats, reproduces the
asymmetry between debtor and creditor.179 I argue that this asymmetrical power relation
introduces a new temporal structure to the subjects of capitalism; first, subordinated to
monetary movements, time that is supposed to bring about an asymmetrical synthesis
between past and future in the present only results in the asymmetry between the
accumulation of capital on the one side and the multiplication of debt on the other.
Moreover, this temporality derived from the circulation of capital seems to have become a
dominant structure of time in contemporary capitalism. In the following section, I will
demonstrate the temporality of the indebted, which is a general condition that most of the
subjects in the current economic system are subjected to in the forms of credit, mortgage,
and loan.

Lazzarato also highlights this in his reading of Deleuze and Guattari: “There is no equality (of exchange)
underlying social relations, but rather an asymmetry of debt/credit, which precedes, historically and
theoretically, that of production and wage labour” (Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of Indebted Man (Los
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2012) 11).
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2.2 Debt and Memory
In her reading of Marx, Brunhoff observes that the system of credit introduces certain
temporality to economic activities: “[c]redit introduces the notion of time (i.e., the amount
of time that elapses between C and M if the commodity buyer does not immediately pay the
seller in hard cash).”180 She notes that credit constitutes the monetary relationship’s
temporal manifestation. When there is an interval in time between the moment where a
commodity-owner is ready to sell and the moment where another commodity-owner is
ready to buy, “[t]he seller sells an existing commodity, the buyer buys as the mere
representative of money, or rather as the representative of future money. The seller becomes
a creditor, the buyer becomes a debtor.”181
If being in debt is a temporal condition, how can it be characterized? On an empirical
level, time is immediately perceived by the indebted as that which multiplies the amount of
debt. They may feel bound to their past debt obligations that restrain their decisions for the
future. They may also feel that they do not have ownership of ‘time to come.’ But more
importantly, the promise of future repayment they make affects their experience of time on a
more profound level, what we may equate with subconscious or transcendental conditions.
In making promises to pay back, one is supposed to create a memory of the fact of
indebtedness and must hold to it. Memory is crucial for establishing and maintaining a
debtor-creditor relationship.182 So, in this section we will look at the role of memory in the
temporal experience of the indebted, which will prepare us for the discussion of

Suzanne de Brunhoff, ‘Marx’s Contribution to the Search for a Theory of Money,’ in Marx’s Theory of
Money: Modern Appraisals, edited by Fred Moseley (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 211.
181 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol.1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin Books,
1992), 268.
182 Margaret Atwood also said famously, “Without memory there is no debt” (Payback: Debt and the Shadow
Side of Wealth, 81).
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subjectification under financial capitalism in the following chapter. Once we establish the
relation of memory to debtor’s conscience, we will be able to relate the concepts of memory
and forgetting that we have analyzed in the production of subject formation to the
temporality of capital.
For Deleuze’s discussion of debt and memory, we need to go back to his early work,
Nietzsche and Philosophy. Here Deleuze comments on the debtor-creditor relationship,
anticipating his writings on financial capital that were published a decade later. In Genealogy
of Morals, Nietzsche shows how the moral principle of ‘guilt [Schuld]’ derived its origin from
the materialistic idea of ‘debt [Schulden]’ in the history of morality in the Western tradition.
He notes that the issue here is that “a memory had to be made for those who promised.” 183
Deleuze emphasizes that this memory is not simply remembrance or a recollection of the
past, but a memory straining toward the future. In his terms, it is a ‘forgetting of
forgetting.’184 By making promises for repayment, the indebted bind themselves to the past,
not only in the moment but from that moment onwards; they need to remember not only
that they are in debt, but also that they repay on time. In this sense, this faculty of memory
is no longer a function of the past, but a function of the future. It is not the memory of the
sensibility but of the will (NP 134/209). It is the “commitment to the future and memory of
the future itself (engagement de l’avenir, souvenir du futur lui-même)” (ibid.) that makes a man
capable of promising and of making use of the future. To put it another way, the creditor, in
lending money, expects to have control over the debtor’s future. Nietzsche writes,
Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale
(Vintage Books: New York, 1967), 64.
184 In AO, Deleuze reiterates this point: “it is a matter of creating a memory for man; and man, who was
constituted by means of an active faculty of forgetting (oubli), by means of a repression of biological memory,
must create an other memory, one that is collective, a memory of words (paroles) […] (AO 144) Deleuze and
Guattari call Nietzsche’s Genealogy the “great book of modern ethnology” in that it interprets primitive
economy in terms of debt and the debtor-creditor relationship, rather than exchange (AO 190).
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to impress repayment as a duty, an obligation upon his own conscience, the debtor
made a contract with the creditor and pledged that if he should fail to repay he
would substitute something else that he “possessed,” something he had control over;
for example, his body or his wife or his freedom or even his life.185
What Deleuze finds interesting here is that Nietzsche conceives the debtor-creditor relation
as the archetype of social relation. It is an essential form of relation in which man forms
habits, learn to obey laws and reinforce conscience. The techniques of memory include
punishment, where pain is given as the equivalent of a forgetting, a promise not kept
(“injury caused = pain undergone”).
Once the debtor develops conscience,186 that is to say, when she becomes ‘capable’ of
making herself feel guilty by reflecting on the fact of indebtedness, she no longer needs the
creditor exercising power over her from outside. Thus Deleuze in the essay “Postscript on
the Societies of Control” compares the workings of power in the 19th century capitalism
and in contemporary capitalism, characterizing the former as the spaces of enclosure and
the latter as the open circuits of the bank. That is, in contemporary capitalism, “[m]an is no
longer man enclosed, but man in debt.”187 As the indebted become bound to the past, they
get closed off from certain possibilities of the future. A subject finds herself passively subject
to the temporality determined by the condition of indebtedness, and yet she also actively
reproduces and imposes it on herself by the feeling of guilt.

Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, 64.
Guilty conscience is not directly caused by punishment, but originated from the development of what
Nietzsche calls the ‘instinct for freedom’ under a particular condition. When this instinct is repressed by
punishment, it turns back on its possessor. That is, one develops internally a critical view of oneself. This
‘internalization of man’ and the emergence of bad conscience are related to the condition for the production of
subjectivity. We will come back to this movement of ‘turning back’ or recoiling later in this chapter.
187 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the societies of control,” October, Vol. 59 (Winter, 1992): 3-7, 6
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Nietzsche was not the only one who has observed the ‘moralization’ of debt. Marx,
in his early essay, ‘On James Mill’ (1844), also talks about how human morality has become
an article of commerce in the credit system and how the moral concepts of good and bad are
translated into the ability and inability to pay back (solvency and insolvency): “Credit is the
economic judgment on the morality of man.” He notes that in the system of credit, it seems
as if man returns to human relations since it presupposes a mutual trust, but it only appears
so on the surface. In the credit relationship, one is expected to estimate the value of another
person in money. By a good man, one understands, a man who is able to pay. “Money is
not transcended in man inside the credit relationship but man himself has been changed into
money or money become incarnate in him.”188 Marx continues,
[…] the life of the poor man and his talents and activity serve the rich man as a
guarantee of the repayment of the money lent. That means, therefore, that all the
social virtues of the poor man, the content of his vital activity, his existence itself,
represent for the rich man the reimbursement of his capital with the customary
interest (ibid.).
Here the credit-debt relation goes far beyond the economic relationship, and concerns one’s
moral and social existence. As Lazzarato points out, in the credit relation “[t]he content of
money here is not labor but existence, individuality, and human morality; the material of
money is not labor time, but the time of existence.”189
The moralization of debt that both Marx and Nietzsche observe directs us toward the
problem of conscience that follows the formation of memory. Memory is crucial in the
social relation of debt in that a debtor needs to recognize debt as binding obligation for her
Karl Marx, “On James Mill,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, edit. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 124-133, 124.
189 Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition, trans. Joshua David
Jordan (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2012), 60. Lazzarato argues that neoliberalism as a debt economy
appropriates and exploits both chronological time (labor time) and non-chronological time as decision, that is,
the power of money as financing structure in its ability to prescribe and order, specifically the “possibilities for
choices and decisions with regard to the future” (84).
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acts in the future, even when her instinct tells her to betray it. Punishment as a technique of
memory does not effectuate directly guilty conscience, but it establishes a condition in
which ‘the instinct of freedom’ turns inward. In the transition from debt to guilt, there is an
internalization of debt in one’s conscience. In addition, what Deleuze calls ‘the memory of
the will’ requires the idea of the self that endures over time. The activity of the ‘I’ – “I will,”
“I shall do this” – ensuring the consistency between one’s acts with the promise made
develops a sort of reflexivity: the formation of conscience. I will discuss further the
relationship between this memory of the will and the production of subjectivity in the
following chapter.
In this chapter we have examined the temporality characteristic of financial
capitalism. First we looked at the movement of capital as the flow of financing as opposed
to the simple circulation of money as a means of payment. We said that the dualism
between two kinds of money and the fictitious nature of their convertibility are dissimulated
by banks, the role of which is to convert financial capital into loans and payment money.
This shows that the monetary movement in the current economic system needs to be
characterized in terms of self-generating capital. In the second section, we have discussed
the notion of time subordinated to the movement of financial capital through the TVM
theory, which is based on the idea, ‘inherent monetary value of time.’ It was noted that this
monetized time shapes the debtor’s temporal experience quite differently from the creditor’s.
So we looked at how the obvious ‘power’ of time in its multiplication of debt is internalized
by the indebted in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. In the next chapter, we will turn to
Deleuze’s notion of subjectification, with which we articulate the specific process of the
subject formation through debt. We will examine the role of memory and forgetting in
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Deleuze’s account of subjectivity under the condition of indebtedness that instigates a
temporal control over one’s future.
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IV. The Production of Melancholic Subjects: Subjectification through Debt
If the subject is produced through time (Chapter II) and if time is subordinated to the
movement of capital (Chapter III), there must be a form of subjectivity born out of the
temporality of capital. This form of subjectivity should be defined in terms of a specific
temporality characteristic of capitalism and the process through which one internalizes it.
We described the temporality of capitalism in terms of debtor-creditor relationship earlier,
which is founded upon a particular kind of memory that enables the possibility of a promise,
the ‘memory of the future.’ This last chapter will be dedicated to developing further
Deleuze’s theory of subjectification by giving an account of the subject formation under the
condition of indebtedness. Specifically, we will relate the ‘memory of the future’ back to the
notion of virtual Memory that Deleuze takes to be ‘time as subjectification.’
One of the important goals of this chapter will be to advance Deleuze’s concept of
subjectification by complementing it with Judith Butler’s theory of subject formation.
Specifically, we will look at her reading of Nietzsche’s concept of bad conscience and
Foucault’s notion of subjectification, which are, I shall argue, crucial to understanding the
process of subjectification in Deleuze. Also, Butler’s emphasis on the mechanisms of power
in the constitution of the subject and its ‘melancholic’ operation will be vital for our analysis
of the subjectification process through debt. After establishing a kinship between debt and
melancholia, we will revisit Deleuze’s passive synthesis to give a temporal account of the
production of indebted subjects.
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1. The Problem of Subjectification in Deleuze
1.1 Foucault-Deleuze Encounter: Power and Subject Formation
In his book on Foucault, Deleuze develops the Foucauldian concept of
subjectification (subjectivation) in his terms. As in his other works on various thinkers in the
history of philosophy, Deleuze’s reading of Foucault should not be seen as a mere
commentary, but as part of his own system of thought with reinvented concepts. For
instance, Deleuze creatively connects the dots between concepts such as folding/doubling,
subjectification and Memory; he says, “[s]ubjectification is created by folding” (F 104/111),
and “[t]he folding or doubling is itself a Memory [le plissement lui-même, le redoublement est une
Mémoire]” (F 107/114). Finally, he writes, “time as subject, or rather subjectification is
called memory” (F 107/115). In the following, we will examine what this conceptual
linkage entails.
Subjectification is a translation for the French word subjectivation, which is also
translated as ‘subjectivation,’ or as ‘subjectivization’ although less frequently. For Foucault,
subjectification concerns the production of subjectivity in relation to power. He defines the
notion in his last interview as follows:
I will call subjectification [subjectivation] the procedure by which one obtains the
constitution of a subject, or more precisely, of a subjectivity which is of course only
one of the given possibilities of organization of a self-consciousness.190
In Foucault’s system, subjectification is to be distinguished from ‘subjection’ that translates
the French words assujetissement or sujétion, which seem to highlight the passivity of the

Michel Foucault, “The Return of Morality,” trans. Thomas Levin and Isabelle Lorenz, in Michel Foucault:
Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977–1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (London:
Routledge, 1988), 253. Translation modified.
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subject with respect to power.191 Some argue that subjection (assujetissement) in Foucault has
both senses of the word ‘subject,’ that is, being passively subjected and actively selfconstituting subject, whereas subjectification only refers to the active aspect.192 The
distinction will prove useful in our analysis down the road, but let us note for now that
subjection and subjectification are inseparable given the productive nature of power, in
addition to its regulatory operation; it not only subordinates the subject from outside, but
also produces it from inside when internalized.
As John Marks points out, the Foucault-Deleuze relationship is defined through their
position with regard to Nietzsche.193 Deleuze sees Foucault’s discussion of subjectification
as the legacy of Nietzsche; if the subject formation in Nietzsche concerns creating ways of
existing and inventing new possibilities of life, Foucault developed it as a political issue, in
its relation to the way power operates.194 In what follows we will see how Deleuze draws on
both Nietzsche and Foucault in advancing his conception of subjectification under
capitalism.
Doubling and folding of the subject
In the chapter on subjectification in Foucault, Deleuze argues that the theme that has
always haunted Foucault was that of ‘the double.’ (F 97-98/105) ‘The double’ in the general
sense indicates the inside/ interior and the outside/exterior of the subject that constitute

For the distinction between subjectification and subjection in Foucault, see Sylvain Roux, “Subjectivation,
assujettissement et connaissance de soi chez Plotin et Foucault,” 2008. Retrieved from
www.europhilosophie.eu/recherche.
192 See for example, Mark G.E. Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault (New York and London:
Routledge, 2010), 87-88.
193 John Marks, Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity (London: Pluto, 1998), 112-119.
194 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1995), 117-118.
Ansell-Pearson presents a similar view; the subject-power relation in Foucault is closely related to Nietzsche’s
account in Genealogy of Morals. “The Significance of Michel Foucault’s Reading of Nietzsche” in Nietzsche: A
Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 13-30, 17.
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subjectivity in their reciprocal determinations. Deleuze uses the terms ‘doubling’ and
‘folding’ interchangeably, both of which concern the problem of subject formation. He
derives the idea of the double from Foucault’s book on Raymond Roussel, more specifically,
from his comments on Roussel’s novel titled, La Doublure. In this piece, Roussel used the
duality of language – the examples of which Foucault gives are a homonymic word play
‘jeunesse (youth)=genèse (genesis)’ and the approximation of ‘billard (billiard)= pillard
(plunderer)’) – that “opens a chasm in the identity of language, a void that has to be
revealed and at the same time filled.”195 Foucault thinks that La Doublure, where the
characters with cardboard faces play dual roles, shows the interplay between repetition and
double meaning that runs through Roussel’s works. He writes: “The hollowness that opens
within a word would not simply be a property of verbal signs, but a more basic ambiguity,
perhaps even more dangerous: it would show that a word, like a gaudy cardboard face,
hides what it duplicates […] The double meaning of words would be like the repetition, by
the mask on top, of the face. It reveals the same eclipse of being.”196
After identifying the ‘doubling’ as a key concept in Foucault’s theory of
subjetification, Deleuze proceeds to relate it with a certain kind of memory: ‘absolute
memory.’ He locates the idea also in Foucault’s book on Roussel:
From so many things without any social standing, from so many fantastic civic
records, he [Leiris] slowly accumulates his own identity, as if within the folds of
words there slept, with nightmares never completely extinguished, an absolute memory.
These same folds Roussel parts with a studied gesture to find the stifling hollowness,
the inexorable absence of being, which he disposes of imperiously to create forms
without parentage or species.197

Michel Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel, trans. Charles Ruas (New York &
London: Continuum, 2004), 19.
196 Ibid. 20.
197 ibid. 21 (emphasis added.)
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Here Foucault speaks of ways to reach the thought of ‘the Outside’ in Blanchot’s sense by
comparing Roussel’s writing with Leiris’s. Unlike Leiris, who tries to grasp truth about what
has occurred by slowly gathering various records, Roussel attempts to create radically new
forms. In his comments on this passage, Deleuze contrasts Roussel’s search for death as a
way to reach the Outside by undoing the doubling, with Leiris’s method of reinforcing the
doublings and folds that forms an ‘absolute memory.’ (F 99/106) According to Deleuze,
death and memory are the two forms of the double that Foucault has always oscillated
between.
Absolute Memory and Forgetting
However, Deleuze does not stop at commenting on Foucault’s idea of absolute
memory, but takes an interesting turn; he ties it to his idiosyncratic notion of Memory. By
shifting from the thought of ‘the outside’ – which Deleuze believes was the reason for the
primacy of space over time in Foucault’s early work – to memory, he seems to change the
focus from a spatial metaphor of the dynamic formation of subjectivity to the temporal
structure of subjectification. In this regard, I agree with Ronald Bogue who argues that
Deleuze uses Blanchot’s idea of the thought of the Outside to consider “the structure of time
itself in the thought of the Outside, a structure framed in terms of an enfolding and
unfolding of the pure becoming of the Outside that constitutes a memory (a folding) of
forgetting (an unfolding).”198 Drawing on Foucault’s reference to the aesthetic existence of
the Greeks as the first instance of subject formation, Deleuze develops his own theory of
time and subjectification:

Ronald Bogue, “Deleuze, Foucault, and the Playful Fold of the Self,” in Deleuze’s Wake: Tributes and
Tributaries (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 18, 57.
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The folding or doubling is itself a Memory: the ‘absolute memory’ or memory of the
outside, beyond the brief memory inscribed in strata and archives […]. The aesthetic
life of the Greeks had already essentially prompted a memory of the future, and very
quickly the processes of subjectification were accompanied by writings that were real
memories, ‘hypomnemata.’” (F 107/114-115, translation modified)
Hypomnemata is what is generated by hypomnesis, an externalizing technique of memory.
Foucault thought of hypomnemata as writing of self, and as a way of constituting oneself. For
the Greeks, it is a tool for care of the self. This form of writing was not to say the unsaid but
to “capture the already said, to collect what one has managed to hear or read, and for a
purpose that is nothing less than the shaping of the self.”199
But what does the doubling have to do with Memory? Memory here is not the
empirical sense of memory as the ability to remember or recall. It is the virtual, ontological
memory that exceeds the limit of individual consciousness: absolute memory. As we saw in
Chapter II, there is a doubling or a bifurcation of the present in the two-fold movement of
the Memory cone. The present as the actualization of the virtual Memory involves two
dimensions: actual present and coexisting levels of the pure past. Earlier I defined the
subject as the locus of actualization of the virtual memory. The subject in the present is
understood as a product of the interactions between the present self and the past selves. As
Jay Lampert says, “when faced with an experience today, I run through one series of
reactions that calls into play my eight-year-old self, and another my fifty-year-old self.”200
When Deleuze says Memory is “the real name of the relation to oneself, or the affect on self
by self,” (F 107/115) he means that the present is in constant interaction with the coexisting
levels of virtual Memory, a product of which is the subject. It is in this sense that Ronald

Michel Foucault, “Self Writing” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (New York: The New Press, 1997), 207-221,
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Bogue writes, “[t]his absolute memory resembles what Deleuze refers to elsewhere as a
Bergsonian virtual past.”201
In our reading of Deleuze’s passive synthesis of time, we saw that this absolute,
transcendental memory is a memory with forgetting, unlike empirical memory that is
opposed to forgetting. Forgetting is the idea that allows us to understand how the repetition
of the virtual memory, coexistent with the actual present, constitutes time as the future; the
virtual, absolute memory repeats itself differently each time it repeats. The virtual memory
is not opposed to forgetting, but the ‘forgetting of forgetting,’ where forgetting indicates the
reconstitution of the memory in each present as the new. Deleuze writes,
Time becomes a subject because it is the folding of the outside and, as such, forces
every present into forgetting, but preserves the whole of the past within memory:
forgetting is the impossibility of return, and memory is the necessity of renewal (F
108 /115).
In a similar vein, Leonard Lawlor, in his essay on philosophical archeology in MerleauPonty and Foucault, points out that the ‘absolute memory’ in Foucault is a new kind of
memory that is “identical to forgetfulness.”202 He argues that philosophical archeology’s
investigation on the past is never for the sake of the past, but always for the future. Thus,
this can be called ‘counter-memory’ in that it is opposed to the kind of memory that is tied
to an individual consciousness, to the form of the present.
So far, we have seen that in Deleuze’s reading of the Foucauldian notion of
subjectification is explained as a doubling or folding, which are intrinsically related – in
Deleuze’s system of thought – to memory and forgetting. This is, I argue, consistent with
the virtual memory with forgetting in Deleuze’s passive syntheses of time that constitutes a
Bogue, Deleuze’s Wake, 18.
Leonard Lawlor, “The Chiasm and the Fold: An Introduction to the Philosophical Concept of
Archeology,” in Thinking Through French Philosophy (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
2003), 24-46, 45.
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temporal structure for the production of the subject. He translates the doubling or folding,
defined as the interiorization of the outside in Foucault, into temporal terms, as the relation
of the self to self in Memory.
We will now return to our initial question regarding the subject formation in the
current socio-economic system, namely, financial capitalism. What does the above account
of subjectification tell us about the formation of subjectivity in social relations of power?
Before we turn to Deleuze’s later work on capitalism, let us take a quick look at the
distinction between subjectification and subjection in his account of Foucault. Deleuze
notes that the ‘doubling’ as the relation of the self to oneself discussed above becomes more
complicated when power comes into play. Subjectification, as the process in which the
subject both actively constitutes oneself in time and is passively determined by virtual
memory, is interrupted by the mechanisms of power that subjectivates. Deleuze writes,
For the relation to oneself will not remain the private and folded zone [la zone réservée
et repliée] of the free man, independent of all ‘institutional and social system.’ The
relation to oneself will be understood in terms of power-relations […] The fold
therefore seems unfolded, and the subjectification of the free man is transformed into
subjection: it is, on the one hand, ‘the submission to another by control and
dependence,’ with all the processes of individualization and of modulation which
power institutes, acting on the daily life and the interiority of those it calls its
subjects; it is on the other hand ‘the attachment (of each one) to one’s own identity
by conscience and knowledge [connaissance] of the self,’ through all the techniques of
moral and human sciences that will make up a knowledge [savoir] of the subject (F
103/110, translation modified, emphasis added).
In this passage, Deleuze talks about the transformation of subjectification into subjection. If
the Greek’s technique of the care of the self is an example of the Foucauldian
subjectification, subjection is a process by which the subject is produced in its subordination
to power. In the latter, the interiority of the subject as well as its relation to oneself is
reconstituted by power, through internalization. As will be shown shortly, Deleuze does not
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hold strictly the distinction between subjectification and subjection, but what the idea of
subjection introduced to the “subjectification of the freeman” deserves a closer examination,
especially with respect to the ‘doubling’ process.
1.2 Subjectification in A Thousand Plateaus: Capital as a point of subjectification
“The principal strata binding human beings are the organism, significance and
interpretation and subjectification and subjection” (MP 134/167).
In his later works written with Guattari, Deleuze speaks of subjectification in terms
of doubling, but this time in a different context. His focus here is not so much on
temporality, but the workings of power in the subject formation. In the chapter on different
regimes of signs in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the constitution of
subjectivity in linguistic terms. For them, subjectification is the product of a collective
assemblage characteristic of a certain regime of signs: post-signifying regime. Unlike the
despotic, signifying regime where all significations circle back to an authority (despot), postsignifying regime produces coexisting points of subjectification that proceed in a linear
fashion.
What is important, what makes the post-signifying passional line a line of
subjectification [subjectivation] or subjection [assujettissement], is the constitution, the
doubling of the two subjects, and the recoiling of one into the other, of the subject of
enunciation [sujet d’énonciation] into the subject of the statement [sujet de l’énoncé] (MP
129/162).
The subject of enunciation designates a subject of utterance, ‘the ego’ of the unconscious. It
is “a function of a mental reality” determined by the point of subjectification concerned. It is
the subject that is produced or revealed by discourse, rather than the subject that produces
discourse. The subject of statement (enunciated) is ‘the I’ that is the subject of what is
spoken about. It is ‘the I’ recognized by the self and by the others, “a subject bound to
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statements in conformity with a dominant reality” (ibid.). The distinction between these two
Lacanian terms, to simplify, concerns the gap between what a speech is meant to convey
and what it signifies in a given context; when I say something, the meaning of what is said is
always more than what it was intended to convey. Lacan’s example is the sentence ‘I am
lying.’203 If I say ‘I am lying,’ the subject of enunciation is telling the truth about lying. But
the subject of the statement, ‘the I’ determined at the level of the statement, is lying. As
Tamsin Lorraine points out, what makes a speech ‘make sense’ is not an individual subject,
but the system of significance. In the same way, “[w]hat counts as a recognizable subject (to
oneself as well as others) is dictated by systems of subjectification that determine a subject’s
position vis-à-vis others.”204 She notes that the operative statements in various social fields –
statements concerning school, prison or the political system – form the elements of
dominant reality.
According to Deleuze and Guattari, a point of subjectification can be anything – any
object, event, or practices that make one a recognizable subject. For example, for a cinephile,
a film (or films) is a point of subjectification. If I say ‘I am a cinephile,’ there is a film (films)
that has become a point of departure, or a significant life event that eventually led me to
identify myself as a person who is enthusiastic about films. What makes one call oneself a
cinephile (a subject of enunciation) is a function of a particular mental reality determined by
films. From the subject of enunciation, the subject of statement emerges. As soon as I utter
the sentence, I am bound to the statements in conformity with the dominant reality, which
my mental reality is part of, even when it seems opposed to it. That is to say, there is a

Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis Book XI, edit.
Jacques-Alain Miller (W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 139-140.
204 Tamsin Lorraine, “Majoritarian,” Deleuze Dictionary, edit. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2010), 153.
203
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system of significance that determines what it means to be a cinephile whether I agree with
it or not; I, as someone who lives in the United States in the early 2000s, might be able to
convince you to believe that I am a cinephile without knowing any Portuguese filmmakers,
but I would not likely be able to without knowing what ‘Netflix’ is, unless I have a good
reason for it. That is, I do not become a cinephile by waking up one day and decide to be
one, but by coming to be part of the culture. A subject’s relation to film, as any other
cultural product, is never only about an individual mind fascinated by films, but always also
about the system of significance as well as the distribution system of cultural capital that
one’s appreciation of film is part of.
In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari define subjectification as the process in which
one is constituted as a subject by the doubling of the subject of enunciation (ego, or the self)
and the subject of statement (the I). Thus the process of subjectification is necessarily a
social process that involves the relations of power. When they speak of the process of
subjectification and subjection together in the above passage, they are considering the form
of power operating immanently in the subject. A subject is always a doubled subject, always
in the making in its relation to power.
There is no longer even a need for a transcendent center of power; power is instead
immanent and melds with the ‘real,’ operating through normalization. A strange
invention: as if in one form the doubled subject were the cause of the statements of
which, in its other form, it itself is a part (MP 129-130/162).
Deleuze and Guattari note that the doubling of two subjects is the recoiling of one into the
other. We can think of it as a practice that translates mental reality into dominant reality
through various forms of education and normalization imposed on an individual, which, in
turn, reconstitutes one’s mental reality. Through the circular process of the doubling
between ‘the self’ (subject of enunciation) and ‘the I’ (subject of statement), one becomes her
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own ‘legislator’ that replaces the power exercised from outside. As Deleuze and Guattari
point out, “the more you obey the statements of the dominant reality, the more in command
you are as subject of enunciation in mental reality, for in the end, you are only obeying
yourself! You are the one in command, in your capacity as a rational being. A new form of
slavery is invented, namely, being slave to oneself, or to pure ‘reason,’ the Cogito” (MP
130/163). This is, according to them, not a question of linguistic operation, but an
organization of power.
Subjectification as a regime of signs or a form of expression is tied to an assemblage,
in other words, an organization of power that is already fully functioning in the
economy, rather than superposing itself upon contents or relations between contents
determined as real in the last instance. Capital is a point of subjectification par excellence
(MP 130/163, emphasis added).
Here Deleuze and Guattari introduce capital as a preeminent point of subjectification. As
Frédéric Rambeau observes, capitalism functions in the production of subjects by means of
inscribing a ‘subject function’ – the enunciations or the signs by which the individuals are
called to recognize themselves as subjects – in the economic infrastructure itself.205 We may
also consider ‘the semiotic process of subjectification in capitalism,’ the account of which
was given by Guattari, together with Éric Alliez. Alliez and Guattari have further developed
a concept of semiotic capitalism in their works on ‘Integrated World Capitalism (IWC).’206
Guattari regarded the problem of subjectification as that of the production of collective
subjectivity (une subjectivité de groupe), thus as an intrinsically political issue.207 He has
advanced a theory of the production of subjectivity in his solo work, especially in Chaosmosis,

Frédéric Rambeau, “Deleuze, Guattari et les apories de la subjectivation politique,” retrieved from
http://www.implications-philosophiques.org/actualite/une/deleuze-guattari-et-les-apories-de-lasubjectivation-politique-2/
206 Eric Alliez and Félix Guattari, “Capitalistic Systems, Structures and Processes,” The Guattari Reader, edit.
Gary Genosko (Oxford and Cambridge, Blackwell Publishing, 1996), 233-247.
207 Félix Guattari, Psychanalyse et Transversalité (Paris: Maspero, 1972; La Découverte, 2003), 153.
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where he emphasizes the plurality of subjectivity through his reading of Bakhtinian
conception ‘polyphony.’208
The example of subjectification that I would like to look into is the one Deleuze
gives in his essay “Postscript: on the societies of control,” published ten years later than A
Thousand Plateaus. Here Deleuze describes the transition from what Foucault called
‘disciplinary societies’ to the current ‘societies of control,’ which he defines by a new form
of power. He explains how the organization of power in the economy changes its form,
using the example of salary. In the disciplinary societies, the factory used to function as a
body with internal forces that strives for equilibrium between the highest possible
production and the lowest possible wages, which constituted individuals as a single body
(mass resistance). In the society of control, corporations operate on ‘salary according to
merit’ that presents the rivalry as a motivational force that opposes individuals against one
another. Power that used to manifest itself as spatial enclosure or confinement becomes ‘the
voice in your head’ to compete and accomplish more. As Byung-Chul Han points out, this
‘imperative to achieve’ has become a new form of power that puts the subject into a battle
with herself. Han describes this as a shift from disciplinary society (a society of ‘should’) to
achievement society (a society of ‘can’); in a society that says, ‘nothing is impossible,’ it is
solely your responsibility whether you succeed or not.209
In this section, we have examined the problem of subjectification in Deleuze,
specifically in his work on Foucault and in A Thousand Plateaus. The key notion in the
process of subject formation turns out to be ‘doubling,’ whether it is understood as absolute
memory or the internalization of power relation. On the basis of Deleuze’s accounts of
Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, trans. Paul. Bains and Julian Pefanis (Sydney:
Indiana University Press, 1995 [1992]).
209 Byung-Chul Han, The Burnout Society, trans. Erik Butler (Stanford University Press, 2015), 11.
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subjectification as Memory and as the organization of power in the capitalist system, I shall
develop in the following a Deleuzian theory of subjectification in financial capitalism. I
argue that the way power in financial capitalism functions is through the normalization of
debt; by submitting oneself to a private relationship of debtor-creditor, one becomes
subjected to a larger structure of power surrounding financial capital. The exercise of power
on the subject would take the form of temporal control, namely, the internalization of the
capitalist temporality. We will also see how Memory as the doubling of the subject
functions in the production of indebted subjects.

2. Subjectification in the time of debt
Let us note that although subjectification in Deleuze involves a necessary relation of
the subject to power, this does not mean it is equated with the absolute subordination to
power, which would leave the subject no possibility of resistance or freedom. The subject is
produced in the process of doubling, that is, somewhere in between mental reality and
dominant reality: A subject is free, but only to a certain extent. It seems to me that
Deleuze’s account of subjectification through time shows more explicitly how this process
allows us freedom, or the ontological possibility to create oneself anew. With respect to time,
the subject is in a passive relation, and it is the very passivity that leaves the subject free,
permanently open for determinations. In the production of the subject through passive
syntheses, ‘the doubling’ process comes down to the relation between the past and the
present. Thus the problem of freedom concerns the following question: to what extent is the
past repeated in the present in the constitution of subjectivity? If the second synthesis shows
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that the past is virtually coexistent with any present moment, the third synthesis shows a
radical renewability of the past in the present that marks the condition of the future.
Since our inquiry into the subject formation through the temporality of financial
capital concerns a point of subjectification where time and power structure intersect, it is
important to understand how the two accounts of subjectification can be translated into one
another. With regard to the subjectification through power, I think the question about the
repetition of the past in the present above becomes: To what extent is one subjected to
power in the constitution of subjectivity? Accordingly, we may say that the condition of the
future would correspond to political freedom, or what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘a line of
flight.’210 We will return to this point in Section 3.1.
What then, would it mean for temporality when subjectification is transformed into
subjection? This question will be the key in our analysis of the subjectification through debt.
I define the condition of indebtedness as ‘subjection,’ and see how the subjection to this
form of financial obligation transforms the temporal condition of the debtor’s lived
experience.
2.1 Debt as an instrument of power: From subjectification to subjection
We ended the previous chapter on time subordinated to the movement of capital, by
noting the inherent monetary value of time in the self-generation of financial capital and
how this monetized time creates an asymmetry between the debtor and the creditor. We
also saw that the dualism of money requires the convertibility of credit money into money

The concept Deleuze develops in relation to Foucault’s analytics of power – Deleuze differentiates it from
the resistance to power in his letter to Foucault, “Desir et plaisir” (Gilles Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous: Textes et
entretiens, 1975-1995 (Paris: Minuit, 2003), 112-122, originally appeared in Magazine littéraire, 325 (1994 [1977]):
59-65); for a further discussion of the problem of agency and political virtues in Deleuze, see Fred Evans,
“Deleuze’s Political Ethics: A Fascism of the New?,” Deleuze Studies, Vol.10 (No.1, 2016): 85-99.
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as purchasing power and that the current economic system depends on the creation of
money through the issuance of debts by commercial banks. The monetary system relies on
debt, thus requires its subjects to be indebted. In this sense, we may say that debtors are put
through the contradiction systemically resulted from the gaps between two kinds of money.
What is interesting about the debt-credit relationship as a social relation is its discreet
mechanism or technique of power. As Lazzarato notes, “[c]redit or debt and their creditordebtor relationship constitute specific relations of power that entail specific forms of
production and control of subjectivity – a particular form of homo economicus, the ‘indebted
man.’”211 He brings the term ‘indebted man’ from Deleuze’s essay on the mechanism of
power in the societies of control that says “[m]an is no longer man imprisoned, but indebted
man.”212 Entering into a debtor-creditor relation does not involve any spatial confinement –
at least not immediately. Since the relation is established through a contract, it makes the
subordination seem to be a ‘free’ choice. For those who are deprived of capital, debt even
appears to be possibilities and potential accomplishments that would not otherwise be
available for them. As Lazzarato points out, “[t]he power of debt leaves you free, and it
encourages you and pushes you to act in such a way that you are able to honor your
debts.”213
In addition to the questionable freedom with which borrowers enter into a contract,
there is another factor that contributes to concealing the technique of power, specific to
debt. It should be clear to us by now that the problem of debt is not a personal but a
Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition. trans. Joshua David
Jordan (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2012), 30.
212 “Man is no longer man imprisoned, but indebted man. It is true that capitalism has retained as a constant
the extreme poverty of three quarters of humanity, too poor for debt, too numerous for confinement: control
will not only have to face the dissipation of borders but with the population explosions in shanty towns or
ghettos” (Deleuze, “Postscript on the societies of control,” October, Vol. 59 (Winter, 1992): 3-7, 6-7. translation
modified).
213 Lazzarato, The Making of Indebted Man, 31.
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systemic one. However, since the credit relation appears to be a private one, i.e. the relation
between private individuals and private institutions (banks that issue loans), the problem of
debt is very quickly taken to be a private matter of the borrowers who are ‘fiscally
irresponsible.’ As an article on debt in Guardian puts it, when debt is discussed “the focus
continues to be exclusively on the irresponsible borrower, with complete immunity for the
totally reckless lender or the enormous leech-like industry which continues to feed on the
interest or ‘economic value’ created by shifting fictional money around.”214 Debtors
themselves are not free from this misconception, either. When they are not able to meet the
obligations to repay, debtors are led to blame themselves for the decision they made in the
past to take out loans, even if it was inevitably necessary due to structural inequalities.215
The seemingly private nature of debt leads to the moralization of its obligation; the failure in
repayment of debt results in shame, feeling of guilt or self-reproach, all of which are
considered to be moral feelings that presuppose a particular process of ‘doubling’ in the
subject. One needs to develop an ideal against which one can be critical of the self, in order
to generate moral judgments about herself. The critical self-judgment and heightened
conscience often lead the debtors to depression.
Keeping the social nature and psychological effects of debt in mind, I will articulate
the process of subjectification under the condition of debt, by defining the particular
‘doubling’ in the production of indebted subjects. Drawing on the moralization of debt and
the affective subjectification process, I will claim that the debt-based economy produces a
Alex Andreou, “If you think you know what ‘debt’ is, read on,” Guardian, July 29, 2013. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/29/think-you-know-what-debt-is
215 Some obvious examples include debts incurred from student loans and health service in the United States,
which are inseparable from the systems of education and health care. For a philosophical analysis of student
loan debt and subject formation, see for example, Maurizio Lazzarato, “The American University: A Model
of the Debt Society,” in Governing by Debt, trans. Joshua D. Jordan (Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2015), and Hollis
Phelps, “Parasites on unwilling hosts: student loan debt and the generation of value, Continental Thought &
Theory, Vol.1(2), 2017: 383-405.
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‘melancholic subjectivity.’ I use melancholia as a model to describe the pathological form of
temporality that one experiences under the structure of power surrounding debt.
Subjection to power: ‘doubling’ or ‘turning back on itself’ in conscience
In our previous discussion of debt, we have noted the moralization of the obligation
to repay the debt and the development of conscience. In order to elaborate further on the
‘doubling’ and the role of conscience in the process of subject formation, I will turn to
Judith Butler’s theory of subjection. She understands subjection (assujettissement) as “the
process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a subject,”216
which seems to be in line with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of subjectification, except
that the subjugation or subordination to power is much more primary and fundamental in
Butler’s account of subject formation.217 She thinks that the theories of subjection developed
by Foucault as well as Althusser demonstrate the subject’s necessary relation to power in its
formation, but do not explain the mechanisms of power in the psyche. Since our goal here is
to theorize the process of subjectification through debt, the discussion will be centered on 1)
the internalization of power through the doubling (recoiling) of the will and 2) the
melancholic character of this internalization process.
In the Psychic Life of Power, Butler shows how crucial the recoiling of the will or the
will’s ‘turning back upon itself’ – what Deleuze called a doubling – is in the production of
the subject. In the chapter on Freud and Nietzsche, she discusses the subject formation in
relation to conscience, which is understood as the effect of an internalized inhibition.
Judith Butler, The Psychic Life Of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1997), 2.
Mark G.E. Kelly accuses Butler of misinterpreting Foucault “by running the concepts of subjection and
subjectivation together, indeed using them interchangeably, believing ‘subjectivation’ to be ‘a translation of the
French assujetissement (Butler 1997, 11)” (Mark G.E. Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault (New
York and London: Routledge, 2010), 88-91).
217 She says, “[w]hether by interpellation in Althusser’s sense, or by discursive productivity, in Foucault’s, the
subject is initiated through a primary submission to power” (ibid.).
216
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According to Butler, both for Freud and Nietzsche, prohibition turns drive or instinct back
on itself, fabricating reflexivity and the condition for self-inspection. With conscience, the
subject becomes an object of itself, a reflexive being. She claims that a subject is formed only
as a consequence of reflexivity. Subjection marks certain limit in the production of the
subject. Butler writes,
Bad conscience would be the fabrication of interiority that attends the breaking of a
promise, the discontinuity of the will, but the “I” who would keep the promise is
precisely the cultivated effect of this continuous fabrication of interiority.218
As previously noted, for the debtor to make and keep the promise, a memory has to be
created, and it has to persist. It is the need for such persistence that requires a development
of continued consciousness/ conscience – both of which are ‘conscience’ in French. In this
sense, the memory of debt inscribed in the mind serves as a point of subjectification, in
Deleuze’s terms, that constitutes the debtor as the ‘I.’
Nietzsche’s conscience as ‘the will turning back upon itself’ forms the ground for the
emergence of a sovereign individual. It is a protracted will and the coherence between the
past promise and future actions that render a person ‘responsible.’ Butler says, “Nietzsche
offers us a political insight into the formation of the psyche and the problem of subjection,
understood paradoxically not merely as the subordination of a subject to a norm, but as the
constitution of a subject through precisely such a subordination.”219 We may say that one,
by submitting herself to the debtor-creditor relation, is produced as a responsible economic
subject: the subjectification through debt.
The originality of Butler’s theory of subjection and conscience lies in the analysis of
what she calls, ‘constitutive melancholia.’ For Butler, melancholy is inseparable from the
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process of subject formation; the production of a subject involves gender identifications, and
the formation of gender is an inherently melancholic process. A gendered subject is
produced by internalizing gender norms, specifically, the prohibition on homosexual desire.
The foreclosure of homosexuality grounds the constitution of a heterosexual subject, but
such ‘ungrievable loss’ marks the limit of the subject’s reflexivity. Following Freud, Butler
sees heightened conscience and self-reproaches as distinguishing features of melancholia
that indicates an uncompleted grief. According to her, “the account of melancholy is an
account of how psychic and social domains are produced in relation to one another.”220
Butler’s account of subjection and melancholia shows how the guilty conscience
plays a key role in the production of the subject. Just as Butler emphasized the melancholic
process of gender identification in the subject formation, I will elucidate the specific
temporality of this ‘constitutive melancholia’ in subjection, and that it is the key in the
production of indebted subjects.
2.2 Subjectification through debt: Melancholic temporality
According to the research conducted in 2015 by the Political Economy Research
Centre at Goldsmiths University of London, there is ample evidence that establishes a
causal relationship between indebtedness and depression.221 Proving such causality is not
our concern here, but the descriptions of the debtors’ temporal experience are worth our
attention. The study presents an analysis of the online peer-to-peer forums, which shows
Ibid. 167.
William Davies, Johnna Montgomerie & Sara Wallin, “Financial Melancholia: Mental Health and
Indebtedness,” 2015 (Retrieved from http://www.perc.org.uk/project_posts/financial-melancholia-mentalhealth-and-indebtedness/; see also John Gathergood, “Debt and depression: causal links and social norm
effects,” Economic Journal 122 (2012): 1094-1114; Mind, “In the red: Debt and mental health,” 2008. Retrieved
from http://www.mind.org.uk/media/273469/in-the-red.pdf; Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Money
advice trust, “Debt collection and mental health: The evidence report,” (London: Royal College of
Psychiatrists, 2010). Retrieved from http://malg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Debt-Collection-andMental-Health-TheEvidence-Report.pdf;
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that the indebted feel powerless and incapable of acting deliberately towards the future,
trapped by past debt obligations.222
I propose that we consider melancholia as a model of the temporal psychic structure
of the indebted. I aim to present melancholia as a constitutive, ‘transcendental’ psychic
structure that is inseparable from the historical condition of financial capitalism, rather than
as a phenomenological description of the indebted subject’s experience of melancholic
feelings. I use the studies in psychopathology on melancholia to identify its distinct
temporal characteristics, however, as will be shown in the next section, my discussion of
melancholia as a temporal structure bears little on clinical depression. The defining features
of melancholia such as heightened conscience and moral feelings of guilt and self-reproach
that we learn from psychopathology will prove useful in our consideration of the affective
effects of debt and its implications for temporality. As Butler notes, melancholia is “the limit
to the subject’s sense of pouvoir, its sense of what if can accomplish and in that sense, its
power.”223 The production of a ‘melancholic subjectivity’ through debt will show that the
subjection to the power structure of debt marks the limit of one’s becoming in time.
In his classical account of melancholia in ‘Mourning and Melancholia,’ Freud talks
about ‘the melancholic inhibition’ that accompanies what is not seen in mourning: selfreproach and self-abasement. There is a feeling of guilt, or ‘a delusion of (mainly moral)
inferiority’ of the self.224 Freud writes: “In the clinical picture of melancholia, dissatisfaction
with the ego on moral grounds is the most outstanding feature.”225 The melancholic
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develops a highly critical view of oneself that even extends back over the past. What we see
here is the ego that ‘takes it as its object’ by setting itself over against the other: development
of conscience as the major institutions of the ego. According to Freud, such internal work
consumes the ego as much as mourning does, where one suffers from an identifiable loss in
regard to a specific object. Melancholia too could be caused by a loss, but the melancholic
may not be consciously aware of what it is that has been lost.
It is important to note here that the feeling of guilt necessarily involves a certain way
of understanding time; guilt arises from the irreversibility of what had been done and the
inability to proceed into the future. Fuchs, a phenomenological psychiatrist, interestingly
describes how the death of a close person may cause guilt to us; as long as the person is
alive, there is a possibility of making up for what we failed to do for him, but this possibility
vanishes with death.226 In this sense, it is the impossibility of the future that generates guilt.
Fuchs also notes that this feeling of guilt is central to the melancholic depression; the
melancholic has such feelings not only about a deceased person, but about everyone. They
experience time as ‘no longer’ and suffer from a dominance of the past and from a failure to
achieve forgetting. They lack interests or needs that would direct them toward the future.
Although it is unavoidable for everyone to carry the weight of the past to some extent, for
the melancholic, the overall possibility of renewing oneself in the present or any possibility
of change is closed off with the overshadowing past. It is an “inhibition of vital becoming”227
that defines the temporality of the melancholic.
Fuchs explains depressive psychopathology through ‘synchronization,’ a term
borrowed from chronobiology that concerns circadian rhythms such as sleep-wake cycles
Thomas Fuchs, “Melancholia as a Desynchronization,” Psychopathology, Vol. 34 (2001): 179-186.
Ibid., 179; we will see the implications of this coincidentally Bergson-Deleuzian term that Fuchs uses here
later in the section 3.3 ‘Capital and the inhibition of becoming.’
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and hormone release. He argues that melancholic depression can be best understood as a
desynchronization in the intersubjective time.
The desynchronisation also becomes manifest in a failure to achieve forgetting and
elimination of the past. ‘Everything goes through my head again and again, and I
always have to wonder if I did things right,’ as a patient described it. It is the torture
of not being able to forget, of being constantly forced to remember and therefore not
arriving at the present any more.228
The melancholic experiences time as if their time gets stuck or slows down, whereas the
time of others goes on. They feel the discrepancy between the ‘ego-time’ and the ‘world
time.’ What causes the inhibition of becoming, or lived time is ‘ever-growing guilt’ that
necessarily causes an exclusion of themselves from others. “Guilt, instead of being an
intersubjective relation that can be dealt with, becomes a thing or an object the patient is
identified with.”229
Again, it is not my concern here to prove the causal relation between debt and
melancholic depression, but to develop a theory of subject formation with respect to a
specific temporality imposed by a socio-economic system. We saw earlier that the debtorcreditor relation is temporal in its nature, and the internalization of indebtedness in the
psyche of the debtor leads to a moral feeling of guilt. Drawing on the description of
melancholia in psychopathology, where the affect state of guilt prevails, I claim that the
condition of indebtedness produces a certain form of subjectivity that can be best
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characterized by the temporality of the melancholic. I define the melancholic temporality as
the dominance of the past and the inability to proceed into the future. And I will call the
subject produced by this particular temporality, a ‘melancholic subjectivity.’
In this section, we have described the process of subject formation through debt, by
looking at the subjection to power in the debtor-creditor relationship and the temporality of
debt and guilt. What we have left to examine is the particular temporal structure that
constitutes the indebted as a melancholic subject. By the temporal structure I mean the way
in which the present is understood in relation to the past and the future, which frames the
production of subjectivity. For this inquiry we will return to Deleuze’s passive syntheses,
where the temporal structure that produces the subject is specifically elucidated. In our
attempt to bring the socio-economic temporality and ontological notion of time together, we
will discuss how certain social relation and systemically imposed temporality could
transform one’s experience of time, and further, obstruct new possibilities of becoming.

3. The Production of Melancholic Subjects: The Passive Syntheses Revisited
We have seen that debt as a social relation operates on the moral obligations arising from a
past promise, which necessarily effectuates a temporal control over the subjects involved.
While the indebted suffers from a failure to proceed into the future, her own guilty
conscience keeps her subjected to the weight of the past. In this last section, I hope to show
how debt functions as a point of subjectification by analyzing the temporal structure under
which a melancholic subject emerges. I shall revisit Deleuze’s account of the passive
syntheses of time discussed in Chapter two to demonstrate the particular process of
subjectification under the time subordinated to financial capital. Deleuze notes that when
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time is constituted as the future in the third synthesis, it ceases to be subordinated to
movement and becomes an empty form through which the new appears. Yet we will see
that the temporality of the melancholic subject, in its failure to proceed beyond the second
synthesis of the past, remains subordinated to the movement of capital.
Our return to the passive syntheses at this time will be useful for the following
reasons: First, Deleuze sees time as a structure that produces subjectivity, rather than as a
subjective form of experience. This will allow us to consider the process of subject formation
under socio-economic temporalities, systemically imposed upon the subject. Second,
Deleuze’s passive synthesis of time, as my reading suggests, shows how crucial memory is
in subject formation, in terms of habit-memory, recollection-memory, and forgetting. Thus
it sheds light on the account of subjectification through the memory of indebtedness
required for the promise for repayment, or the ‘forgetting of forgetting.’
3.1 Memory of debt: Bare repetition of the past
In his account of the three passive syntheses that correspond to the present, past and
future, Deleuze shows that the operation of repetition – which occurs in the mind, but is not
performed by the mind – constitutes time as well as the subject. The moment in the
syntheses that interests us the most, for our discussion of debt and memory, is the transition
from the second synthesis of the past to the third synthesis of the future.230 Let us return to

As noted in Chapter II, ‘Transition’ here does not imply an order of occurrence. Each synthesis provides an
explanation for all three temporal modalities, but describes the others as the dimensions (elements of synthesis)
of a particular modality of time discussed. For example, the first synthesis of the present discusses the past and
the future as its dimensions: “Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the
repetition of instants. […] The past and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed present
instant, but rather the dimensions of the present itself in so far as it is a contraction of instants” (DR 70-71/97).
From the present to the past, and from the past to the future, the moments of transition are important in that
they present the reasons why the previous synthesis is insufficient and what calls for the next synthesis.
230
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the passage that we discussed earlier,231where Deleuze summarizes the three syntheses and
describes the relationship between them:
The first synthesis, that of habit, constituted time as a living present by means of a
passive foundation on which past and future depended. The second synthesis, that of
memory, constituted time as a pure past, from the point of view of a ground which
causes the passing of one present and the arrival of another. In the third synthesis,
however, the present is no more than an actor, an author, an agent destined to be
effaced; while the past is no more than a condition operating by default. The
synthesis of time here constitutes a future which affirms at once both the
unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of its production,
and the independence of the work in relation to its author or actor (DR 93-94/125).
Here Deleuze defines the synthesis of the future as a product that resembles neither its
author (the present) nor its condition (the past). This way of delineating the future raises a
number of questions: If an act is independent of the actor, how could it be attributed to the
actor? In the same way, if the product is free of the condition of production, how does it
stand in relation to its condition? If it is tied neither to the present nor the past, what is it a
future of?
Let us briefly review the argument in the first two syntheses to see why the present
functions as an agent and the past as a condition. According to Deleuze, the preliminary
operation that founds time and subjectivity is ‘contraction.’ A succession of instants is not
enough to form dimensions of the present; there has to be an activity of ‘contracting’ passing
instants into one another. This pre-reflective activity of contraction in the mind, drawing a
relation between independent instants that succeed one another, enables us to form habits.
The first synthesis of habit as the foundation (fondation) of time constitutes the present in
time, and what Deleuze calls an originary subjectivity. But the first synthesis requires as its
condition another time that causes the present to pass – the second synthesis of memory.

231

See Section 2.4 “The third synthesis of the future” in Chapter II.
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Following Bergson’s paradoxes of past, Deleuze notes that the past has to be
contemporaneous and coexistent with the present; for the present moment to pass, it has to
be past ‘at the same time’ as it is present. It follows that since each past is contemporaneous
with the present, all past is coexistent with the present. If the past is presupposed by a new
present, we need to speak of the past that never was present, namely ‘pure past.’ In this
synthesis, a present moment is only a dimension of the past, more precisely, a contraction of
the entire past that coexists with it (DR 82/112). The past, in this sense, is the ground
(fondement) of time.
When Deleuze questions the being of pure past as a condition or ground of time in
the section “Inadequacy of memory: the third synthesis of time” (DR 87/118), he seems to
reveal how the indebted gets stranded in the past. Specifically, he accounts for a certain
temporal structure, i.e., the relation of the present to the past that the debtor is subjected to.
As noted earlier, in the second synthesis a present moment is considered as the most
contracted state of the entire past. Does this mean that the present is a mere repetition of the
past? According to Deleuze, each present contracts the entire past as a coexisting totality,
but at a different level or degree: “[F]reedom lies in choosing levels” (DR 83/113). There
are two kinds of repetition in terms of which the present can be thought in relation to the
past: the bare and the clothed repetition. The former concerns a repetition of independent
instants reappearing at different times, and the latter a repetition of the Whole on the
various coexisting levels. The clothed repetition can be called a repetition of difference; it is
a repetition of the pure past understood as the open whole that can be repeated or
contracted differently in each present moment. Bare repetition, however, concerns a return
of the same. As in Plato’s doctrine of reminiscence, it is the replaying of past events. The
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pure past here is reduced to ‘a mythical present’ in the sense that it can be brought back to
the mind by recovering what we have forgotten. Pure past, understood as such, puts time in
a circular form (DR 88/119).
I believe it is this bare repetition of the past that constitutes the present for the
indebted. Once the subjectification through debt is transformed into subjection to power,
that is, one’s mental reality is taken over by the dominant reality, the fact of indebtedness
functions as a pure past that overshadows the present. Pure past loses its original meaning as
virtual coexistence that produces difference in each new repetition, but instead introduces a
circle of time to the debtor – the circle that ties any present moment back to a particular
event in the past. The debtor’s conscience brings back the memory of her promise to pay
back and replay it incessantly in her mind. In short, the indebted is deprived of the freedom
to choose at which level he would repeat the past. If we see the condition of indebtedness as
a limit to the freedom to choose levels, we could say that the indebted are trapped in
repeating a particular level of contraction in the whole. This level, the fact of indebtedness,
would be empirically represented as a former present in the active synthesis of memory, but
at the same time, it constitutes the ‘ever-increasing coexistence of levels’ within passive
synthesis as it is actualized repeatedly in a present present.
One might argue that the structure of time that the passive syntheses introduce is
purely ontological, thus it is not subject to the historical condition of capitalism. It is true
that the originality of Deleuze’s account of the syntheses lies in the insubordination of time to
the subject; time is, rather, constitutive of the subject. However, it is my contention that our
understanding of the structure of time as a condition for the subject formation would be
limited if Deleuze’s passive synthesis is understood independently of the social and
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historical context. As previously shown, the ‘doubling’ of the present and the past that take
a central place in his account of temporal synthesis extends in his later works to the sociopolitical process of subjectification. More straightforwardly, we see already in Difference and
Repetition examples of repetition that engage in historical events. Regarding the two kinds of
repetition discussed above, Deleuze gives the example of Marx’s theory of historical
repetition (DR 90-92/121-123) – the Revolution of 1789 and the Romans. Here he
emphasizes the difference between the clothed repetition of the historical condition under
which a past that was never present (‘the new’) appears, and the bare repetition of a
historical fact which concerns only empirical correspondences between two presents – a
present present and a former present. This seems to suggest the possibility of conceiving ‘the
virtual coexistence of the whole’ as the social and historical condition rather than as a
purely ontological structure.
Understanding the temporal structure of the historical condition as ‘the
transcendental’ does not necessarily imply that its psychological manifestations would be
same in all of its empirical subjects. As a historical condition, capitalism subjectivates in a
number of different ways. I am articulating a specific mode of subjectification here, the
subjectification through debt. I have emphasized that there is a temporal structure of debt
that determines the present’s relation to the past in a particular way and demonstrated this
structure with the idea of bare repetition in the second synthesis describes the dominance of
the past as a characteristic of the indebted.
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3.2 Temporality of ‘no longer’: Failed synthesis of the future
Let us now proceed to the third synthesis that constitutes time as future. Here we will
see the contrast between the synthesis of the future as a time liberated from movement and
the melancholic temporality subordinated to the movement of capital. We saw earlier that
the third synthesis concerns an act that supersedes both the condition (past) and the agent
(present). In relation to the present as the foundation (fondation) of time and the past as the
ground (fondement), Deleuze calls the synthesis of the future ‘ungrounding (effondement) or
groundless (sans-fond).’ Recall that the three stages of the process of ungrounding: (1) The
‘before’: a time at which the imagined act is supposed ‘too big for me,’ which determines the
a priori past, the before. (2) The ‘during’: The second time is the present of metamorphosis
or a doubling of the self to become equal to the act. (3) The ‘after’: In the third time where
future appears, the act becomes coherent, leaving the self ‘fractured’ (DR 89/120-121).
We have seen that Deleuze develops the idea of the doubling within the subject in
reference to Kant’s notion of time. Kant discusses the problem of the split between ‘the I’
and the self by defining time as an empty form. Kant observed that there is a split between
‘the I’ as a thinking subject and ‘the I’ as an object that is thought’ when we try to intuit
ourselves: ‘the I’ can be given to me only as I appear to myself, rather than as I am in itself
(CPR, B156). According to Kant, we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected by
ourselves, that is, by the affection of a passive self. It is under the form of time that we affect
ourselves. From Kant’s notion of time as a form of auto-affection, Deleuze derives the idea
that ‘[t]ime signifies a fault or a fracture in the I (Je) and a passivity in the self (moi)’ (DR
86). The three moments above are translated into Kant’s terms as a synthesis of the active I
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and the passive self: (1) the I, conditioned by the past, (2) the doubling of the self and the I
in the present, and (3) the self, going beyond the condition, that becomes unequal to the I.
But if this temporal synthesis concerns the fracture, why is it called a synthesis? What
does it synthesize? We have noted that the third synthesis differs from the first two, in that it
concerns the relationship between the two precedent syntheses. The three moments
aforementioned express this relation. The first moment concerns the virtual, passive self,
(memory), where the action is beyond (‘too big for’) the subject. In the second moment, the
actual, active I in the present attempts to bring the passive self under its unity (‘becoming
equal to the action’). In the third moment only the act remains coherent and both the active
I and the passive self dissolve in the failed attempt to unify. The subject becomes an ‘Other’
by transcending itself. Whatever was synthesized by habit and memory are loosened in this
synthesis. The act divides the before and the after, and ‘the I’ and the self into two unequal
parts. To state simply, the third synthesis shows the fracture in time through which the
subject in the present becomes capable of an act that exceeds its past condition.
For Deleuze, time as auto-affection is a form, in the sense that it is no longer
subordinate to movement or to a substance to which the movement is attributed. It is not
simply the a prioiri form of intuition that expresses the interiority of time in the mind, but
“the most radical form of change” (DR 89/120) that concerns the constitution of the mind
itself. Understood as such, time goes beyond the time of the subject, since it is the form
through with the subject is determined in the self-affection: Time is “the formal possibility”
of the affection by oneself.232 If phenomenological inquiries into temporality as ‘lived time’

“If the I determines our existence as a passive self changing in time, time is the formal relation through
which the mind affects itself, or the way we are internally affected by ourselves. Time can thus be defined as
the Affect of the self by itself, or at least as the formal possibility of being affected by oneself” (Deleuze, Essays
232

177

pushed the limit of what we called ‘substance-based’ notion of time, Deleuze’s challenges
the very notion of unity of the subject. The doubling or the fracture forms ‘the essential
structure of subjectivity.’
But what about the future does this synthesis illuminate? Since Deleuze explains the
future as a formal possibility, the synthesis does not concern what will happen, or what is
supposed to happen in time. Rather, it concerns the very structure of time that institutes the
fracture in the subject. The ontological structure of time itself that bifurcates between the
present and the past constitutes the doubling in every being, which the subject is only a
product of. In Deleuze, we do not begin with the subject that unfolds in time or the
consciousness constituting the intentional object of phenomenological experience. Instead
we begin with an impersonal force of repetition that contracts different elements and
synthesize them as what we call ‘the subject.’ By showing the primordial time structure prior
to the subject, the third synthesis reminds us what the subject is in the first place: the fracture
as the un-conditioning condition that returns every moment.
The transition from the synthesis of the past to that of the future describes the
necessary split in the subject between the fractured I and the self by the force of time. The
subject is constituted in the genuine sense of the ‘open’ future only in its becoming capable
of the act – the act of transgression, in Derrida’s term – beyond the condition. Now, let us
consider a concrete model of subjectification. I argue that in the subjectification through
debt, the transition from the second to the third is hardly present, thus the third synthesis of
the future fails. Under the time subordinated to the movement of capital, it is the debtor’s
conscience that results in a split between ‘the I’ as the inescapable condition and the self as
Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997) 31, emphasis added).
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the incapable agent. In this failed synthesis, future no longer opens up and the subject falls
back into the circle of the past that never disappears. However, the sense of ‘failure’ here
needs clarification. It has to be noted that the third synthesis is already a failed synthesis,
insofar as the synthesis concerns unity. Thus when I say the failure of the third synthesis in
the indebted, I do not mean a failure in the synthetic unity of the subject, but a failure to
achieve ‘the fracture’ in the subject. Debt as a social relation institutes a temporal structure
that prohibits the un-grounding of the ground (the past) of the subject. What the indebted is
unable to achieve is not a future considered as a projection (or prolongation) of the present
that the active I has a control over, but a future that allows the subject the formal possibility
of a radical break from itself. The problem with the temporality of debt lies in the fact that it
produces an all too well-grounded, well-unified form of the subject: the persistence of
Memory.
We discussed the implications of the fracture in the subject in ontological terms, i.e.
the production of novelty, or Forgetting as the ontological renewability. However,
articulating the future as ‘the open’ or ‘the new’ seems too vague and general to elucidate its
failure in the subjectification through debt. Not having a completely open future is not
specific enough to define the temporality of the indebted. Given the intersections between
the two accounts of subjectification we have examined thus far, it is important to consider
how ‘the production of novelty’ in the temporal account of subject formation can be
translated into the political subjectification through power. As the second synthesis
deformed as bare repetition, the failure of the synthesis of the future demonstrates how the
temporality of debt transforms the subjectification into the subjection of power. As stated
earlier, the relation of the present with the past as a virtual coexistence concerns the
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question of freedom – ‘To what extent the present repeats the past’ – and the third synthesis
defines the condition of freedom in terms of the fracture in the subject. The formal
possibility of the affection of the self, allowing the subject to exceed its own condition, can
be translated into the formal possibility of freedom in the socio-political subjectification.
Therefore, the failure of the third synthesis does not simply express the failure of the ‘open’
future as a mere ideal, but of the concrete possibility of political and economic freedom.
Some might argue that debt, in fact, enables the possibilities of the future, for those
who are deprived of self-generating financial capital. There is perhaps some truth to that
claim. It is through debt that what is not readily available becomes something achievable; it
is through student loan that I can get my education. It is through mortgage loan that I can
live in a house that does not belong to me. It is through my credit card debt that I can get
medical treatment that I cannot afford at the moment. However, it is also through debt that
we buy into the idea that education, housing and health care are what we are supposed to
earn in exchange of our ‘open’ future, rather than what we have rights to have. It is through
debt that the subject is put into a battle with herself. Once indebted, the subjects must take
the responsibility solely for themselves despite the fact that debt was built into the system as
a general, necessary condition. It is through debt that even “the most disadvantaged creature
[by the system]” (AO 229/275) voluntarily submits herself to the system.
Where then does the future lie in this time subordinated to capital? I believe that it is
now capital itself, no longer subordinated to the movement of commodities that replaces
time’s creative force to self-differentiate: the productive force of time is manifested in
financial capital in its self-generation. This idea of capital as a logic of time resonates with
what Deleuze and Alliez call ‘abstract time’ of capital. In his conversation with Alliez at the
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1984 seminar, Deleuze defines the abstract time as (1) a uniform, homogenous time that
forms a straight line, and (2) a time abstracted from movement.233 ‘Homogenous time’ and
‘time as a straight line’ normally do not belong together in Deleuze’s account of time, since
the former indicates ‘spatialized,’ quantified time that is secondary to movement, whereas
the latter concerns time that produces difference, liberated from movement.234 But here, the
two seemingly contradicting terms come together to define the ‘abstract’ time of capital that
is productive despite being quantitative – a time subordinated to the ‘aberrant movement’ of
capital that produces difference, but only quantitative difference. In their discussion of
abstract time, Alliez and Deleuze refer to the transition from the C-M-C’ to the M-C-M’ and
the M-M’. The M-C-M’ is an unequal or dissymmetrical exchange of money for more
money that puts an end to a circular economic movement of commodity exchange. Then
the straight line of the M-M’-M’’ circuit conveys the liberation of time with respect to the
movement of exchange. Deleuze notes that the production of novelty belongs to the realm
of capital: “Through what time perpetually produces something new? More money. Ever
more money.”235 In Alliez’s terms, the transition can be understood as the development of
three different figures of time: movement-time (temps-mouvement), abstract time (temps
abstrait), and power-time (temps -puissance). The emergence of capital renders time abstract,
independent of movement of commodity exchanges. As the capital begins to self-

La voix de Gilles Deleuze, Vérité et temps, February 7, 1984.
In our discussion of multiplicities in Chapter I, the homogeneous character was attributed to space, as a
homogeneous and quantitative multiplicity. Thus homogeneous time would be adequate to describe a
‘spatialized’ time – or, time subordinated to the spatial understanding of movement. In contrast, the image of a
straight line was used to describe Deleuze’s idea of time as a force to produce difference in its selfdifferentiation, opposed to repetition that forms a circular image of time. This time as a straight line, liberated
from movement, was what defined the third synthesis of the future.
235 Ibid. See also C2, 77-78/104; “If it is true that movement maintains a set of exchanges or an equivalence, a
symmetry as an invariant, time is by nature the conspiracy of unequal change or the impossibility of an
equivalence. It is in this sense that it is money: in Marx’s two formulations, C-M-C is that of equivalence, but
M-C-M is that of impossible equivalence or tricked, dissymmetrical exchange.”
233
234
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differentiate in the circulation of credit money, time gains a ‘machinic power.’236 Hence,
power-time. In his book Capital Times, Alliez draws a more explicit link between the time of
capital and the third synthesis:
If money bears within itself an ineffaceable debit, it is because time, converted into
the money form, is discovered as an empty form, a pure order of time, quantitative
and differential, measurable and coinable, which nothing can come to fill.237
As Alliez points out, the capitalist universe emerges by conquering time. And this conquest
culminates in the process of temporal subjectification. When subordinated to the movement
of capital, the power of time to produce novelty serves capital’s reproduction. Under the
time of capital the subjectification as temporal syntheses is restricted, and take the form of
the subjection to a rigid temporal structure.
3.3. Capital and the inhibition of becoming: Debt as the ‘memory of the future’
For Deleuze, time is the self-differentiation of virtual, ontological memory. The
virtual memory, or ‘time as a whole’ is repeated in each present moment, but never as the
same. The subject is constituted as the product of the temporal syntheses in that it is always
in the process of being determined by the relations of the present state of the self (the actual)
to the past and the future selves (the virtual), which always exceed one’s individual
consciousness. The distinction Deleuze draws between two kinds of memory is thus crucial
in subjectification. The empirical memory relative to consciousness is opposed to forgetting,
whereas virtual Memory, or absolute memory is with Forgetting. In Deleuze’s passive
syntheses, the latter concerns the condition for the possibility of the future, or the
ontological renewability of the subject.

Éric Alliez, Les séminaires de Félix Guattari, Trois figures du temps, December 13, 1983.
Éric Alliez, Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time, trans. George van den Abbeele (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 13.
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Now, consider the role of Forgetting as the possibility of the future in relation to the
subjectification process through debt. Let us remind that for the debtor-creditor relationship
to be established, memory as the ability to make promises is required. As we noted earlier,
this is a particular kind of memory – it is not a simple remembrance of a past event, but the
one straining toward the future. Deleuze calls it the “commitment to the future and memory
of the future itself,” (NP 134/209) which is against our natural forgetfulness. It is the
memory in the sense of a ‘persistent awareness’ of the condition of indebtedness.
‘The remembrance of the future (souvenir du futur)’ inscribed on the debtor’s
conscience should be distinguished from ‘the memory of the future (la mémoire du futur)’ that
Deleuze relates to ‘absolute memory’ in his book on Foucault.238 The French word ‘souvenir’
indicates an individual memory or recollection, whereas ‘mémoire’ refers to the faculty of
memory, or the entirety of what can be recalled by it, part of which is souvenir.239 The former
binds the debtor’s future to the past promise, in determining the future as a repetition of the
past, and as a reliving of the memory. The latter indicates the force of time (Forgetting) that
pushes the subject beyond the determinations of the ‘I’ in the present and beyond the
ossified memories; the ‘different repetition’ of virtual memory in every moment forms the
very condition of the future. Deleuze is very clear on this point when he says, with regard to
the doubling in subjectification, “[i]t is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of
the Different” (F 98/105). If the former concerns subordination, where the fact of
indebtedness overshadows the debtor’s decisions for the future, the latter relates to
subjectification as the ‘doubling’ of the present and the virtual memory, or “the formation of
See F 107/114
We may recall here the Bergsonian distinction between memory-images and pure memory that we
discussed earlier. In his example of our experience of learning a lesson by heart, Bergson says “At this precise
moment, I know my lesson by heart; some say that it has become a memory (souvenir), that it is imprinted on
my memory (mémoire) (MM 79).
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the self through techniques of living, not of repression through prohibition and law.”240 The
memory of the future as subordination instigates a melancholic temporalization of the
subject, characterized as the inability to forget and the inhibition of becoming.
This is, of course, not to say that any promise or commitment to the future produces
one as a melancholic subject. As emphasized earlier, subjectification is supposed to occur
between dominant reality and mental reality, between the past (Memory) and the future
(Forgetting), and between subordination and freedom. What we observe here in the
production of indebted subjects is the transformation of subjectification into subjection,
where the condition of indebtedness becomes one’s dominant reality. What I have tried to
demonstrate is how debt goes beyond financial obligation and operates as a technique of
control without any apparent spatial confinement, that is, by imposing an anomalous
temporal structure. With an emphasis on the moralization of debt, I saw the temporality of
indebtedness as essentially melancholic, however, it could well be described in terms of
other affects, such as anxiety, shame or fear.
Lastly, it is perhaps worth considering the temporality of the melancholic in
comparison with that of the schizophrenic to see how capital replaces time’s force to
produce difference, especially given that Deleuze and Guattari describe the logic of
capitalism with the model of schizophrenia. In their critique of the normalizing tendency of
Freudian treatment, they note that schizophrenia cannot be explained by a fundamental
lack – the Oedipus complex. The schizophrenic, having no center or unified identity as a
subject, is incapable of experiencing lack. They contend that capitalism is comparable to
schizophrenia as it continues to escape its immanent limit by pushing itself beyond it, and
Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New
York: The New Press, 1997), 87-92, 89.
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thus it can insert itself into any cultural, economic, and social system. Interestingly, the
temporality of the schizophrenic, due to its ‘de-centeredness,’ is defined by an inability to
experience continuity or by being in a passing present. If monetary flows form
“schizophrenic realities” as Deleuze and Guattari claim (AO 246/296), the temporal logic
of capital would also be marked by a perpetual present in its self-generation. As Fredric
Jameson puts it, this present is “a disengagement from the shackles of the past (the family
and, in particular, Freud’s conception of the Oedipus complex) as well as from those of the
future (the routine of the labor process under capitalism).”241 If the schizophrenic
temporality, characterized as a ‘perpetual present,’ effectively describes the temporal logic of
capital, we may say that melancholic subjectivity is seen as a failed synchronization with the
schizophrenic movement of capital. Time subordinated to monetary movement constitutes
the present in capital, rather than in the subject: Capital becomes capable of taking itself
beyond the condition and produces the new, while the melancholic subject recedes into the
past.

In this chapter, we have looked at the account of subjectification, shown in Deleuze’s
solo works and in his collaboration with Guattari. In order to develop a Deleuzian theory of
subject formation under financial capitalism, I have attempted to identify the temporal logic
of capital and its workings in the new form of social subordination, the debtor-creditor
relation. In his critique of time subordinated to movement, Deleuze proposes a notion of
time that is not attributed to individual substances, a time that produces qualitative
difference in its self-differentiation. Yet we have seen that time in the circulation of financial
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capital serves as that which generates quantitative difference in monetary value. Thus I
claimed that the productive force of time is replaced by capital in its self-generation. Time,
subordinated to capital, only results in the asymmetry between the accumulation of capital
on the one side, and the multiplication of debt on the other. By analyzing the case of the
indebted, I have established a model of subjectivity produced by internalizing the externally
imposed temporal structure. From the moralization of debt arises the feeling of guilt, which
shapes the temporal experience of the indebted. I have shown that for the indebted, deprived
of financial capital that generates itself over time, time is no longer constituted as future, but
only as a dominant past. Based on the essential function of guilty conscience in the
constitution of ‘the I’ that is found both in melancholia and indebtedness, I called the
subject produced through debt a melancholic subjectivity.

186

Conclusion: Financial Melancholia
The main claim of this dissertation is that financial capitalism as a debt-based economy
produces a melancholic subjectivity, by imposing on its subjects a certain structure of time. I
have supported this claim, using Deleuze’s theory of time and his account of subject
formation. Deleuze’s passive synthesis of time presents time as a constitutive of the subject
rather than a subjective form of time, thus explains how the subject can be passively
produced by time. He also provides an account of the subject formation through capital, the
process that he calls, ‘subjectification.’ Specifically, this inquiry consisted of the three main
tasks: (1) a critical role of temporality in the formation of the subject, (2) a specific
temporality characteristic of contemporary financial capitalism, and (3) the pathologies of
time found in the subjects of capitalism.
First we have examined the relationship between time and subjectivity.
We began with Deleuze’s claim that time was traditionally understood in terms of
movement. Following Bergson, Deleuze presents a critique of ‘time subordinated to
movement’ and suggests that we reconceive time as a self-differentiation. Instead of thinking
time based on individual substances, Deleuze suggests that we think of it as ‘a whole’ that
goes through qualitative change, which individual substances are only the manifestations of.
Such a whole is ‘the open,’ as it becomes something other than itself in its qualitative
change. Since the whole has nothing external to it, the only movement observed in it would
be the movement of ‘self-differentiation.’ We saw that time, in this sense, is a vehicle for the
production of difference, through which any substance – including the subject – is produced.
Having shown that Deleuze develops his notion of time by synthesizing Bergson’s concept
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of duration and Kant’s auto-affection, I argued that Deleuze’s critique of traditional theories
of time was to reconceive the relation between time and the subject.
Having established the notion of the subject as a temporal production instead of a
substance that survives changes, we moved on to Deleuze’s account for the production of
the subjectivity in time. In our analysis of Deleuze’s passive syntheses of time, we saw how
time functions as a structure in the process of subject formation. I focused specifically on
Deleuze’s treatment of memory, which he claims to be central in the temporal process of
subjectification. While examining how the present relates to the past and to the future in the
subject, I claimed that the concept of ‘Memory’ (or pure past) that Deleuze develops from
Bergson’s theory of virtual memory, and his take on the Nietzschean concept of ‘Forgetting’
each plays a crucial role. We saw that the present is produced by a temporal synthesis; if the
ontological Memory represents a repetition of the entire past coexisting with the present,
Forgetting makes this repetition as a repetition of the different. The subject is a product of
certain temporal relations, with differing degrees of repetition and novelty. By means of
understanding the production of subjectivity through the Memory-Forgetting, Deleuze
reconstructs Kant’s empirical-transcendental relation through the actual-virtual schema.
Then we examined the relationship between time and subjectivity in a specific socioeconomic system, financial capitalism. We explored in the ways in which time is
subordinated to monetary movement, especially the movement of interest-bearing capital.
Unlike the monetary circulation for commodity exchange that is a finite transaction, the
self-expanding movement of financial capital is potentially limitless. With the selfgenerating capital, time expresses its power via so-called ‘inherent monetary value,’ that
concerns a production of quantitative difference. Capital’s self-generation over time results
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in the asymmetry between the creditor and the debtor. We also saw that the promise the
debtor makes requires memory, memory as a function of the future. In our analysis of
Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s notion of subjectification, we saw how the temporal
relations in Memory/ Forgetting and the sociopolitical relations of power intersect. I
demonstrated how indebtedness becomes a point of subjectification par excellence under
capitalism, while it engages both aspects of the subject formation process. By instituting the
promise, the memory of the future, the condition of indebtedness inhibits one from certain
possibilities of the future, or becoming. With the moralization of debt that generates guilt, the
indebted turns against herself and. Based on the psychopathological analyses of melancholia
that suggest the dominance of the past and the inability to forget as its defining
characteristics, I claimed that the subjectification through debt as a principally temporal
process produces melancholic subjectivity.
Deleuze once said that his last book was going to be called, La Grandeur de Marx [The
Grandeur of Marx].242 Unfortunately the book was never completed, but as Éric Alliez says,
“we can take comfort from the possibility of thinking that this virtual Marx, this
philosophically clean-shaven Marx that Deleuze alludes to in the opening pages of Difference
and Repetition.”243 In his remarks on the creative utilization of the history of philosophy,
Deleuze says that we should be able to “recount a real book of past philosophy as if it were
an imaginary and feigned book” (DR, xxi/4). This dissertation, as a version of Deleuze’s
unwritten story of Marx, illustrates one of the many virtual Marxs. It presents, in analyzing
Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Marx through Brunhoff, the contemporary relevance of
“Le ‘Je me souviens’ de Gilles Deleuze,” interview with Didier Eribon Le Nouvel Observateur No. 1619
(1995): 50-51. 51.
243 Éric Alliez, “Questionnaire on Deleuze,” Theory, Culture and Society 14(2)(1997): 81–87, 81
242
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Marx’s theory of money, while problematizing the system of debt/credit in the current form
of capitalism.
This imaginary book of Deleuze’s Marx also explores the possibility of developing a
coherent theory of subject formation in time in Deleuze’s work, by putting his early writings
on time and his later works created with Guattari on capitalism in conversation with one
another. In doing so, it goes beyond Deleuze’s description of capitalism, in that it analyzes
the problem of debt in its effect on the dominant temporality of one’s lived experience. We
suggested melancholia as a model for the pathological form of temporal experience, found
in the indebted subjects.
The kinship between melancholia and subject formation established in our study of
financial melancholia should point us beyond the economic realm. The affective aspect of
subjectification can be further developed in various directions. My future research shall
advance the idea of melancholic subjectification specifically in the formation of a gendered,
racialized subjectivity. I hope to theorize the affective process of racial assimilation in the
United States. Assimilation as the internalization of power, or a ‘voluntary’ subjection to
power, involves a denial of the self and the sense of ‘unfitting’ that creates a feeling of shame
and guilt. The loss of the self in the mechanisms of racial subjectification seems to suggest
that it can be an inherently melancholic process.
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